ASSESSMENT OF CHALLENGES TO INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT PEACE MEDIATION IN SOUTH SUDAN:

A CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT (2011 - 2016)

BY

WATERA RACHEAL

2015/FEB/M.IRD/M20508/WKD

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD
OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY
OF NKUMBA UNIVERSITY

OCTOBER, 2018

DECLARATION

I, WATERA RACHEAL, hereby declare to the Academic Board of Nkumba University that this research dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted or presented to any University or Higher Institution of learning and any reference to the work of others, acknowledgement has been made. Further, any errors or omissions are solely my own.

Signed................................... Date: 13 /oct /2018

WATERA RACHEAL

2015/FEB/M.IRD/M20508/WKD

(STUDENT)

This dissertation entitled **"ASSESSMENT OF CHALLENGES TO INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT PEACE MEDIATION IN SOUTH SUDAN:A CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT",** is now ready for submission to the academic board of Nkumba University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of a Master's Degree in International Relations and Diplomacy of Nkumba University.

Signature.. Date: ....17/10/18..............

MR. GEORGE MUGISHA BARENZI

(SUPERVISOR)

DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my beloved aunt, the late Modesta Mushikoma and uncle, the late Timothy Kivuunike Kadaga who cherished education and made me able to reach this far, may your souls rest in peace.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I extend my deepest gratitude to the almighty God who has given life, wisdom and also enabled me reach this far.

My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisor **Mr. George Mugisha Barenzi** for his effective supervision, guidance and encouragement that has enabled me to complete this Dissertation Report. I also thank all my lectures who were always willing and ready to be consulted.

I greatly appreciate the unconditional support of my family and friends. In a special way I thank my mother for the unconditional love, trust, encouragement, financial support and advise she always gives me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4.5: Objective Two: To assess the challenges to IGAD mediation capacity in South Sudan

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACSS   : Agreement on the Resolution on the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan

AMISON   : African Mission in Somalia

AMU   : Arab Maghreb Union

AU   : African Union

AUSC   : African Union peace and Security Council

CEWARN   : Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

COMESA   : Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CPA   : Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPMR   : Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution

DART   : Disaster Assistance Response Team

DRC   : Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC   : East African Community

ECOWAS   : Economic Community of West African States

EDF   : European Development Fund

EU   : European Union

FGD   : Focus Group Discussions

GDP   : Gross Domestic Product

GoS   : Government of Sudan

GoSS   : Government of South Sudan

HoA   : Horn of Africa

HRW   : Human Rights Watch

ICG   : International Crisis Group

IDPs   : Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD   : Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGADD   : Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development

IPF   : Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Partner Forum

LRA   : Lord's Resistance Army

MFAs   : Ministries of foreign affairs

MVM   : Monitoring and Verification Mechanism

NCA   : Norwegian Church Aid

NGOs   : Non-Governmental Organisations

NRA   : Norwegian Refuge Council

NPA   : Norwegian people's Aid

OFDA   : Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PLCC   : Pearson's Correlation Coefficient

PSC   : Peace and Security Council

RECS   : Regional Economic Communities

RMT   : Response Management Team

RoSS   : Republic of South Sudan

SADC   : South African Development Community

SOFA   : Standard Force Agreement

SPLA   : Sudanese People's Liberation Army

SPLA/M   : Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement

SPLM   : Sudanese People's Liberation Movement

SPLM-FD   : Sudanese People's Liberation Movement- Former Detainees

SPLMIO   : Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition

SPSS   : Statistical Package for Social Scientists

SSDM/A   : South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army

SSNA   : South Sudan News Agency

SSPC   : South Sudan Protection Cluster

TSU   : Transitional Support Unit

UN   : United Nations

UNHCR   : United Nations High Commission Refugees

UNHQ   : United Nations Head Quarters

UNMISS   : United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNOSOM II : United Nations Operation in Somalia II

UNSC   : United Nations Security Council

UPDF   : Uganda People's Defense Force

USA   : United States of America

USSR   : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UNISFA   : United Nation Interim Security Force for Abeyi

DEFINITIONS OF OPERATIONAL / KEY TERMS USED

Assessment: Assessment is the process in which you make a judgement about a person or situation after thinking carefully about it or the judgement you make. For example, assess the effectiveness or impact something (www.longman.com /dictionaries).

Challenge: challenge is the situation of being faced with something (https: //dictionary Cambridge.org)

Conflict Resolution: Fetherston (1994) the non-coercive application of negotiation and mediation measures by third parties, with the goal to disarm hostilities among adversaries and to support a lasting end to violence among them. Conflict resolution is a way for two or more parties to find a peaceful solution to a disagreement among them. Conflict resolution addresses the cause of the conflict and seeks to build new and lasting relationship between hostile groups. Conflict resolution refers to the strategies that aim at enabling two or more parties that have a disagreement to find peaceful solution to the problem.

Conflict: conflict is a struggle, between individuals or collectivities, or even values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values over those of others" (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999).

IGAD: IGAD stands for Intergovernmental Authority on Development. This organization was founded in 1986 by the following countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, with a focus on development and environmental control. Its mission was revised and upgraded in 1996 to address issues of severe drought and development in the region. In addition, IGAD's mission expanded to coordinate and balance policies in the areas of socio-economic, agricultural development, environmental protection, and political and humanitarian affairs. The creation of IGAD was viewed positively in the region. Eritrea became independent and joined the group in 1993 and South Sudan joined the union and became the eighth member of IGAD in 2011, after celebrating its independence (kuekjohn@yahoo.com).

Mandate: Mandate is an official order or commission to do something. It's an authority to carry out a policy/course of action or to give someone authority to act in a certain way (www.Oxford dictionaries.com).

Mediation: Mediation is derived from the Latin word *mediare* that means to be in the middle. Nathan (2009:2) defines Mediation as "a process of dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists two or more disputant parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict without resort to force." Mediation is differentiated from other forms of third-party intervention, primarily due to the fact that it is not premised on force and that the parties maintain a certain degree of ownership over the outcome of the peacemaking process (Herrberg, Gunduz and Davis, 2009).

Negotiation: Hoffman and Peter (1986) defined negotiation as a method by which people settle differences. It is a process by which compromise or agreement is reached while avoiding argument and dispute. In any disagreement, individuals understandably aim to achieve the best possible outcome for their position or perhaps an organisation they represent.

Peace mediation: Peace mediation is a term that covers a range of instruments used to deal with intra- and inter-state conflicts. It includes mediation, mediation support and mediation-based dialogue processes. Such mediation and dialogue processes can be actively supported by third parties with the relevant mandates and mediation frameworks. States play a key role and often make effective contributions (Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland, 2017).

Peace process: it consists of all the meetings and agreement and negotiations in which people such as politicians are involved when they are trying to arrange peace between countries or groups that are fighting each other. Peace process refers to the mediation efforts conducted to end the South Sudan conflict (dictionary.com).

Peacemaking: Peacemaking is a practical conflict transformation focused upon establishing equitable power relationships robust enough to forestall future conflict often including the establishment of means of agreeing on ethical decisions within a community or among parties that had previously ended in an inappropriate (i.e. violent) response to conflict (https://en.m.wikipedia.org).

South Sudan: South Sudan officially the Republic of South Sudan, is a landlocked country in East-Central Africa that gained its independence from Sudan in 2011. Its current capital is Juba. South Sudan is bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the South west, and the Central African. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan).

ABSTRACT

The study assessed the challenges to IGAD'S mediation capacity in the South Sudan focusing on South Sudan conflict from 2011 – 2016. The study was guided by the following objectives: to analyze factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan, to assess the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)peace mediation in South Sudan and to examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan. The researcher obtained relevant data from 73 respondents out of the total accessible population of 90 respondents. Purposive simple sampling and simple random sampling techniques were used to select respondents. According to the study, majority of the respondents indicated that parties to the conflict and IGAD member states greatly influenced peace mediation process. The study also concluded that IGAD peace mediation was majorly challenged by; regional rivalries and power struggle between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar that made negotiations hard, the off-shoots of fighting groups which hampered negotiations, suspicion, breakdown of peace talks centralization of decision-making at the Heads of State level, and Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators extra. The study finally revealed that endless calls for cessation of hostilities, the use of trade sanctions, Arms embargo and institutionalization of mediation units. The study concluded that despite the challenges, the IGAD peace process for South Sudan has prevented the country from plunging into a war even worse than the one it has endured. The study also recommended continuation of IGAD revitalization process, in-depth conflict analysis extra.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 INTRODUCTON

This chapter contains the background to the study, problem statement, purpose of the study, study objectives, research questions, hypothesis of the study, scope of the study, justification of the study, significance of the study, ethical considerations, anticipated limitations as well as definition of terms used.

1.1 Background to the study

Currently, the international political climate is fraught with unresolved intra and interstate disputes that emanate often from mere suspicion, mistrust, political and economic rivalry as well as competition over territory. Disputes, such as these, if not carefully monitored and resolved peacefully, they may, as they have, lead to armed conflicts – conflicts that would bring, as they have done so, devastating effects not only to the disputants but also to the international community. What can be achieved through peaceful means may not be achieved through wars. Due to unending disputes and conflicts in the world thus need for diplomatic methods in pacific settlement of dispute, these include, mediation, inquiry, negotiation, conciliation, arbitration extra (NaqibIshan, 2008).

1.1.1 Historical background

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development has been mediating the current South Sudan conflict since December 2013. Growing political tensions among key leaders in South Sudan erupted in violence just three years after the country gained independence from Sudan in an internationally supported public referendum (Blanchard, 2014). In January 2014, the mediation process resulted in the signing of two landmark agreements on the cessation of hostilities and the political detainees. However the authority's mediation process faces a number of issues, including the authority's structural problems and lack of leverage to enforce its will on the parties to the conflict (Kasaija, 2015). There are some factors that have limited IGAD's mediation capacity and remain a challenge, that is regional rivalries and power struggles, centralisation of decision-making at the Heads of State level and related lack of institutionalization within IGAD and challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan.

Mediation in the sphere of international relations of states developed actively and was used to maintain peace in Europe until the XX century. (Terris, Lesley and zeev). Mediation is the primary strategy for ending civil wars but it has not been conducted and developed in a professional and systematic way. This has greatly reduced the prospect of successful peace-making in deadly conflicts. Additionally, insufficient attention has been paid to training and nurturing international mediators and there are few opportunities to undergo such training. The pool of proficient senior mediators is therefore small and it is not growing. There has been no systematic effort to evaluate mediation cases, identify lessons, adapt methods accordingly and establish a central repository of know-how Nathan, 2010).Consequently, there has been no accumulation of knowledge and improvement in mediation over time. There is no coherent concept and strategy of mediation in national conflicts. The style of mediation is largely dependent on the personality of the mediator and the habit of repeating what was done previously. Those appointed have been poor mediators and have created confusion and even exacerbated conflicts. International organisations have repeatedly deployed mediators in complex and protracted conflicts without adequate political, technical, administrative and financial support (Nathan, 2010).

The horn of Africa is one of the most volatile and conflict ridden parts of the world. The region continues to be the venue for most interstate and intra state conflict in the post colonial Africa. The African region has experienced many conflicts ranging from the perilous war in Somalia, the Post-election violence in Kenya, the Sierra Leone Conflict, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict, the Genocide in Rwanda the Conflict in Sudan just to name a few. In resolving these conflicts, mediation has been used as a tool for conflict resolution. The commonly used type of mediation in African conflict is regional organization-led mediation processes(Nathan, 2010).

Mediation is a process of dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists two or more disputant parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict without resort to force. The general goal is to enable the parties to reach agreements they find satisfactory. However mediation has suffered from an acute lack of professionalism, expertise and rigour. A comparison with the military is instructive in this regard. Like the conduct of warfare, mediation is complicated, volatile, unpredictable and risky. This sorry state of affairs has given rise to a

number of serious problems: The appointment of high-level mediators has not always taken account of their peacemaking ability and experience (Nathan, 2010).

The African Union (AU) and many of the regional organisations on the continent have a formal mandate to engage in mediation and other forms of peacemaking. This is evident, for example, in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002); the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999); and the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (2001). Despite this formal commitment to mediation and its widespread use in practice, neither the AU nor any of the regional organisations has a dedicated mediation unit and specialist expertise in mediation. Peace initiatives consequently suffer from a chronic lack of skill, capacity and support thus creating a vast gap between the peacemaking mandates of African organisations and their ability to deliver on those mandates (Nathan, 2007)

In Africa, mediation mandates are typically contained in resolutions passed by the United Nations, the African Union or sub-regional bodies that attempt to resolve conflicts. Mediation to resolve a major conflict in Africa is based on a mandate that shapes the process and outcome of peacemaking. This is true of mediations in Burundi, Congo, Kenya, Namibia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and many other countries. (Nathan, 2017). The mediation mandate - which authorises to resolve a conflict - has been largely ignored in academic studies. This is unfortunate because mandates are a vital component of peacemaking. In fact, research confirms that mandates are treated very seriously by mediating organisations and mediators. Mandates often contain demands that have a strong influence on the duration of a conflict and the difficulty of peacemaking. This was the case with the SADC mediation for Madagascar after the coup in 2009 (Nathan, 2017).

Mediation in violent national conflict has long been undertaken by the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and other multilateral organisations. The mediation effort is predicated under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter under which regional organizations can undertake activities in the area of conflict mediation and resolution. Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter states that ―all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered (United Nations (UN), 1945, p. 3) Furthermore, Article 33(1) provides the different diplomatic mechanisms to be employed by concerned parties upon the resolution of conflict among which

include mediation. Additionally, the African Union (AU) following its normative shift from non-interference to non-indifference has advocated the ―peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union such as mediation as indicated by Article 4(e) (African Union (AU), 2000).

1.1.2 Theoretical background
The theoretical background was based on the following theories**;**

Ripeness Theory: Ripeness theory is one of the most influential theories of motivation and conflict resolution in the field today (Coleman et al., 2008). It is William Zartman's theoretical approach to the study of conflict resolution in studies starting from the 1980s. In his opinion, two factors are centrally important for finding a solution by negotiation or mediation to an international conflict, the substance of proposals and timing of efforts. He focuses on the timing of efforts. The ripe moment is described in the dictionary as the juncture in a dispute when the parties are most inclined (perhaps out of exhaustion) to make a settlement and when, therefore, it is best to start a negotiation or force the pace of an existing one (Berridge and James, 2003). Zartman defends that substantive proposals are fruitless until the moment is ripe for parties. Ripeness is a necessary condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated. It must be seized by the parties or by the mediator. The mediator must specify the meaning and evidence of ripeness in order that the conflicting parties can fruitfully start mediation sessions. It is predictive in identifying some elements necessary for the productive initiation of the mediation Mediators should look and search for a ripe moment for the solution during their interactions with the parties even at the peak of hostilities (Zartman, 2000).

Readiness theory: Readiness theory is a revision and elaboration of Zartman's ripeness theory. Readiness theory differs from Ripeness in that it uses variables rather than necessary states and focuses on a single party rather than both parties to a conflict. The Readiness notion is a characteristic of one party reflecting the thinking of its leadership with regard to conflict with the other party and it might vary within a wide scale of conciliatory behaviour. Readiness advances conciliatory behaviour (Pruitt, 2007, 1524-1525). Pruitt argues that his point of view as an extension of ripeness is better able to fit historical cases as well as being more heuristic, with its ability to include more elements of conflict mediation outcomes (2005). For Pruitt, readiness has two components which combine in a multiplicative way: Motivation to end the conflict and

optimism about the outcome of conciliation and negotiation or mediation. From the perspective of one party, there is a sense that the conflict is unwinnable or contains unacceptable costs or risks and/or a pressure exists from powerful third parties such as allies for the motivation. The sense that one is losing creates greater motivation. The existence of both motivation and optimism are compulsory, even in some degree (Pruitt, 2015, 9-10; 2007, 1525).

Bercovitch (1997) theory on peace-making in International Conflict; Bercovitch identifies three factors that contribute to effective mediation. First, parties must be motivated to settle their conflict and seriously committed to mediation. Second, the conflict circumstances must be ripe for intervention. "The existence of a hurting stalemate (e.g. a military setback, a change in power relations, or a failure to impose a unilateral outcome) remains the best benchmark in a conflict for deciding when to initiate mediation." Certainly, the parties must have already tried and failed to negotiate on their own. Third, an appropriate mediator must be available. Bercovitch notes that "there is wide agreement among scholars and practitioners that appropriate mediators should possess intelligence, tact, skills in drafting formal proposals, and a sense of humor, in addition to specific knowledge of the conflict at hand." High rank is associated with mediator effectiveness, as is the use directive strategies. Bercovitch considers methods and standards for evaluating international mediation efforts. Since mediation may pursue many different goals, different sets of criteria will be needed. Subjective criteria assess party satisfaction, perception of fairness, and the quality of the parties' relationship. Objective criteria focus on such elements as reductions in violent behavior, reaching an agreement, and the breadth and endurance of settlements. Both sorts of criteria are important. General assessments must be sensitive to the goals of the mediation and to the complex nature and context of the conflict (Conflict research consortium, 2005).

Principles of mediation: Mediation involves the settlement of a dispute by intervention of a neutral third party which may be an individual or state or organisation. The major aim of this is to contain violence and enable settlement of a dispute. A good mediator should have the following qualities; neutral, objective, good communication skills, personality (intelligent, competent, control, clarity, confident, sense of judgement, trust worthy, and good analyst). The strategic principles of mediation are: mediators should not be partisan (neutral), the parties must consent to mediation and the choice of mediator, conflict cannot be resolved shortly and quickly,

parties must own the settlement, mediators should apply punitive measures, mediation is a specialised activity according to Nathan (1999). Some conditions are necessary for beginning a mediation process whatever the skills of the mediator are. These conditions constitute a set of starting postures that bring the contenders to mediation and continue to influence the course of events and outcome during the mediation process. A broad list of these factors that must be present for mediation from the parties to have a high potential for success (Isenhart and Spangle, 2000, 75-76) is below: A stalemate or crisis situation in which the parties are willing to allow a third party to help them resolve the dispute; Willingness to engage in collaborative discussion on the issues; The interests or goals are interdependent; Voluntary participation and capability to create a mutually agreeable settlement; Willingness to suspend hostilities, threats, and intimidation during the process; Contribution of all parties who effect the dynamics of the conflict; Acceptance of the mediator to all parties. Some scholars suggest a more limited framework on when does the mediation work. Beer and Stief portray five conditions (2007, 7): A resolution, or at least a desire for change; All the important stakeholders come to the table; the contenders are (eventually) able to express the reasons for their discomfort and distress; the mediator is capable to control and sustain the process; Capability of the parties for living up to their promises. Timing is also an important part of mediation and mediating activity. Analysing mediation raises some interests and questions about what the third party can do in a conflict, under what circumstances, and to what effect. Two major paradigms dominate the debate over these issues: The structuralist and the social-psychological paradigms of mediation. The structuralist paradigm is constructed on a basis that through the use of persuasion, incentives, and disincentives (such as costing process), rivals to a conflict can be led to and through a negotiated settlement. This paradigm accepts that the causes of conflicts are objective issues that can yield to negotiation. On the other hand, the social-psychological paradigm of mediation focuses on the processes of communication and exchange as a way to change perceptions and attitudes. According to this paradigm, conflicts reflect subjective, phenomenological, and social fractures and third parties can change the perceptions, attitudes, values and behaviours of the parties to a conflict (Crocker et al., 2003, 22-23).

1.1.3 Conceptual background

The South Sudanese Civil War is an ongoing conflict in South Sudan between forces of the government and opposition forces. In December 2013, President Kiir accused his former

deputy Riek Machar and ten others of attempting a coup d'état. Machar denied trying to start a coup and fled to lead the SPLM – in opposition (SPLM-IO) Fighting broke out between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and SPLM-IO, igniting the civil war. Ugandan troops were deployed to fight alongside the South Sudanese government. The United Nations has peacekeepers in the country as part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). In January 2014 the first ceasefire agreement was reached. Fighting continued and would be followed by several more ceasefire agreements. Negotiations were mediated by "IGAD " (which includes the eight regional nations called the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the African Union, United Nations, China, the EU, USA, UK and Norway). A peace agreement known as the "Compromise Peace Agreement" was signed in August 2015. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SouthSudan).

A challenge is the situation of being faced with something (https: //dictionary Cambridge.org) conflict is a struggle, between individuals or collectivities, or even values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values over those of others" (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999).

IGAD stands for Intergovernmental Authority on Development. This organization was founded in 1986 by the following countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, with a focus on development and environmental control. Its mission was revised and upgraded in 1996 to address issues of severe drought and development in the region. ` Peace mediation: Peace mediation is a term that covers a range of instruments used to deal with intra- and inter-state conflicts. It includes mediation, mediation support and mediation-based dialogue processes. Such mediation and dialogue processes can be actively supported by third parties with the relevant mandates and mediation frameworks. States play a key role and often make effective contributions (Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland, 2017).

Peace process: it consists of all the meetings and agreement and negotiations in which people such as politicians are involved when they are trying to arrange peace between countries or groups that are fighting each other. Peace process refers to the mediation efforts conducted to end the South Sudan conflict (dictionary.com).

1.1.4 Contextual background

IGAD stands for Intergovernmental Authority on Development. This organization was founded in 1986 by the following countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, with a focus on development and environmental control. Its mission was revised and upgraded in 1996 to address issues of severe drought and development in the region. In addition, IGAD's mission expanded to coordinate and balance policies in the areas of socio-economic, agricultural development, environmental protection, and political and humanitarian affairs. The creation of IGAD was viewed positively in the region. Eritrea became independent and joined the group in 1993 and South Sudan joined the union and became the eighth member of IGAD in 2011, after celebrating its independence. Initially, IGAD was viewed as an emerging leader by both the African Union and United Nations (kuekjohn@yahoo.com).

With eight member states, IGAD is the third smallest of the eight RECs recognised by the AU, after the 5- member EAC and AMU (Arab Maghreb Union). IGAD also has the third smallest population, at 236 million people. While in principle, this might facilitate the job of IGAD in promoting regional cooperation, other features of the region clearly mitigate against this. Starting out in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), IGAD widened its scope and mandate with its transformation to IGAD in 1996. This was due to the growing complexities of issues that IGADD surpassed the original scope of IGADD thus needed to expand its mandate. IGAD is therefore a young organisation addressing a widening regional agenda. Varying degrees of success across policy areas underline the need to better understand the drivers and constraints to IGAD's regional role.

South Sudan officially the Republic of South Sudan is a landlocked country in East-Central Africa. Its current capital is Juba, which is also its largest city. South Sudan is bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest, and the Central African. It is rich in oil, but following decades of civil war it is also one of the least developed regions on earth. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan).
 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14019208).

South Sudan that gained its independence from Sudan in July 2011 as the outcome of a 2005 peace deal that ended Africa's longest-running civil war. The world's youngest nation came into existence amid great challenges. Secession from Sudan marked a major milestone and a fresh

opportunity for South Sudanese. The agreement also provided for a referendum in the south on independence in 2011, in which 99% of southern Sudanese voted to split from Sudan. An overwhelming majority of South Sudanese voted in a January 2011 referendum to secede and become Africa's first new country since Eritrea split from Ethiopia in 1993. The young state plunged into crisis in December 2013 amid a power struggle between the president and his deputy whom he had sacked. Fighting between government troops and rebel factions erupted into a conflict that had killed thousands and prompted more than 2.2 million people to flee their homes by the time a tentative internationally-mediated peace agreement was signed in August. (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa).

1.2   Problem Statement

Mediation is used in solving of conflicts however a disconcerting trend in the practice of Mediation in Africa is often limited successes, and sometimes failures, of states and regional organisations in achieving the objectives. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started the peace mediation processes over the current conflict in South Sudan between the two warring factions in December 2013, it has failed to formulate an enforceable ceasefire agreement that will create lasting peace in South Sudan. Apart from the lack of progress in reaching an enforceable settlement, other fault lines have been raised in the mediation process including; the partisanship of IGAD mediators. The continuing violence in South Sudan makes an interesting case for further assessment of the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan.

1.3 General Objective

The study assessed of the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in the South Sudan focusing on South Sudan conflict from 2011 – 2016.

1.4 Study Objectives

The study was guided by the following objectives;

i.   To analyze factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan.

ii.   To assess the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan.

iii.   To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan.

1.5 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions;

i.   What are the factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan?

ii.   What are the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan?

iii.   What are the strategies that can be adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in improving peace mediation process in South Sudan?

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study scope comprised of the geographical scope, content/subject scope, time scope and interviewee scope as showed below;

1.6.1 Geographical scope

Figure 1: Geographical map of South Sudan

South Sudan officially the Republic of South Sudan, is a landlocked country in East-Central Africa that gained its independence from Sudan in 2011. Its current capital is Juba, which is also its largest city. South Sudan is bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the South west, and the Central African. It is rich in oil, but following decades of civil war it is also one of the least developed regions on earth. The location by coordinates is South Sudan lies between latitudes 3° and 13°N, and longitudes 24° and 36°E (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan).

1.6.2 Subject/ content scope

The study focused on assessing barriers to mediation capacity of Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the fulfillment of its peacemaking mandate, a case study of South Sudan conflict (2011 to 2016) or date. The research study made a critical assessment of the challenges to IGAD'S mediation capacity in the Horn of Africa focusing on South Sudan .To effectively achieve this, the study investigated origin and historical underpinnings of the current conflict, the factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process and establish the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan.

1.6.3 Time scope

The study scope covered a period of five years from 2011 to 2016 because it is during this time that Inter-Governmental Authority on Development became more engaged in peace mediation process in South Sudan since the country became independent state; and in the aftermath internal conflicts broke out in 2013. Data collection was taken one month and then a report was expeditiously compiled for examination.

1.7 Purpose of the Study

The study shall enable the researcher to obtain the degree of Masters of International Relations and Diplomacy of Nkumba University.

1.8 Significance of the Study

The study will be of benefit to a number of stake holders, that is;

The IGAD Secretariat: The IGAD head office will utilize the findings to develop a model which can be advanced in future conflict resolution and management among all

member countries and in mitigating future conflicts at national, sub-national peace building initiatives.

The governments of Uganda and South Sudan: The regional governments which have been involved heavily with South Sudan conflicts that is Uganda and South Sudan itself can utilize the findings to come up with a more formidable way of ensuring that similar conflicts can be quickly diffused using early warning mechanisms which could have been ignored when the conflict was breaking out in 2013.

Local Conflict Management Initiatives/ bodies: The findings will be of use to national and local governments who could have conflicts emanating from political, social and economic friction, because it will enable them to come up with lasting solutions to their minor problems drawing inspiration from the reformed more global and mutual security architecture.

Body of researchers: The study findings will add to the fragile body of research with more existential research findings from which both under graduate, and post graduate students as well as projects can draw information for reference in their own pieces of work.

Conclusion

Mediation is the primary strategy for ending civil wars but it has not been conducted and developed in a professional and systematic way. The study was important to undertake because of the vast gap between the peacemaking mandates of African organisations and their ability to deliver on those mandates. Since December 2013 when IGAD started the mediation processes over the conflict in South Sudan between the two warring factions, it has failed to formulate an enforceable ceasefire agreement that will create lasting peace in South Sudan. Apart from the lack of progress in reaching an enforceable settlement, other fault lines have been raised in the mediation process including; the partisanship of IGAD mediators. Therefore this study created awareness about the challenges to IGAD'S peace mediation in the South Sudan focusing on South Sudan conflict and serve as a reference for other researchers, academicians, practitioners, government and non-governmental organizations in future investigation particularly for those who are interested in conflict resolution activities.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the review of literature related to the theme of the study which is about the assessment of the challenges to IGAD'S mediation capacity in the Horn of Africa focusing on South Sudan from 2011 – 2016. This section enables the researcher to identify studies that have been carried out on the Republic of South Sudan whose findings relate somehow to the current theme in order to identify the research gaps that the current study sought to fill. The literature review is aligned to the following subthemes; literature survey; theoretical review of theories; Objective two: To analyze the factors that influence Inter Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan conflict; To assess the challenges to IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan; To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan.

2.1 Literature Survey

Mugo, (2016) did an analysis of mediation as a tool in conflict resolution in Africa: a case study of mediation process in South Sudan between December 2013-march 2015. Ndunge, (2014), also carried out an assessment of IGAD's role in conflict management in South Sudan. Aleu (2015), focused on the impact of external actors on the prospects of a mediated settlement in South Sudan.

From the above Literature Survey, I identified that there were discussion on mediation as a tool in conflict resolution, IGAD's role in conflict management, the impact of external actors on the prospects of a mediated settlement, challenges of IGAD-led peace process of South Sudan but no concentration was given on critical assessment of challenges to mediators ability in conflict resolution thus rationale for this study. The study was also important to undertake because of the vast gap between the peacemaking mandates of African organisations and their ability to deliver on those mandates.

2.2 Theoretical Review of Theories

The purpose of this section is to review of theories on mediation so as to identify the gaps. A review of theory reveals a number of observations.

Ripeness Theory: Ripeness theory William Zartman's theoretical approach to the study of conflict resolution in studies starting from the 1980s. In his opinion, two factors are centrally important for finding a solution by negotiation or mediation to an international conflict, the substance of proposals and timing of efforts. He focuses on the timing of efforts. The ripe moment is described in the dictionary as the juncture in a dispute when the parties are most inclined (perhaps out of exhaustion) to make a settlement and when, therefore, it is best to start a negotiation or force the pace of an existing one (Berridge and James, 2003). Zartman defends that substantive proposals are fruitless until the moment is ripe for parties. Ripeness is a necessary condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated. It must be seized by the parties or by the mediator. The mediator must specify the meaning and evidence of ripeness in order that the conflicting parties can fruitfully start mediation sessions. It is predictive in identifying some elements necessary for the productive initiation of the mediation Mediators should look and search for a ripe moment for the solution during their interactions with the parties even at the peak of hostilities (Zartman, 2000).

Readiness theory: Readiness theory is a revision and elaboration of Zartman's ripeness theory. Readiness theory differs from Ripeness in that it uses variables rather than necessary states and focuses on a single party rather than both parties to a conflict. The Readiness notion is a characteristic of one party reflecting the thinking of its leadership with regard to conflict with the other party and it might vary within a wide scale of conciliatory behaviour. Readiness advances conciliatory behaviour (Pruitt, 2007, 1524-1525). For Pruitt, readiness has two components which combine in a multiplicative way: Motivation to end the conflict and optimism about the outcome of conciliation and negotiation or mediation. From the perspective of one party, there is a sense that the conflict is unwinnable or contains unacceptable costs or risks and/or a pressure exists from powerful third parties such as allies for the motivation. The sense that one is losing creates greater motivation. The existence of both motivation and optimism are compulsory, even in some degree (Pruitt, 2015, 9-10; 2007, 1525).

From the above theories it is worth noting that there is no coherent concept and strategy of mediation in national conflicts. More focus is given to finding a solution by negotiation or mediation to an international conflict. There is also focus on the timing especially ripeness of a conflict but is complex in identifying the right moment for parties.

Bercovitch (1997) theory on peace-making in International Conflict; Bercovitch identifies three factors that contribute to effective mediation. First, parties must be motivated to settle their conflict and seriously committed to mediation. Second, the conflict circumstances must be ripe for intervention. "The existence of a hurting stalemate (e.g. a military setback, a change in power relations, or a failure to impose a unilateral outcome) remains the best benchmark in a conflict for deciding when to initiate mediation." Certainly, the parties must have already tried and failed to negotiate on their own. Third, an appropriate mediator must be available. Bercovitch notes that "there is wide agreement among scholars and practitioners that appropriate mediators should possess intelligence, tact, skills in drafting formal proposals, and a sense of humor, in addition to specific knowledge of the conflict at hand." High rank is associated with mediator effectiveness, as is the use directive strategies. (Conflict research consortium, 2005). From the above, it is really complex to know or easily predict when the conflict is ripe and its main indicators of ripeness. It limits intervention of a third party to the only when parties must have already tried and failed to negotiate on their own. Also assessment of effectiveness of motivation and availability of a mediator can be quite hard.

Theory on the strategic principles of mediation: A good mediator should have the following qualities; neutral, objective, good communication skills, personality (intelligent, competent, control, clarity, confident, sense of judgement, trust worthy, and good analyst). Therefore mediators should not be partisan (neutral), the parties must consent to mediation and the choice of mediator, conflict cannot be resolved shortly and quickly, parties must own the settlement, mediators should apply punitive measures, mediation is a specialised activity according to Nathan (1999). A broad list of these factors that must be present for mediation from the parties to have a high potential for success like a stalemate or crisis situation ,contribution of all parties who effect the dynamics of the conflict; acceptance of the mediator to all parties. Therefore , the style of mediation is largely dependent on the personality of the mediator but it is very had to find a mediator with all the mentioned above qualities.

**2.3 Objective one: To analyze the factors that influence Inter Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan conflict**

2.3.1 Parties to the Conflict

In the 1990s, during Sudan's north-south war, former Vice President Riek Machar was a senior Nuer SPLA commander who, along with others, split from the SPLM/A, citing grievances with the centralized leadership of the SPLM under John Garang, a Dinka, alleged human rights abuses, and disagreements on the objectives of the insurgency against Khartoum. Machar and his allies, who were primarily ethnic Nuer and Shilluk, later allied themselves with the government in Khartoum and briefly held positions in the Sudanese government. Machar's struggle with Garang's forces cost thousands of southern Sudanese lives -Amnesty International estimated that 2,000 civilians, mostly Dinka, were killed in a series of raids referred to as the Bor Massacre by Nuer forces under Machar's command. Abuses against civilians by both sides fueled ethnic hatred and fighting, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile area (now northern Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states) throughout the 1990s. Machar reconciled with the SPLM in the early 2000s and assumed the third-highest post in the leadership structure, after Garang and his deputy, Salva Kiir. After John Garang died in a helicopter crash in 2005, shortly after the signing of the 2005 peace accord, Kiir then became head of the SPLM, with Machar as his deputy (Blanchard, 2014).

Sudan held national elections in 2010, prior to the 2011 referendum on southern independence. As part of the CPA deal, the SPLM had formed a temporary Government of National Unity with Sudan's ruling party. Salva Kiir, as chairman of the SPLM, served as first vice president under Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, and concurrently as president of a then-semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Rather than Kiir running against Bashir in 2010, the SPLM decided to field a northern candidate on their national ticket. Kiir, who by many accounts viewed secession as imminent, instead ran to retain the GoSS presidency, winning the position with almost 93% of the votes cast. As incumbent GoSS president, Kiir retained his post, now as president of the Republic of South Sudan, under a transitional constitution after independence, with Machar remaining his vice president (Blanchard, 2014).

The efforts by senior leaders, often led by Kiir, to seek reconciliation with various armed groups and among communities throughout South Sudan have been ongoing for more than a decade. As

part of these efforts, and out of apparent concern for the country's political stability, Kiir granted amnesty to several individuals who once led rebellions against the SPLM. In addition to Machar, other faction leaders who returned to the party were often incorporated into either the government or the security forces; many brought their forces with them, adding to the government's new challenge of reforming and "right-sizing" the increasingly bloated security sector. Some faction leaders, including Peter Gadet, another Nuer commander who fought against Garang during the war, received senior posts in the SPLA (which now refers to South Sudan's armed forces) (Blanchard, 2014).

August 25, 2015 (Addis-Ababa) the South Sudanese president, Salva Kiir, signed the final peace agreement to end the long civil war against his former deputy, Riek Machar, as announced by IGAD. This sudden change of mind came seven days after the South Sudanese leader refused to sign the final peace agreement on 17 August, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, citing disagreement with many critical provisions in the peace deal. His arch rival and leader of the armed opposition faction of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM-IO), Machar, had signed the final document. Representative of the former detainees, Pagan Amum, who was reinstated in the president Kiir's government as secretary-general of the ruling SPLM party also signed the deal, as well as civil society organizations and representatives of the regional and international bodies and countries (http://www.sudantribune.com, 2015)

President Kiir requested IGAD to allow him to sign the agreement in Juba instead of in Addis Ababa so that he could be able to monitor the situation at home. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda advised president Kiir to sign the peace deal, despite reservations, in order to avoid the looming United Nations sanctions against the government. The opposition faction led by Machar welcomed the decision of president Kiir to sign the peace agreement, but added that signing it in Juba instead of at the venue of the peace talks in Addis Ababa indicated lack of seriousness on the part of the government. (http://www.sudantribune.com, 2015). Therefore the willingness of parties to resolve a conflict makes the mediator's work easier however the delays in signing the agreements also do affects IGAD led peace process.

2.3. 2 Mediation mandates

In the African context mediation mandates are typically contained in resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council, the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council or sub-regional bodies that attempt to resolve specific conflicts. Mediation to resolve a major conflict in Africa is based on a mandate that shapes the process and outcome of peacemaking. This is true of mediations in Burundi, Congo, Kenya, Namibia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and many other countries (Nathan, 2017). Mandates serve several functions. They: Confer legitimacy on mediation; endow the mediator with authority and leverage; provide the mediator with instructions; and Set the parameters of the peacemaking process and outcome. Failure to obtain a strong mandate from the parties can weaken the mediator's authority and credibility. It can also cause domestic and international stakeholders to lose confidence in the mediation, and give rise to rival peacemaking bids. The parties' mandate is essential but it can weaken the mediator's hand because it gives the parties leverage over the mediator. They can withdraw or threaten to withdraw from the mediation if the mediator does not support their positions. To complicate matters further, the UN, the AU and sub-regional bodies sometimes issue inconsistent mediation mandates for the same conflict. Another problem is where member states fail to reach consensus on the mandate. This occurred with the AU in the Libya crisis. It is usually the case that a mediating organisation's mandate is at odds with the mandate of one or more of the conflict parties (Nathan, 2017).

The mediation mandate - which authorises to resolve a conflict - has been largely ignored in academic studies. This is unfortunate because mandates are a vital component of peacemaking. In fact, research confirms that mandates are treated very seriously by mediating organisations and mediators. Mandates often contain demands that have a strong influence on the duration of a conflict and the difficulty of peacemaking. This was the case with the SADC mediation for Madagascar after the coup in 2009. A mandate can also determine whether the mediation process is inclusive. In 2007 for example, SADC mandated Mbeki to facilitate dialogue in Zimbabwe "between the opposition and the government". The process was thus confined to these actors, controversially excluding civil society. By contrast, during the 2013-2015 mediation for South Sudan the Intergovernmental Authority for Development insisted on the inclusion of civil society actors. This mandate ensured that the conflict resolution process was more inclusive than

in Zimbabwe (Nathan, 2017). A mandate is an instruction to the mediator. Mediators who deviate from their mandate risk being replaced. (Nathan, 2017).

2.3.3 IGAD's Mandate

IGAD stands for Intergovernmental Authority on Development. This organization was founded in 1986 by the following countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, with a focus on development and environmental control. Its mission was revised and upgraded in 1996. IGAD's mission expanded to coordinate and balance policies in the areas of socio-economic, agricultural development, environmental protection, and political and humanitarian affairs (kuekjohn@yahoo.com).

Starting out in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), IGAD widened its scope and mandate with its transformation to IGAD in 1996. This was due to the growing complexities of issues that IGADD surpassed the original scope of IGADD thus needed to expand its mandate. IGAD is therefore a young organisation addressing a widening regional agenda. Varying degrees of success across policy areas underline the need to better understand the drivers and constraints to IGAD's regional role (Byiers, 2016).

2.3.4 Nature of mediation

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East Africa regional group that led the peace negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan in the early 2000s, has sought to mediate talks between key leaders in the crisis with the support of the U.N. and the AU. Special envoys from the United States and the European Union are also playing a role. Concurrently, South Sudan's influential church leaders have initiated reconciliation efforts. High-level IGAD engagement has pushed both sides to send negotiation teams to Ethiopia (Blanchard, 2014).

Much of the formal peace process during 2014 and 2015 focused on bringing Kiir and Machar to the negotiating table. Mediation talks were held under the oversight of a regional trade body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in Addis Ababa. The centrality of Kiir and Machar, present on behalf of the two sides they were thought (or hoped) to control, reflected the initial source of the unrest, as divisions within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) party led to violence between rival army factions. As a result, the path to

resolution of the conflict has often been seen as a matter of finding a balance in the sharing of power at the expense of underlying issues.

The IGAD mediation process was notable for its extensive involvement of outside actors. The talks became known as the 'IGAD-Plus' initiative, due to the presence of states beyond the group's East African bloc, with representatives from the so-called 'Troika' group (the US, the UK and Norway, responsible for financing the talks), China, the European Union and the African Union joining. At the time of the signing of the final peace agreement, both parties still held reservations, but were reportedly forced to proceed under pressure from frustrated international partners. Significant regional power dynamics were also evident around the talks. In June 2015, Kenya – seen, along with the Ethiopian hosts, to be vying for control of the process – hosted a parallel meeting between Kiir, Machar and a group of former political detainees. Further parallel meetings were convened in Tanzania, intended to reunify the divided factions within the SPLM. Meanwhile, both Uganda and Sudan, present as IGAD member states, had individual interests in the conflict: Uganda had deployed troops into South Sudan at the request of the government, while in certain areas Sudan was alleged to be providing logistical and intelligence support to the opposition.

2.3.5 IGAD member states

There are eight IGAD member countries. These IGAD Member States include: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda (Bruce Byers, January 2016). In 1986 the countries in the Horn of Africa formed the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). A decade later the body was transformed into IGAD with a mandate to promote peace and stability and create mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. Accordingly, the IGAD Secretariat established a peace and security division and a conflict early warning and response mechanism. In 2003 the IGAD heads of state tasked the Secretariat to develop a comprehensive peace and security strategy. The resultant strategy document had not been approved at the time of writing (Nathan, 2010)

An organization's peacemaking effectiveness depends largely on whether its members want the organization to be effective and on whether they have the political trust and cohesion that are needed to make it effective in the realm of peace and security. The internal and external logic of

regional peacemaking are separate requirements for sustained effectiveness. The external logic, which is captured by liberal institutionalist theory, refers to the interests and objective conditions that make communal peacemaking a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is captured by constructivist theory, refers to the normative congruence among these states that enables them to engage in close political co-operation in order to prevent and end conflict. In the absence of common values, member states are unable to resolve or transcend their major disputes, build trust and cohesion, develop regional policies and act with common purpose in crisis situations. Whereas the external logic provides the motivation for the peacemaking mandate, the internal logic is the glue that allows member states to reach agreement on the mandate and to implement it (Nathan, 2010).

Neighbouring states threatened to impose punitive measures in order to secure a durable peace, South Sudan's warring elites need to begin to feel the consequences of their actions. Negotiations led by the East African Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which includes Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, have so far to yielded an agreement. Although neighbouring states had threatened to impose punitive measures, including asset freezes and travel bans, on individuals obstructing the peace process, deadlines had passed without action. The regional heads of state had met over a half a dozen times to discuss the situation in South Sudan, but these extraordinary summits had done little to stop the violence. Without regionally and globally enforced sanctions on key individuals and credible threat of prosecution for mass atrocities and human rights violations, the civil war looks set to intensify.

Overlapping membership; IGAD as a basis for regional integration, particularly given overlapping membership of multiple Regional Economic Communities (RECs) - all except Somalia are members of other RECs- and common policy areas with COMESA and the EAC in particular. This has an impact on how they related to the issue in study because they fall under multiple Regional Economic Communities.

In terms of impact, Uganda's role in the South Sudanese civil war was second to none. Its military intervention on behalf of Kiir's government and unilateral decisions were a constant strain on the peace process, an x-factor that made an already complicated knot harder to untie. In addition to undermining IGAD's impartiality, the tension between Museveni and what he saw as "junior" partners in Ethiopia and Kenya prevented regional consensus at critical junctures. The

Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) had a long history of regional deployments geared toward political and financial gain, and this appeared to explain at least part of its presence in South Sudan. Though never expressly articulated, observers speculated on Museveni's economic and strategic objectives.. (Vertin, 2018)

Given its historical role as host to the process that yielded Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Kenya's government had likewise hoped to host the new peace talks. When they materialized instead in Ethiopia, Nairobi chafed. The relationship between these two neighbors— sometimes cooperative, sometimes competitive— was defined by latent tension, as was their shared stewardship of the peace process. President Kenyatta tried on several occasions to negotiate his own deal, secretly convening the factions in an attempt to short-circuit the process and score a major diplomatic victory on Kenyan soil. Such attempts were not only unlikely to succeed but undermined the credibility of the official mediation. Financial interests— some state, some individual—also shaded Kenyan engagement. Not only did Kenyan elites own businesses in Juba, but it was widely believed that South Sudanese officials had parked millions of dollars of stolen cash in Kenyan banks and real estate, much of it with the help of local facilitators. When the international community attempted to create leverage by threatening economic sanctions against South Sudan, Kenyan diplomats publicly supported the calls while privately campaigning against them (Vertin, 2018).

Khartoum had a long history of playing Southern Sudanese groups against one another in service of its own interests. So the Sudanese leaders kept a foot in both of South Sudan's warring camps, publicly supporting the government in Juba while privately supplying enough ammunition to keep the opposition afloat. But Sudanese attention was also piqued by Uganda's provocative intervention and the presence of UPDF fighter jets near Sudan's southern border. The two countries had long been ideological adversaries and occasionally engaged proxy groups to destabilize the other. Sudan's Influence; Sudan's constant sabotaging of south Sudan affairs, Sudan embraced Riek Machar's group and constantly funded and provided logistical support to them, this did not end in those years but it's contended that Sudan still got involved by siding with Riek Machar in the recent 2013 conflict in south Sudan something that was so absurd. (Vertin, 2018).

The IGAD chair proved, in comparative terms, to be the most responsible actor in the region, guided both by its desire for stability in a volatile neighborhood and aspirations of regional (and continental) leadership. Its management of the peace process was frustrated, however, by competition with neighbors. Ethiopian officials resented Kenya's parallel initiatives and were deeply frustrated by the adventurism of Ugandan President Museveni and his army. But Ethiopia's mediation effort was also sometimes clouded by preoccupations with its prestige as chair of the regional body and desire to maintain a veneer of IGAD unity despite profound divisions over South Sudan. Occasional friction among senior government personnel also hindered Ethiopia's leadership, as communication gaps and lack of coordination led to mistakes. But any assertions of Ethiopian interests in South Sudan, whether personal or institutional, were negligible in comparison to the other frontline states (Vertin, 2018).

2.4.6 African Union

The continental organization has taken important measures to not only institutionalize mediation but also having Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as key partners in this endeavour. Under the principle of subsidiarity, as defined and elaborated under Article 16 of the AU's Peace and Security (AU PSC), Protocol, RECs are to be part and parcel of the AU's effort to prevent as well as resolve conflict (African Union (AU), 2002). The African Union (AU) and many of the regional organisations on the continent have a formal mandate to engage in mediation and other forms of peacemaking. This is evident, for example, in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002); the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999); and the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (2001).Despite this formal commitment to mediation and its widespread use in practice, neither the AU nor any of the regional organisations has a dedicated mediation unit and specialist expertise in mediation. Peace initiatives consequently suffer from a chronic lack of skill, capacity and support. There is a vast gap between the peacemaking mandates of African organisations and their ability to deliver on those mandates (Nathan, 2007).

As IGAD started to implement its programs with good will, the African Union Peace and Security Council approved an IGAD proposal to deploy a Peace Support Mission in Somalia in September of 2006. IGAD played a role of a policeman in the region, trying to keep peace and support developments in Somalia and the surrounding region. On February 21, 2007, the United

Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1744, which authorized the deployment of a new African Union Mission to Somalia, relieving the IGAD support mission troops.

The proximity gave IGAD the advantage of taking lead on South Sudan mediation, yet the AU maintained a role in the overall ownership of an African problem within the African continental framework. The unspoken arrangement was that IGAD takes the lead in facilitating a political solution through mediation while the AU takes on the issues of providing protective space in international arena while it tackles accountability related matters in nature such as Justice and investigating the alleged atrocities and human rights violations. The responsibility on matters of international peace and security lies on the UNSC, however at the AU continued as part of its complementarity with the UN to play a vital role through its Security Council providing guidance and management of conflict on African conflicts (Garang, 2015).

AU's overall responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa demanded that IGAD reports the progress, hinderers and challenges to the AU Peace and Security Council which it continue to do in implementation to the principle of subsidiarity where RECs play vital roles as building blocks of the AU. The AU in the case of current conflict in South Sudan took lead to investigate the alleged atrocities and violations of human rights. However, its role is complementary as the report was held by the AUSC and not released as leverage on the parties to achieve a mediated settlement as well to avoid polarization of the parties and hardening their positions more in case no agreement is reached. AU encourages the complementarity between RECs and its structures as well attempting solutions to African problems through its mechanism (Garang, 2015).

Having endorsed IGAD's leadership of the mediation, the African Union's Peace and Security Council largely deferred to the decisions taken by IGAD heads of state. In December 2013, however, it did mandate the body's first-ever commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations and other abuses committed during the initial phase of the conflict and to make recommendations on transitional justice. Though AU officials later shared wider frustration with the IGAD process, Peace and Security Council member states were reluctant to assert higher authority or exert leverage on the South Sudanese parties—partially as a result of sustained lobbying efforts by the government of South Sudan. When the commission of inquiry completed its investigations in 2014, aggrieved South Sudanese citizens and peace process supporters

eagerly awaited their report. Many hoped it could be a game changer, introducing accountability into the peacemaking effort and possibly serving as a mean to exclude responsible parties from future governance arrangements. Though the report was completed in 2014, the Peace and Security Council opted several times to delay its public release. These delays were often requested, or backed, by the IGAD heads of state and others who worried that the report could upend a fragile peace process. The report was ultimately released to the public one year later, in October 2015, after the peace agreement was signed. Former Malian president Alpha Oumar Konaré was ultimately appointed AU envoy for South Sudan in June 2015 as part of an attempt to demonstrate enhanced AU support for the peace process. But his appointment came late in the process and had little impact on the mediation effort or institutional dynamics (Vertin, 2018).

International Community: Diplomatic interventions by the United States and others, including China and Sudan, aim stop the hostilities and prevent further civilian displacement. Meanwhile, the potential for tensions among displaced communities to spark further violence is a growing concern. The United States is the largest provider of bilateral foreign assistance to South Sudan and a major financial contributor to peacekeeping efforts there. The United States historically supported self-determination for the South Sudanese and played a major role in facilitating the 2005 peace deal that brought an end to Africa's longest-running civil war. Congress was active in supporting South Sudan's independence and plays an ongoing role in setting U.S. policy toward both Sudan. A small group of designated special envoys from Norway, the United Kingdom, and the European Union regularly worked in lockstep with the United States, providing diplomatic support and essential funding to the mediation effort. The European Union also imposed sanctions against select individuals for obstructing the peace process or committing atrocities and coordinated its designations with the United States (Vertin, 2018).

2.4.7 IGAD Plus

In June 2015, at the urging of the United States and other peace process supporters, Ethiopia announced the reconfiguration of the mediation as "IGAD Plus." Supporters agreed that the process had been poisoned and needed an antidote. The expanded mediation format thus added five AU member states, the United Nations, the Troika, the European Union, and China as official partners. IGAD Plus was designed, first and foremost, as a way to mitigate troublesome regional dynamics by widening the circle of participants. It was also intended to reinvigorate

flagging international support for the process, invest a wider constituency of African states in its success, and provide much needed technical and strategic support to the mediation team. In practice however, little changed. Participation by AU member states was minimal, and IGAD member states did not facilitate the kind of structural changes necessary to make IGAD Plus a reality (Vertin, 2018).

2.4.8 United Nations

Regional organisations in all continents of the world and regional groupings are considered significant not only by the member states that devote resources to them but also by the United Nations and the donor governments that fund these bodies in the South (Klingebiel et al. 2008). Article 52 of the UN Charter encourages pacific settlement of local disputes by regional arrangements or agencies. Over the past two decades the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General have championed the peacemaking role of regional organisations (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UN General Assembly 1994; UN 2001, 2006, 2008; UN Security Council 2005). The United Nation's enthusiastic endorsement of these organisations rests largely on the promise that they can help to create a pacific regional environment because they serve as forums for conflict resolution, build trust through the frequency of interaction among states, encourage and facilitate a collective approach to cross border security issues and encourage their members to adhere to international and regional norms on governance and conflict prevention.

The UN has no direct role in the mediation process as an external actor, yet it has huge presence on the ground in South Sudan through its mission in country (UNMISS), which superseded the conflict. The relations between the GoSS and the UN deteriorated at early stages of the conflict when (13) UNMISS tracks transporting weapons manifested as building materials were uncovered. The weapons were packed in crates whose labels said they contained food rations. Under the terms of its agreement with South Sudan, the U.N. is only allowed to ship its peacekeepers weapons by air, not by land. The UN admitted its responsibility and the mistake of non-adherent to the Standard of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the weapons seized were claimed to belong to Ghanaian peacekeepers but the cargo wrongly labeled, containers were wrongly labeled and inadvertently contained weapons and ammunition. The GoSS and the general public in South Sudan accused UNMISS of housing in protection camps elements of pro-

Machar rebels and in some occasion's white army militia members within its protection sites. UNMISS' role in South Sudan continues to expand with its vital civilian protection mandate where it housed hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are forced to take shelter either because of fighting or fearing retribution of other communities in relations to the current conflict. It accepted responsibility over the violation of the Standard of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and apologised but still denied covering elements of rebellion within its protection, then conducted search for weapons among IDPs who sought protection in the camps and managed to uncover huge numbers of rifles and pistols though refused to surrender them to the security organs of the GoSS destroyed these weapons transparently in a present of its representative.

Though, the UN HQs expressed an apology and was able to dispatch a high level team to investigate the circumstances of the incident it issued a press statement ahead the arrival of the team and expressed "the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is looking forward to being able to conduct this investigation in full transparency and collaboration with the authorities of South Sudan, and allow the Mission to clarify the circumstances of this unfortunate incident, ensure that it will not happen again, and defuse any misunderstanding between the United Nations and the Government of South Sudan". The implications of this serious incident created difficult relations where mounting distrusts by the parties to the conflict of assigning a role to the UN on Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) established by the Secession of Hostilities Agreement signed on 23 Jan 2015. The UN mission in South Sudan continues to provide logistic to the MVM in their deliverance of mandate "to protect civilians and provide humanitarian relief wherever possible" (Vertin, 2018)

The UNSC tries to play its leverage role through threatening targeted sanctions against people it may name as spoilers or obstructing peace. Despite the mixed reactions on which the sanctions were received and the regional and national rejection of even a wider arms embargo, it remained an attempt to skillfully engage in ending the crisis through backing African Unions efforts as well IGAD led process. UN Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios was based in Addis Ababa and served as another informal but important adviser to Seyoum Mesfin. His interventions were often closely coordinated with other peace process supporters, though other UN obligations meant he could not dedicate his full energies to South Sudan. Back in

South Sudan, the head of the UN peacekeeping mission, Ellen Løj, was understandably frustrated by her distance from the process. The mission had an enormous task in hosting more than 200,000 internally displaced persons on its bases and facilitating humanitarian access. The UN was not positioned to play a larger political role after relations with the government soured in December 2013. Nonetheless, Løj sought a stronger connection with the IGAD process, as decisions being made in Addis Ababa would inevitably impact the mission's mandate, posture, and resources going forward (Vertin, 2018)

2.4.9 Humanitarian Concerns

Of the estimated 1.8 million people who remain displaced from their homes today, 1.35 million are within South Sudan and 453,600 have fled to neighbouring countries. Nearly 100,000 civilians are currently sheltering on U.N. bases around the country as South Sudan. Efforts to combat famine have been successful through the end of the year, but humanitarians warn that this requires a Herculean effort. Continuing to sustain that level of response may not be possible if the violence continues. UNHCR in South Sudan was mostly focused on continuing to provide services to Sudanese refugees from the north living in South Sudan, despite the much larger emerging internal displacement crisis. Globally there are huge demands on UNHCR's resources due to the increase in refugee crises; this is impacting UNHCR's ability to deliver on its global commitments to engage in the protection of IDPs as well as in shelter and camp management for IDPs. UNHCR has since developed a strategy on internal displacement in South Sudan that has led to a scaling up of UNHCR staff focused on IDP protection. Given UNHCR's role as a protection agency, it is essential that it demonstrate effective leadership on IDP protection, vigorously advocating for it and actively representing the views of the "clusters" that it leads on IDP issues in the humanitarian country team. Humanitarian assistance can minimize the suffering created by this conflict, but it cannot solve the crisis. Only a full cessation of hostilities and a peace agreement can do that.

2.4.10 European Union

In the current crisis of South Sudan, EU's role continued as a financer to the mediation process led by IGAD yet, it developed its own positions towards addressing the conflict while channeling them via the mediation as it categorises its role "the EU's efforts, including those of its Special Representative for the Horn of Africa Alexander Rondos, are coordinated with, and

complementary to this united international effort". The new EU stand is much illustrated by the statement of the 28 members on the crisis of South Sudan ""The European Union is determined to do everything possible to avert further suffering of the people of South Sudan" (Garang, 2015).

The EU challenges the parties to address this conflict seriously and engage towards achieving an end to the violence "It is now time for the South Sudanese leaders to rise to the challenge and start negotiating in good faith towards a peaceful, equitable and sustainable solution". European seriousness about contributing positively to ending the violence took to another level when it started imposing sanctions "two persons responsible for violating the ceasefire agreement will be targeted with a travel ban and a freeze of their assets in the European Union". The two sanctioned individuals were reported to be Maj. Gen. Santino Deng, Commander of Third Division of the SPLA and Peter Gadet who was described as the leader of the anti-government Nuer militia (Garang, 2015).

The EU engagement goes parallel levels in case of pushing for a negotiated settlement while in the other hand imposing sanctions "targeted measures against individuals responsible for obstructing the peace process, breaching the cease- fire agreement and having committed egregious human rights violations". The sanctions extend to the country as well to "same time, an existing arms embargo against South Sudan will remain in place" (Garang, 2015).

The EU role in the IGAD led mediation can be summarized as it offers support using leverage both sanctions and benefits attaining peace in addition to financing the process " Supporting IGAD in its efforts to mediate between the warring parties and broker a peaceful solution to the conflict (Garang, 2015).

2.4.11 Troika and the US

The Troika emerged "as partnership that Norway forged with Britain, and the USA to revive Sudan peace talks" in order to provide support to the first IGAD's efforts on Sudan 1993 – 1999. It provided crucial support and sphere of influence with consistent pressure and engagement that resulted in the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2000 – 2005 (Garang, 2015 and Mugo, 2016).

On the other hand, Norway enjoyed acceptance in Sudan with developmental agenda but often perceived to have "close relations with the southerners" led to it command respect from both communities and political engagement of its government and leadership with all parties. Norwegian NGOs worked during the years of South civil war in the country in particular the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) both enjoyed long outstanding presence and humanitarian services delivery records letter on joined by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) which operated "in both side" in delivering diverse services. As perceived true friends, the Norwegian authorities continued to engage the GoSS and the SPLMIO constructively in current conflict formulating the international agenda on achievement of a mediated settlement (Garang, 2015 and Mugo, 2016).

The Top U.S. officials engaged both South Sudanese leaders and key figures in Africa and the international community to seek a mediated solution to the current crisis. Obama Administration officials referred to the U.S.-South Sudan relationship as one based on "deep ties" and an "affinity" cast in the context of American public sentiment toward the South Sudanese that developed during the civil war. Despite increasing strains in recent years, Secretary of State John Kerry and others, including National Security Advisor Susan Rice, acknowledged a "personal stake" in finding a resolution to the crisis. In addition to private calls made by Secretary Kerry and Susan Rice and public comments made by President Obama, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan Donald Booth and U.S. Ambassador Susan Page are engaging both sides in the region. The envoy, who previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia, offered U.S. support to the regional mediation effort in Addis Ababa (Blanchard, 2014).

Military deployment: The U.S. plans to fund new and ongoing conflict mitigation efforts aimed at improving internal stability. The current crisis has created new requirements for humanitarian aid for people displaced by the recent fighting. The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) activated a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Response Management Team (RMT) to support U.S. government efforts to respond to the humanitarian aspects of the crisis. The U.N. Mission in Southern Sudan (UNMISS) and more than $197 million to support the U.N. Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). However this aid has conditions which affect the decision making of parties i.e. it remains to be seen how any withholding of U.S. development or security assistance might affect the decision making of

parties to the current conflict. One could argue that withholding foreign aid might influence those leaders most concerned about the ability of the government to meet the needs of citizens (Blanchard, 2014)

The U.S. Embassy in Juba suspended normal operations and the Administration ordered the departure of non-emergency U.S. government personnel, commencing evacuation operations for U.S. citizens on December 18. At that time, the President ordered 45 combat-equipped U.S.
 On December 21, 2013, President Obama ordered 46 additional U.S. military personnel deployed by military aircraft to Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, to evacuate U.S. citizens who were sheltering at a U.N. base. The aircraft was fired upon during the approach, and the operation was aborted. Four U.S. military personnel were injured in the attack and evacuated for medical treatment. The following day, the United States, in coordination with the United Nations, evacuated U.S. citizens and others from Bor on U.N. and civilian helicopters (Blanchard, 2014).

The congressional committees and Caucus leadership also publicly called for an end to the violence, improved humanitarian access, and respect for human rights. In a letter to President Kiir, they expressed deep concern, called for restraint to prevent the violence from escalating, and emphasized the importance of inclusive political dialogue. The letter cautions, "your actions over the course of the coming days will be critical in influencing the path your country takes and how people remember your leadership" (Blanchard, 2014).

Foreign Assistance/external support: The United States, which is the single largest bilateral aid donor to South Sudan, has invested significant resources in its development. In recent congressional testimony, responding to a question about why the current crisis matters to the United States, the State Department's senior Africa official explained "we birthed this nation," suggesting that the Administration views the situation there with particular urgency. Peace and stability among the Sudanese has long been a key focus of U.S. foreign policy makers in Africa and a sustained issue of bipartisan congressional attention. Congressional engagement in Sudan and South Sudan has historically been driven largely by human rights and humanitarian concerns.

In recent years, U.S. foreign assistance to the people and government of South Sudan has been among the largest spending priorities for the United States in Africa, with more than $410 million committed in FY2013 and more than $393 million in economic, health, and security assistance requested for FY2014. In its FY2014 budget request (released in 2013), the Obama Administration stated that South Sudan "still requires significant external support to provide basic services to citizens, develop a broad-based, diverse economy, and establish basic standards for of law and good governance." The request also referred to "persistent ethnic conflict" and warned that South Sudan was "trending toward authoritarianism," although it argued that there was "still time to influence this trend through strategic and targeted assistance that supports the government's responsiveness and citizen participation in determining a way forward." The request further outlined U.S. plans to fund new and ongoing conflict mitigation efforts aimed at improving internal stability (Blanchard, 2014).

The crisis has implications for sizeable U.S. financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions in South Sudan, some of whose personnel have come under attack during recent fighting and whose bases have been transformed into camps for those seeking safety. In the longer term, the evolving conflict in South Sudan may call into question the future direction of U.S. and international assistance to the South Sudan government. U.S. support to the government and security forces was already subject to certain restrictions, some of which are based on human rights and budget transparency concerns. South Sudan has nevertheless been among the largest African recipients of State Department-funded security assistance in recent years, as the United States has sought to support security sector reform there (Blanchard, 2014).

The Administration released a strategy on mass atrocities prevention in 2012. As part of that strategy, the Administration created the Atrocities Prevention Board and launched a new National Intelligence Estimate on the risk of mass atrocities and genocide Human rights groups and others advocating U.S. intervention to protect civilians abroad are divided on the legacy of the mass atrocities prevention initiative (Blanchard, 2014).

2.4.12 China

China is another country with major interests in both South Sudan and the Sudan with actual investments on multiple sectors. It is known the closest ally to the GoS and its major exporter of weapons plus ammunition, yet it maintains good relations with major businesses in South Sudan

including being the imports of about 6% of its needs of oil from South Sudan. China's foreign policy is built upon the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its allies, friendly countries or business partners; it was certainly disturbed by the development in post secession relations between South Sudan and its neighbour the Sudan (Mugo, 2016). China invests heavily in infrastructure, petroleum sector and telecommunication in South Sudan, which constitute real presence on the ground. South Sudan inherited Chinese oil companies working with other south Asians as de facto investors upon its session. Energy-hungry China advances its presence in South Sudan through supporting the developmental activities of the GoSS providing loans and becoming major market for its defence needs (Mugo,2016). China's role in the advancement of peaceful resolution of conflict commenced with IGAD's early mediation processes where it contributed financial support to the process arguing the parties to reach a quick solution. Its interests in South Sudan coupled with its strategic relations and influence in the region (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and South Sudan) encouraged it play a vital role in engaging the parties bilaterally or collectively towards a nationally owned agreement Nonetheless, China sees the conflict in South Sudan to surpass the local politics of power struggle within the SPLM to a more international conflict over resources where its rival the US tries to unseat her via proxy or adopting support to favourable individuals in power. Consequently, China took a robust stand, supporting the mediation, engage the parties while deployed its first combat force in South Sudan as part of UNMISS's peace keeping mission in a clear mark of territory of interests (Mugo, 2016).

IGAD received a one million dollar support for the mediation process from China at the beginning of 2014, and continues to engage high-level representation of its Special Envoy to South Sudan and the Sudan. China's role was viewed as important by both parties to the conflict; it was vocal in rejecting the UNSC proposed sanctions threats against the parties giving it more leverage and credible stand from their view points. It focuses on putting efforts to encourage the parties to expedite the process as China's UN ambassador Liu Jieyi described the move for sanctions modalities as no "logic" behind it while condemned the move stating: "To apply a punitive measure now would send out what kind of message - right message or wrong message?" (Associated Press, New York, March 1st, 2015) as cited by (Garang 2015 and Mugo 2016). Beijing's Africa envoy was dispatched to the Addis Ababa talks on several occasions, and

though mediators and other peace process supporters welcomed China's presence, its engagement was sparing and inconsistent by comparison (Vertin, 2018).

2.4.13 South Sudan Environment

Given the insecurity, many countries and aid agencies have evacuated their foreign nationals. This, together with ongoing hostilities and related security concerns, constrains the humanitarian response. Four U.S. military personnel were injured in an operation to evacuate U.S. citizens on December 21. Talks between the parties began in January 2014, hosted by regional leaders in Addis Ababa, Addis Abba, Ethiopia. Progress, to date, has been limited, as both sides wage fierce campaigns to gain and hold ground, seeking to maximize their negotiating position prior to any ceasefire agreement. The status of political figures detained by the government at the onset of the crisis remains a sticking point.

2.4.14 Cold War Legacy

The Horn of Africa has been beset by chronic insecurity and political tension, which has destabilized the region and undermined efforts to consolidate economic development and democratic governance. The Cold War exacerbated the crisis in the region, because geopolitical superpowers the United States and USSR sought to spread their influence in the region. Regional leaders also took advantage of the Cold War to shift alliances and entrench their rule. This legacy of misrule has set the scene for the violence that has plagued this troubled region. Through its charter, the United Nations (UN) is the self-proclaimed guarantor of international peace and security. Through the mechanisms of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the UN has the ability to oversee the peaceful settlement of disputes through an array of processes including negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement (United Nations Charter, 1945).

The charter of the UN contains "quite elaborate provisions in Chapter VI for the pacific settlement of disputes; the 'teeth' of the Charter are contained in Chapter VII, which grants the Security Council the unprecedented power to take mandatory economic and military action against an aggressor."(White, 1997) However, what seemed initially to be a resourceful array of mechanisms and processes to resolve conflict were soon to be confronted by the structural limitations and the egoistical imperatives of the superpowers that dominated the Cold War era.

The superpowers and their client states within the UN framework formed de facto alliances along ideological lines and institutionalized an oligarchy of power. This appropriation of global power manifested itself through the dominance of the Security Council in all major decisions and meant that the UN's ability to resolve conflicts and build peace was structurally paralyzed. Rarely did the interests of the United States and the USSR converge. The greatest threat to international peace and security, therefore, arose from the conflict between its most powerful members. The Cold War period witnessed over 150 armed conflicts that claimed approximately 25 to 30 million lives (Curle, 1995 as cited by Murithi, 2009)

In this climate of East-West competition, the mechanisms and strategies to manage and resolve conflicts relied on coercive political negotiations in the context of the prevailing superpower rivalry. Leatherman and Väyrynen (1995) concur with this view and further suggest that the "involvement of collective security organizations and other third parties was possible only in conflicts in which the great powers did not have a direct stake or in which they had shared interests" (Murithi, 2009). Mark Katz (1991) suggests that because of the relative unimportance of the so-called "third world" to the United States and the USSR, they employed these mechanisms in several regional conflicts without much consideration for the moral consequences of the communities affected by the outcome. This scenario replicated itself in the Horn of Africa. Both Somalia and Sudan were beholden to one or the other superpower during the Cold War. Sudan was afflicted by a lengthy conflict. Somalia was ruled from independence by Siad Barre, a dictator who shifted his allegiance from the USSR to the United States and then back to the USSR as he saw political winds blow. Sudan and Somalia demonstrated the unsatisfactory nature of superpower intervention in the region (Murithi, 2009)

IGAD's efforts to mediate in the Sudan conflict were, therefore, affected by the complex legacy of the Cold War on what were in effect regional conflicts. In particular, the Cold War emphasized the maintenance of a balance of power regime, and any attempt to resolve conflict in the Horn of Africa would need to take this factor into account. An emphasis would need to be placed on containing the Sudanese and Somali crisis given their potential to spill over and to ignite even a more pronounced sub regional conflict dynamic. Mark Katz suggests that because of the perceived, imagined, or real strategic interest of the Horn of Africa to the United States and the USSR, they played a coercive role behind the scenes either in perpetuating or attempting

to resolve regional conflict without much consideration for the affected communities. Katz observes that "although the superpowers did not cause the many conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, their involvement often exacerbated them." Katz, (1991) as cited by (Murithi, 2009).

2.4.15 Grass root ownership of the conflict

The idea of local ownership is regarded as an important pillar for advancement of African solutions to the continent's development challenges. IGAD'S swift involvement to resolve the recent South Sudan conflict gave sense of hope and commitment by regional leaders towards taking primary responsibility instead of waiting on external help to solve on Africa's peace and security challenges. Whereas external actors were engaged in the peace processes in Addis Ababa, IGAD took the lead as a mediator between main protagonists (natunkunda.r@gmail.com) During the peace process, the belligerent parties were reluctant to allow non-armed stakeholders to participate meaningfully; this revealed the disadvantaged position of civil society and grassroots organisations in relation to peace efforts undertaken at the regional level. The final peace agreement was signed on 26th August 2015 by the representatives of the SPLM-IO, former detainees, civil society organisations, regional bodies, and international organisations. Policies which do not take into account or reinforce indigenous knowledge ignore informal institutionalism in peace building processes and undermine local ownership. Thus efforts have to be put in place for local communities to explore what their cultures and heritage have to offer towards peace building processes (natunkunda.r@gmail.com)

Local Ownership in South Sudan Peace Processes: The violence, which broke out in Juba in December 2013, later spread to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states with insurgents fighting along ethnic lines .Local communities have been severely affected by the conflict, and stakeholders at the grassroots level took on the challenge of finding lasting solutions to the conflict. These local actors' involvement in peace initiatives is of importance not only for the resolution of the conflict but also for ensuring sustainable peace (International Crisis Group, 2014). Innovative ways have been utilised by local civil society organisations and traditional institutions to establish peace markets, village peace committees, women's peace groups and youth peace initiatives to promote peaceful co-existence among different communities (Wilson,

2014), for purposes of exploring indigenous approaches to peace building. These platforms provide for small but effective dialogue amongst different communities that are caught up in the conflict. At the grassroots level, one is able to collect narratives that citizens have concerning the causes and history of violence; and issues that need to be addressed to promote peaceful co-existence (natunkunda.r@gmail.com)..

Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) have also played an important role in peace building processes at the local level, for instance, the Church Leaders' Mediation Initiative which is an inter-denominational platform was established to mediate and reconcile communities involved in the conflict. AU Commission of Inquiry (CoI) report affirms the critical role of these organisations in peace and reconciliation initiatives. These leaders, for instance, participated in the Jonglei peace talks that led to the signing of a peace agreement between rebel leader David Yau Yau and the government of South Sudan in Addis Ababa (Sudan Tribune, 2014; Yugusk, 2014 as cited by natunkunda.r@gmail.com). The mediation process involved consultations between the local community and the rebel leader; and the community was engaged in monitoring the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement. In a way, the local community contributed to and had ownership of the peace process.

This community-based approach created room for other actors to participate, like the UNMISS delegates, church members, traditional leaders and a joint military team from both the rebel and government forces. The focus of the religious leaders' involvement was to promote peaceful co-existence among the Jonglei state's communities caught up in the conflict (Yugusk, 2014 as cited by natunkunda.r@gmail.com). The negotiation processes were upheld as promoting the standard of inclusivity, unlike the Addis Ababa peace-talks that sidelined CSOs. The Addis Ababa peace-talks have been majorly elite-driven, reduced from a multi-stakeholder process to a bilateral negotiation between the principal parties and there has been little connection between the hostile parties and the general population (International Crisis Group, 2014). The warring parties denied South Sudanese CSO representatives the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the Addis Ababa peace process. The behaviour of these actors was self-centred, CSOs had no forum to rectify the injustice because such negot iations do not set inclusiveness as a vital requirement to peace talks, and downplay the importance importance of civilian participation (natunkunda.r@gmail.com).

Civil society organisations in South Sudan established a coalition (Citizens for Peace and Justice [CPJ]) to lobby for the participation of civil society during the Addis Ababa peace-talks; the activists asserted that the peace-talks had to be inclusive in order to promote ownership and accountability. Their 'inclusivity victory' was short-lived; unlike the narrow political interests of the armed parties, CSOs demanded for general reforms to address the root causes of the conflict; their concerns were related to ending violence and bringing about reconciliation, justice and accountability (CPJ, 2014as cited by natunkunda.r@gmail.com). When non-armed stakeholders are included in peace building processes, it promotes 'downward accountability' and more so local ownership is enhanced.

Strengths and Gaps in the Literature

The mediators' mediation strategy focused on deploying a regional force to create conditions for peace negotiations and the current trend in South Sudan does not show that this is happening to achieve success so the study attempted to find out.

The idea of local ownership is regarded as an important pillar for advancement of African solutions to the continent's development challenges. IGAD'S swift involvement to resolve the recent South Sudan conflict gave sense of hope and commitment by regional leaders towards taking primary responsibility instead of waiting on external help to solve on Africa's peace and security challenges.

The conflict in South Sudan has attracted a number of actors in a bid to resolve conflicts among the warring parties. The actors include intergovernmental organizations, regional states, international organizations and the international community at large. South Sudan as a new state as is perceived to have evolving weak institutions while not capable yet to stand its ground resisting international pressure that encourages external actors to manipulate the situations towards their own interests. External actors are determined to support the parties and mediator to achieve mediated settlement that concludes the essence of intervention. It is imperative to stress on the nature of actors intervention as conflict resolution intervention vary greatly and are conducted by numerous kinds of interveners. Most external actors are focused on intervention in South Sudan given the opportunity and interests due to its new emergence and flexibility of Government.

2.4 Objective three: To assess the challenges to IGAD mediation capacity in the current South Sudan conflict

The challenges or barriers to mediation capacity in the horn of Africa in general and South Sudan in particular cause a wider gap between mandate and capacity of African organizations in deliverance of their peace making mandate include; Regional rivalries and power struggles, The rivalry between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar makes negotiations hard, There are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation Centralisation of decision-making at the Heads of State level, Lack of institutionalization within IGAD, Challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites, Insufficient Expertise in Mediation, Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators , No Institutional Memory and Learning and No Viable Concept of Mediation.

2.4.1 Insufficient Expertise in Mediation

Over the past decade domestic mediation has evolved in many countries to the point that it is now regarded as a professional discipline. It encompasses a rich body of theory, comparative research, case studies, skills and techniques. The skills and techniques relate to diagnosing the causes of the conflict; engaging in shuttle diplomacy when adversaries refuse to talk to each other; designing and convening the mediation process; preparing agendas and conducting meetings; identifying common ground between the parties; and generating options for resolving deadlocks. The techniques are intended to facilitate dialogue and cooperative problem-solving (Nathan 2007). By contrast, states and international organisations do not view international mediation as a specialist endeavor. International mediation is conceived and undertaken simply, and often crudely, as a form of 'tough diplomacy'. The main techniques are persuasion, bargaining and the exercise of leverage, with little emphasis on the application of mediation skills. The extreme version of this orientation is captured by the belief of Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, that "if you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow" (Stedman 1991:118).

In 1976 Kissinger arrived in Southern Africa for the first time, confident that his diplomatic prowess and the strength of the US would lead within a few months to a negotiated settlement for Rhodesia. As befits a mediator, he insisted that he was merely an interlocutor and would not

be prescriptive. He had, in fact, devised a formula for majority rule and was determined to sell his plan through threats and promises. The mission was counter-productive. His proposals emboldened the minority regime, were rejected by the liberation movements and Frontline States, and culminated in what British diplomats described as a mess (Stedman 1991).A less extreme example of an overly prescriptive approach by mediators was the 1994 Declaration of Principles issued by IGAD in respect of the war in Sudan. The Declaration synthesised the main demands of the Sudanese protagonists in order to specify the key elements required for a lasting peace. It addressed the root causes of the war in an apparently fair and pragmatic manner. However, two of the principles were anathemas to Khartoum, which denounced the mediators for abandoning their impartial stance (Deng 1997). A Kenyan diplomat familiar with the process argued that IGAD's mistake was to present the synthesis as a formal declaration instead of circulating a draft text and then mediating negotiations between the parties (Nathan 2007).

The perception that mediation is synonymous with 'tough diplomacy' leads to, and is reinforced by, the appointment of international mediators on the basis of their political status rather than their competence as mediators (Susskind and Babbitt 1992). Presidents, ministers, former heads of state and military officers who are not skilled mediators are frequently appointed as peacemakers in high-intensity conflict in Africa. Some of these dignitaries have a natural aptitude for mediation, others do not. Ambassador Ami Mpungwe, the accomplished Tanzanian diplomat who facilitated the abortive Arusha peace talks for Rwanda in 1993-4, has said that throughout the process he was painfully aware that he and his colleagues lacked knowledge and experience as mediators. He did not know whether there was anything they could have done differently to avert the genocide but he was convinced they would have benefited greatly from training in mediation. A decade later, the need for mediation training remains unmet (Nathan 2007).

Mediators who are skilled and experienced will not be successful in every instance, but they are more likely to succeed than inexperienced mediators. They are more familiar with mediation strategies and tactics, giving them a wider range of options and tools, and they are less likely to make mistakes. This matters greatly in conflicts where large numbers of people are being killed. It seems absurd that states and international organisations that would not deploy untrained soldiers or doctors in conflict zones are willing to use untrained mediators (Nathan 2007).

This tendency might be changing in the case of the UN. The UN Secretary- General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) recommended that the organization's capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation should be enhanced substantially. The Panel also argued that in appointing envoys, mediators and special representatives, the Secretary-General "should place high-level competence above all other criteria". The UN has since established a Mediation Support Unit in the Department of Political Affairs, as well as a mediation support website (http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php). In the case of the AU, the current process of constituting the Panel of the Wise is an opportune time to set up a mediation unit.

2.4.2 Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators

Mediators in high-intensity conflict are confronted by a complex array of actors, issues, tasks and problems. They might justifiably feel like jugglers struggling to keep in the air more balls than is humanly possible, painfully aware that the consequences of dropping even a single ball could be very damaging. Of course the parties to a conflict cannot be managed as if they were inanimate juggling balls. They have volition, passion, fury and fear, which make them both unpredictable and intransigent. The greater the number of parties and the greater the divisions within their ranks, the greater the number of perspectives and concerns that are brought into the mediation process, the harder it is to address all of these concerns to the satisfaction of all the parties and the harder it is for the mediator to facilitate decision-making by consensus (Nathan 2007).

The difficulty is heightened by the presence of other actors hovering in the wings: the gatecrashers who want to join the mediation but have not been invited; the godfathers who influence the parties' decisions behind-the-scenes; the parties' members and constituencies that constrain their leaders' decision making freedom; the neighbours that behave in an un neighbourly fashion; the donors and big powers that have their own agendas; and the media, which are hungry for controversy to the point of creating it. These actors can influence the course of the mediation but they typically lie beyond the reach of the mediator and they are not bound by decisions agreed to by the negotiating parties. Adding to the mediator's burden, each of the disputant parties wants the mediator to attend to its concerns as a matter of priority; the mediator may have to play different roles in relation to different parties; he/she has to address both the structural causes of the conflict and the crises that arise from time to time; and all of this

has to be done in an environment of intense mistrust, hostility, volatility and violence (Nathan, 2007).

According to Ebert *et al., (*1995), it follows those mediators in high-intensity conflict need considerable institutional support. The required support can be categorised in terms of different functions and types of expertise: Mediation expertise is needed to plan, convene and run the negotiations, provide tactical and strategic advice to the parties' leader and negotiators, and encourage a co-operative stance by neighbouring states and other state actors; country and regional expertise is needed to ensure a deep understanding of the parties, the factions and debates within their ranks, the cultural practices of local communities, and the history and dynamics of the conflict; intelligence expertise is needed to discern changing conditions on the ground, shifts in the parties' positions, and changes in the relationships between various actors; thematic expertise is needed on a range of topics, such as constitutions, ceasefire arrangements, land distribution and wealth sharing; communications expertise is needed to communicate with the donors, member states, the parties' constituencies and the public at large in the conflict zone and management, administrative and financial expertise is needed to ensure that the process is run efficiently, that proper records are maintained and that funds and other resources are properly managed.

As illustrated by UNOSOM II in Somalia in 1993, a lack of expertise can be very detrimental. The UN undertook a serious analysis of conditions in Somalia only after the operation was well underway, it did not comprehend the magnitude of the crisis and its misjudgments regarding the authority and legitimacy of local leaders contributed to numerous setbacks (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*et al.* 1995).

Driven by schedules set in New York and lacking a proper grasp of traditional reconciliation processes, the UN worked against rather than with indigenous forms of conflict management (Menkhaus, 1996). By contrast, in 2005-6 the AU mediation team for Darfur had deep knowledge of the history and conflict dynamics of western Sudan and utilised many specialists as advisers on the thematic issues under consideration, particularly in the security and wealth-sharing commissions. The advisers outlined solutions that were technically sound and based on comparative experience, enhanced the knowledge of the negotiating parties and the mediators,

generated options that had not previously been considered and thereby helped to overcome deadlocks.

On the other hand, the Darfur peace process suffered from a lack of mediation expertise. It was evident that the members of the AU team and the resource people who played mediating roles did so with varying degrees of competence. The Head of the team, Ambassador Sam Ibok (2016), recognized this handicap but could not find suitably experienced mediators to join the process at short notice and for an extended period. This problem, in turn, was a manifestation of the broader continental failure to view mediation as a specialist endeavour and to train mediators accordingly. The Darfur mediators were put under great pressure by their funders and political principals to produce a 'quick accord' and wrap up the mediation speedily. The unrealistic deadlines, the absence of independent funding and the persistent threat to terminate donor support severely comprised the mediation (Nathan, 2007).

2.4.3 No Institutional memory and learning
In the absence of standing mediation units in regional organisations and the AU, there are no thorough assessments of mediation endeavours, no consistent effort to develop and record lessons, no gradual accumulation of knowledge, and no central repository of know-how. Each new mediation initiative relies on the personal experience of the individuals involved in it and there is no assurance that they have assessed their experience objectively and self-critically; indeed, they tend to blame the parties rather than acknowledge their own mistakes (Nathan, 2007)

What lessons can be drawn from the failed mediations for Rwanda and Ethiopia/Eritrea and from the successful mediation for Mozambique? What mistakes were made during the mediations for Burundi and Liberia? Why were some of the peacemakers in the DRC more effective than others? There is no rigorous and systematic institutional attempt to answer these questions, with the result that mediation on the continent does not improve incrementally over time and mediators continue to make the same mistakes as their predecessors. The point here is not that we will ever find a recipe for successful mediation. Because conflicts are dynamic and differ significantly from case to case, mediation cannot be undertaken in a formulaic fashion. Mediators have to be flexible, creative and responsive to changing conditions. Nevertheless, they are invariably confronted by common strategic issues in high-intensity conflict (Nathan, 2007).

These issues include the following: the problem of several competing mediators in a given conflict, the relative merits of confidence-building mediation versus power-based diplomacy, the relative advantages of state versus non-state mediators, the relationship between mediation and enforcement action, the challenge of ensuring compliance with peace agreements, the leverage exerted by donors who fund the mediation process, the problem of parties negotiating in bad faith, the problem of parties that are themselves deeply divided, the problem of spoilers that are not parties to the mediation, ensuring civil society involvement in peace processes, state sovereignty as an obstacle to preventive diplomacy, regional organisations as arenas of conflict rather than forums for conflict resolution and the importance of non-partisanship in mediation (Nathan, 2007).

While all of these issues have specific features in any given conflict, they also have general features across a range of cases. Through comparative research that includes interviews with mediators and negotiators, it is possible to formulate general knowledge and lessons that might be helpful to mediators in future cases. At the very least, such knowledge could help to avoid obvious mistakes and patently flawed strategies (Nathan, 2007).

There is no better example of the failure to learn from past experience than the recurring problem of mediator bias. There is abundant historical evidence that a mediator who displays bias against or in favour of one of the disputant parties will lose the trust of the disfavoured parties, become less effective if not ineffectual as a result, and complicate or even heighten the conflict. This was true of IGAD in relation to Sudan in the mid-1990s, ECOWAS in relation to Liberia in the 1990s and UNOSOM II in Somalia in 1993; on the other hand, a strict commitment to non-partisanship was one of the reasons for the success of Sant' Egidio in Mozambique in 1990-2 and the World Council of Churches in Sudan in 1971-2 (Nathan, 1999: 3-6).

In the current period, many actual and prospective mediators ignore this historical pattern. For example, the South African government sought to play a mediating role in the Zimbabwe crisis while simultaneously expressing support for President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Unsurprisingly, the Movement for Democratic Change eventually declared that it had rejected South Africa as a mediator because it was biased in favour of the ruling party (Hartnack, 2005).

2.4.4 No Viable Concept of Mediation

Defence planners and senior military officers devote much time and effort to debating, developing and refining military doctrine, strategy and concepts of operations. In the academic literature there are major debates around these issues in relation to international mediation (Kleiboer, 1996).Yet there is scarcely any such discussion within the AU, regional organisations and the member states that undertake mediation on the continent. As a result, there is no coherent doctrine and viable concept of mediation. There are countless failed mediation initiatives in Africa that mistakenly sought a quick settlement and relied too much on strong-arm tactics, underestimating the complexity of the conflict, ignoring the psycho-political dynamics of war and neglecting the political imperative of ownership (Nathan 1999). A comparative study of some of these cases, conducted in 2004, led to the following general observation:

Mediators deployed by states and multinational organisations frequently focus more on the solutions to a conflict than on the process of peacemaking. They formulate solutions, endeavour to win the parties' consent thereto, and press for rapid results through a combination of persuasion and leverage. They might adopt this approach because they regard the solution as fairly obvious and consider the demands of one or more of the parties to be completely unreasonable. They might also be concerned about the high level of fatalities and the financial cost of a drawn-out engagement; whatever their motivation, however, a mediator's confidence that he or she can quickly bring the parties to their senses is both naïve and arrogant (Nathan 2004: 71).This observation captures precisely what happened in the AU mediation for Darfur in 2006. The negotiations were driven by a deeply flawed approach of 'deadline diplomacy' emanating from AU headquarters and the funders and partners of the peace process. This inhibited effective mediation, resulted in a peace agreement that did not achieve peace, and sowed divisions that exacerbated the conflict .As with all civil wars, the humanitarian need for a quick accord in Darfur was indisputable. But there is never a quick fix. These wars are social phenomena whose causes, dynamics and contested issues are multiple, complex and intractable, and the difficulty of resolution is heightened immeasurably by the protagonists' mutual hatred and suspicion. In these circumstances, short-cuts and quick fixes are invariably cul-de-sacs (Nathan, 2007).

A more viable model of peacemaking is confidence-building mediation, as occurred in Mozambique in the early 1990s. According to Father Romano (1998), the Sant' Egidio mediators were put under strong pressure to conclude the talks quickly because of the high level of fatalities. The mediators resisted this pressure on two grounds: "the pathology of memory" was a "heritage of almost a generation and could not easily be cancelled"; and "there is no use in forcing people to agree on anything. The only way the process could have been successful and the reason that made it successful was that all the actors involved gained ownership". In his study of the Mozambique mediation, Hume (1994) summarizes the essence of the confidence-building approach followed by Sant' Egidio: *Both sides wanted to find an alternative to stalemate and destruction. The mediators helped the parties find that alternative. Because this conflict was essentially domestic, the solution had to be found in a new relationship between the parties. The mediators concentrated on developing mutual recognition and respect, rather than relying on outside leverage to push the parties together. Their first step was to begin a dialogue between the parties that could open the way to reconciliation. Eventually the parties could agree on their own solutions.*

Unlike power based diplomacy, (Hume, 1994) which seeks to pressurize the parties into a settlement, confidence-building mediation aims to build the parties' confidence in each other, in negotiations and in the mediator. It entails a protracted process of facilitated dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists adversaries, in an even-handed fashion and with their consent, to engage in collaborative problem-solving and accommodate each other's fears and needs. These features of mediation render the process a non-threatening venture and mitigate the pathology of distrust among the parties. In short, confidence-building reflects the basic logic and utility of mediation.

In civil wars and other intractable conflicts, sustained pressure on the parties is often necessary to alter their strategic calculations, heighten the cost of continued hostilities and thereby make negotiations a more attractive option (Nathan, 2006). But it needs to be clear at all times that coercive action should not be taken by the mediator, who must be non-partisan in order to win and keep the trust of the parties; that a lasting peace will only be achieved if the parties are genuinely committed to any peace agreement they sign; and that this will not happen unless they have a sense of ownership of the agreement and are confident that their opponents will honour

their obligations. The problem is that conflict, peace and stability are complex phenomena that have multiple causes, many of which interact with each other at national, regional and international levels. It is consequently hard to ascertain the relative weight of different causal factors and the particular impact of a regional organization. For example, a mediation process led by a regional body might be accompanied by UN peace initiatives, financial and other support from international partners, military action by member states and coercive measures taken by foreign powers. The IGAD mediation that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan is an example of this constellation of actors and dynamics (Healy 2009).

Generally, there has been a failure to view mediation as a specialised endeavour and to establish specialist mediation units in RECS organisations. In turn, this has led to a sub-optimal approach to peacemaking and has given rise to five specific problems; the appointment of high-level mediators has not always taken account of their peacemaking ability and experience. Some of those appointed have been poor mediators and have created confusion and even exacerbated conflicts; International organisations have repeatedly deployed mediators in complex and protracted conflicts without adequate political, technical, administrative and financial support; insufficient attention has been paid to training and nurturing international mediators and there are few opportunities to undergo such training. The pool of proficient mediators is therefore small and it is not growing. The further consequence is that it is difficult for diplomats to hone their mediation skills; there has been no systematic effort to evaluate mediation endeavours, identify positive and negative lessons, adapt methods and systems accordingly and establish a central repository of know-how. As a result, there has been no gradual accumulation of knowledge and improvement in mediation performance over time; in the context of peacemaking there is no coherent concept and doctrine of mediation. The style of mediation is largely dependent on the personality of the mediator and the habit of repeating what was done previously (Nathan, 2009).

Sudan Tribune (2014) reported that following the oft-violated January 2014 Cessation of Hostilities agreement, the Heads of State mediation strategy focused on deploying a regional force to create conditions for peace negotiations. The South Sudan News Agency (SSNA, 2016), argues that when the wider international community stymied the prospective regional force and the situation stabilized by June 2014, leaders could not overcome their divisions to agree on an effective alternate strategy. This undermined the IGAD special envoys, and the warring parties

opted instead to engage directly with individual Heads of State in a series of initiatives in Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi. IGAD itself had little leverage for example, despite public threats, the warring parties understood some member states were reluctant to support sanctions, repeatedly called IGAD's bluff and refused to compromise (Lomodong Charles, 2016).

Lomodong (2016) noted that peace mediations are threatened by lack of peace due to the public threats by the warring parties understood some member states were reluctant to support sanctions. Susskind and Babbitt (1992) found out that mediation is done by skilled and experienced mediators but whether they are successful in every instance remains questionable. The current study will seek to find out if mediation is a workable peace building tool in South Sudan.

Hume (1994) focused on the high pressure the parties into a settlement, confidence-building mediation build among the parties to improve confidence among the belligerent parties. There are protracted dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists adversaries, in an even-handed fashion and with their consent, and the need to identify how mediation can be applied in the country (South Sudan). In addition, Healy (2009) noted that a mediation process led by a regional body might be accompanied by UN peace initiatives, financial and other support from international partners, military action by member states and coercive measures taken by foreign powers which have been emphasized in South Sudan, and mediation by IGAD mediation led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan is an example of this gathering of actors and dynamics which the current study seeks to focus on in details.

Mediators in high-intensity conflict need considerable institutional support which mediation expertise seeks to see working in South Sudan. Mediations are faced with lack of suitably experienced mediators to join the process at short notice and for an extended period, the study seeks to establish whether failed mediation is manifestation of the broader continental failure, the unrealistic deadlines, the absence of independent funding and the persistent threat to terminate donor support severely comprised the mediation. IGAD and member states and international organisations do not view international mediation as a specialist endeavour because international mediation is conceived and undertaken simply, and often crudely, as a form of tough diplomacy (Nathan, 2010).

The UN Secretary- General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) recommended that the organization's capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation should be enhanced substantially and the study will seek to identify the mediation efforts employed in South Sudan. Mediation aims at showing that there is no better example of the failure to learn from past experience than the recurring problem of mediator bias, and the conflicts in South Sudan continue to proliferate, thus the need to find out how mediation can be successful.

Nathan (2004) also noted that mediators deployed by states and multinational organizations frequently focus more on the solutions to a conflict than on the process of peacemaking. They formulate solutions, endeavour to win the parties' consent thereto, and press for rapid results through a combination of persuasion and leverage and the current study will seek to know how applicable it is in South Sudan. Defense planning by senior military officers who devote much time and effort to debating, developing and refining military doctrine, strategy and concepts of operations, mediation is very crucial and the study sought to know how it can be applicable.

Strengths and Gaps in the Literature

The South Sudan News Agency (SSNA, 2016), argues that when the wider international community stymied the prospective regional force and the situation stabilized by June 2014, leaders could not overcome their divisions to agree on an effective alternate strategy. This undermined the IGAD special envoys, and the warring parties opted instead to engage directly with individual Heads of State in a series of initiatives in Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi. IGAD itself had little leverage for example, despite public threats, the warring parties understood some member states were reluctant to support sanctions, repeatedly called IGAD's bluff and refused to compromise.

Mediators who are skilled and experienced will not be successful in every instance, but they are more likely to succeed than inexperienced mediators. They are more familiar with mediation strategies and tactics, giving them a wider range of options and tools, and they are less likely to make mistakes. This matters greatly in conflicts where large numbers of people are being killed. It seems absurd that states and international organisations that would not deploy untrained soldiers or doctors in conflict zones are willing to use untrained mediators.

2.5 Objective four: to examine the strategies that can be adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in improving peace mediation capacity in South Sudan

Over the past few years a number of international organisations have taken steps to address these problems. The UN has led the way, setting up a Mediation Support Unit, a Standby Team of Mediation Experts for rapid deployment and a specialist website entitled UN Peacemaker (http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.) In 2009 the UN Secretary-General issued a seminal report on international mediation, which was debated enthusiastically by the Security Council (UN Security Council, 2009). The AU has embarked on a three-year programme to strengthen its mediation capacity and is considering the formation of a mediation unit. Similar interest in building mediation capacity has been expressed by the European Union, the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the East African Community. These developments create the potential for a substantial improvement in the quality and effectiveness of peacemaking. This potential will only be realised, however, if the organisations engaged in mediation undertake the following measures, discussed further below: 1. Implement a rigorous system of appointing and evaluating mediators; 2. Provide adequate support to mediators in the field; 3. Develop a learning culture based on review, assessment, research and adaptation; 4. Adopt a confidence-building model of mediation in national conflicts (Nathan, 2010)

The African Union (AU) also organised a seminar entitled 'Towards Enhancing the Capacity of the African Union in Mediation', which was held at the Commission of the African Union, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 15 and 16 October 2009. The seminar was the culmination of a series of consultations launched in late 2008, in collaboration with the United Nations (UN) and other stakeholders, to reflect on lessons learned from mediation experiences in Africa. The Addis Ababa seminar brought together policymakers, mediation experts and civil society actors to develop a more strategic approach in enhancing the AU's mediation capacity. In so doing the participants addressed the following themes: Improving the AU's performance in mediation, Consolidating and integrating the approaches of the AU and the RECs in mediation, discussing collaboration with partners including the UN.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification was established in1986 with a focus on drought and desertification, and renamed in 1996 as the Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD) with an expanded mandate that incorporated conflict resolution. The expansion of the mandate was due partially to IGAD member states' long history of cooperation and conflict with one another. IGAD's conflict resolution attentions have historically paying attention on the north-south conflict in Sudan and now the south-south conflict and various conflicts in Somalia. An IGAD peace process to resolve Sudan's long running second-civil war (1983-2005) was commenced in the early 1990s and gained power in the late 1990s when Kenya was IGAD's chair. IGAD's mediation, led by General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, received significant support from the "Troika" (U.S., UK and Norway), particularly at the end of the process. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 and paved the way for South Sudan's independence in 2011. But immediately nearly after three years of independence South Sudan immersed into atrocious civil war (International Crisis Group, 2015:3).

Sudan Tribune (2014) reported that following the oft-violated January 2014 Cessation of Hostilities agreement, the Heads of State mediation strategy focused on deploying a regional force to create conditions for peace negotiations. The South Sudan News Agency (SSNA, 2016), argues that when the wider international community stymied the prospective regional force and the situation stabilized by June 2014, leaders could not overcome their divisions to agree on an effective alternate strategy. This undermined the IGAD special envoys, and the warring parties opted instead to engage directly with individual Heads of State in a series of initiatives in Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi. IGAD itself had little leverage for example, despite public threats, the warring parties understood some member states were reluctant to support sanctions, repeatedly called IGAD's bluff and refused to compromise (Lomodong, 2016).

There are a number of specific areas in which IGAD plays an important role in contributing to stability in the Horn of Africa. Capabilities range from mediation to conflict-prevention and capacity-building between member states. IGAD has played a mediation role in many regional developments. It was heavily involved in the Sudan peace process that culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In the run-up to South Sudan's independence, IGAD facilitated talks that eventually helped deliver the South Sudanese referendum. IGAD has held a long-standing role in the re-establishment of sovereign government in Somalia. After 13 failed attempts to get Somalia back on track, the 14th attempt headed by IGAD installed the transitional government of President Yusuf, and has been involved in the process of governance. One

significant capability of IGAD is its work in Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) through the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). (www.chathamhouse.org, 2013)

IGAD's approach to peace and security issues is unique, due to the nature of dealing with complex issues on a daily basis. The institution has developed a peace and security role that works on a local basis at the ground level. There are a number of specific areas in which IGAD plays an important role in contributing to stability in the Horn of Africa. Capabilities range from mediation to conflict-prevention and capacity-building between member states. IGAD has played a mediation role in many regional developments. It was heavily involved in the Sudan peace process that culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Mahboub, 2013). In the run-up to South Sudan's independence, IGAD is now mediating the current South Sudan civil.

Copeland (2015) noted that for more than eighteen months, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body mediating peace negotiations to end South Sudan's civil war, had struggled to secure a deal in the face of deep regional divisions and the parties' truculence. To overcome these challenges, it announced a revised, expanded mediation "IGAD-PLUS" including the African Union (AU), UN, China, U.S., UK, European Union (EU), Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). The initiative is designed to present a united international front behind IGAD to the warring sides but so far it has failed to gain necessary backing from the wider international community, much of which is disillusioned with both IGAD and the South Sudanese. Rather than distance itself from IGAD, the international community needs to support a realistic, regionally-centred strategy to end the war, underpinned by coordinated threats and inducements. Supporting IGAD-PLUS' efforts to get the parties' agreement on a final peace deal in the coming weeks is the best if imperfect chance to end the conflict and prevent further regionalization.

In an article titled, "South Sudan: Keeping Faith with the IGAD Peace Process (2015)", it was revealed that the regional organisation for the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), launched the peace talks that eventually resulted in the government and SPLM/A-IO signing the Agreement on the Resolution on the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). The agreement called for the establishment of a transitional government and, through subsequent negotiations, Machar returned to Juba in April with a force of over

1,000 to take his place as first vice president of the transitional government. Many members of both the government, led by President Salva Kiir, and the SPLM/A-IO were only interested in the parts of the agreement that would benefit them, while others engaged in political brinkmanship to seek maximum advantage from the deal's various provisions.

AU and IGAD vow serious actions against violators of South Sudan peace process. They announced actions against anyone who would undermine the Sudanese peace process. Anyone found guilty will be penalized and nothing should stop restoration of lasting peace in South Sudan (CGTN Africa, Feb 18) the foreign ministers of IGAD member states also were in Juba to try and find a solution to the ongoing conflict. They hoped to come up with a realistic time table for the implementation of the South Sudan peace deal (CGTN, Patrick Oyet)

IGAD adopted endless calls for cessation of hostilities in order to end fighting, the use of trade sanctions on the government of South Sudan, Strengthening of the existing peace agreements, which have been signed with attempts, restore peace and stability to the country. It also made the process to be inclusive of all stake holders in South Sudan. It also began revitalization forum in Addis Ababa. Regional leaders met in Ethiopia on south Sudan peace process where they held a revitalization summit to get the country's warring parties back on the negotiation table. A permanent cease fire was one of the goals of the summit.

Lomodong (2016) noted that is important as a forum to regulate the regional balance of power, but it needs high-level support if the region is to reach a unified position on peace. IGAD-PLUS should become a unifying vehicle to engage the ever-shifting internal dynamics in South Sudan more effectively and address the divisions among IGAD members that enable the parties to prolong the war. In particular, the AU high representative might lead shuttle diplomacy within the region to gain consensus on the way forward. A dedicated UN envoy for South Sudan and Sudan should represent the UN in IGAD-PLUS and coordinate the various UN components' support to the process.

Mediation practice should be highly flexible, utilising various strategies and responses to the circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it is possible for the IGAD or AU to define and adopt a 'strategic approach to mediation' – which is based on the principles of the organisation, the experience of peacemaking on the continent and the goal of forging sustainable peace agreements. The key discussion themes were underpinned by the working paper, 'Plan of Action

to build the AU's Mediation Capacity,' prepared by Dr. Laurie Nathan. Most of the working paper themes were mentioned and some critically debated by participants at the Addis Ababa seminar. A common thread throughout the two-day seminar was the nature of mediation relationships between the AU, UN and RECs – more specifically the sensitive question regarding 'who takes the lead in mediation?' In addition, other pertinent themes were raised, such as the importance of promoting gender equality and mainstreaming gender in the AU's mediation framework. The role of women in mediation and mediation relationships between the AU, RECs and partners was explored further in that report (Nathan, 2010).

Mediation is an integral component of peacemaking and has the potential to be instrumental in preventing, managing and ending conflicts. To develop specialist expertise and a systematic mediation practice, mechanisms and processes for mediation at the AU need to be defined, institutionalised and consolidated. Collaboration between African and international actors is critical for strengthening IGAD's capacity in conflict prevention and mediation in Africa. Mediation is a long-term process, thus it is necessary for relationships between external and internal actors to be one of equitable partnership, synergy and complementarity (Nathan, 2010).

Nathan, (2010) also suggests that greater attention should be paid to the criteria for appointing mediators and to the talent and experience of those appointed. The current approach of deploying serving or retired heads of state and diplomats without regard to their aptitude for peacemaking is patently unsound. To the greatest extent possible, the mediators should meet the following criteria:

Skill in peacemaking: A competent mediator will not always be successful but stands a much better chance of success than an inept mediator. Where senior peacemakers are not well acquainted with mediation techniques, technical experts should be assigned to assist them.

Credibility with the parties in conflict: Credibility relates to the stature, seniority, experience, competence and integrity of the mediator. A mediator who lacks credibility among the parties will not be trusted and taken seriously by them.

Proficiency in at least one of the languages spoken by the parties: It is bad practice to attempt peacemaking through translation. This impedes communication and inhibits the building of sound relationships with the parties.

Availability for full-time deployment I: n high intensity conflict it is insulting to the parties and objectively absurd to appoint a mediator who can only engage in peacemaking intermittently.

Personal attributes of a peacemaker. Effective mediators tend to have empathy; analytical ability; excellent political judgement and problem-solving skills; superb communication and facilitation skills; and a sense of quiet confidence and authority.

*The performance of the mediators s*hould be assessed periodically and at the end of each mediation. In contrast to current practice, those who are performing badly should be replaced and only the best of them should be eligible for deployment in other cases.

Support to mediators: Mediators are confronted by conflicts that are highly complex and volatile. Typically, the conflict is violent; it has many structural and proximate causes; it involves several disputant parties, most of which are intransigent and some of which are divided within their own ranks; and it encompasses a range of external actors, some of whom play a harmful role and some of whom have to be coordinated in the peace process. In these circumstances, mediators need considerable support, which can be categorised as follows:

Mediation expertise is needed to design and run the process of dialogue and negotiations and to advise the parties' leaders and negotiators.

Country and regional expertise is needed to ensure a deep understanding of the parties and their internal factions, the cultural practices of local communities, the key groups in civil society and the history and dynamics of the conflict.

Monitoring and analytical expertise is needed to discern and interpret evolving conditions on the ground, shifts in the parties' positions and changes in the relationships between various actors.

Thematic expertise is needed on a range of topics, such as constitutions, ceasefire arrangements, land reform, wealth-sharing, human rights and gender issues.

Communications expertise is required to communicate with external actors, the parties' constituencies and the public at large in the conflict zone.

Management, administrative and financial expertise is needed to ensure that the mediation process is run efficiently and that the mediators are not burdened with administrative and financial duties.

Developing a learning culture. The world of mediation is not characterised by any notable degree of learning and improvement over time. It is idiosyncratic and ad hoc, overly determined by power politics, deadlines and organisational tussles. If mediation is to become more successful, the UN and other multinational bodies need to develop a learning culture based on four components:

Active mediations should be reviewed periodically in order to analyse the changing dynamics of the conflict, evaluate the efficacy of the mediation strategies and decide whether adjustments should be made. These reviews should be led by the chief mediator.

All mediations should be evaluated thoroughly on their completion with the aim of identifying lessons for future endeavours. The evaluations should be designed, facilitated and recorded by the organisations' mediation units.

 Because national conflicts have common features and challenges, much can be learnt from comparative research with a thematic focus. Detailed mediation case studies can also be extremely useful as they enable a close examination of the complexities of the process.

For the reviews, evaluations and research outputs to be productive, they must be written up and disseminated in a fashion that is helpful to mediators and their political principals. Most importantly, it is necessary to set up systems to ensure that the identified lessons lead to changes in strategy, techniques and procedures (Nathan, 2010).

A confidence –building approach to mediation: Mediation in national conflicts relies too much on power-based diplomacy, attempting to make progress by exerting pressure on the disputant parties through declarations, admonitions, threats and punishment. These strategies should be replaced by a confidence-building approach to mediation. It seems painfully obvious that deep-rooted national conflict cannot be solved quickly or easily. Nevertheless, international mediators and donor governments frequently make the mistake of seeking a quick fix. In doing so, they overestimate their influence, underestimate the complexity of the conflict and ignore the parties'

visceral feelings of hatred and mistrust. Flouting the imperative that the parties must own the settlement, they push hard for rapid results. As occurred with the AU mediation for Darfur in 2005/6, this approach can be counter-productive (Nathan, 2010).

Whereas power-based diplomacy tries to bully the parties into a settlement, confidence-building mediation seeks to build their confidence in each other, in negotiations and in the peacemaker. It entails a lengthy process of shuttle diplomacy, consultation and facilitated negotiation in which the mediator helps the parties to engage in collaborative problem-solving and accommodate each other's concerns and needs. The parties' common trust in the mediator offsets their mutual distrust and raises their confidence in negotiations. Confidence-building thus captures the essential logic and utility of mediation. Building confidence between the protagonists in a national conflict is vital for several reasons: a negotiated settlement necessarily entails compromises and mutual accommodation by the parties and this will not happen while they remain locked in enmity; the implementation of agreements demands the parties' co-operation; and stable governance in the long-term depends on their on-going co-operation. Given these factors, confidence-building is not a luxury. It is a pragmatic imperative and should be a paramount goal of the mediator. A fine example of a confidence-building approach can be found in the mediation that led to the ending of the Mozambican civil war in 1992 (Nathan, 2010)

Of course a confidence-building approach will not always overcome a party's intransigence. What then can be done to obtain the co-operation of hardliners, such as the Sudanese government and what kind of pressure and incentives would lead to genuine negotiations and lasting peace? Printed on recycled paper agreements in these cases? History offers no definitive answer to these questions. Punitive action has spurred conflict resolution in some instances but retarded it in others and we can never be certain of its effects in a current conflict. Nevertheless, there is one key lesson from history: punitive action should not be taken or endorsed by the mediator.

A mediating body that resorts to coercion will be mistrusted by the targeted party as surely as a football team mistrusts a biased referee. It sacrifices its status as an 'honest broker' and becomes a party to the conflict. Even the most accomplished peacemaker is unlikely to achieve anything if the parties to a national conflict reject negotiations or are unwilling to forge a settlement. Yet mediators can have a significant impact on the conflict. Depending on their proficiency, they can either heighten or reduce the likelihood of resolution. Mediation is not a mystical affair,

reducible to common sense or synonymous with power-based diplomacy. It is a specialised activity with a set of skills and techniques that can be mastered (Nathan, 2010).

Strengths and Gaps in the Literature

Nathan, (2010) also suggests that greater attention should be paid to the criteria for appointing mediators and to the talent and experience of those appointed. The current approach of deploying serving or retired heads of state and diplomats without regard to their aptitude for peacemaking is patently unsound. I think this is really important because in improving mediation capacities.

The African Union (AU) also organised a seminar entitled 'Towards Enhancing the Capacity of the African Union in Mediation', which was held at the Commission of the African Union, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 15 and 16 October 2009. The seminar was the culmination of a series of consultations launched in late 2008, in collaboration with the United Nations (UN) and other stakeholders, to reflect on lessons learned from mediation experiences in Africa. The Addis Ababa seminar brought together policymakers, mediation experts and civil society actors to develop a more strategic approach in enhancing the AU's mediation capacity. In so doing the participants addressed the following themes: Improving the AU's performance in mediation, Consolidating and integrating the approaches of the AU and the RECs in mediation, discussing collaboration with partners including the UN (Nathan, 2010).

This shows that there is has been concern on mediation capacities in Africa from the regional to the sub regional organization. This indicates the level of cooperation and coordination among the organisations. Collaboration between African and international actors is critical for strengthening IGAD's capacity in conflict prevention and mediation in Africa.

2.6 Conceptual Framework

Conceptual Framework is the model or a theory that we have selected in various theories explaining the research problem or situation or phenomenon or issue in question which we adopt to guide us in our research project. The Conceptual Framework is formulated to indicate the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables. The researcher assumes to know the causes which are the independents variable and the outcome which is the dependent variable. On the same note he/she assumes to know the   factors that affect the relationship

between the two variables. Hence, he/she introduces the assumed intervening variables or factors. This is usually demonstrated with a diagram by the researcher (Bogere and Gesa, 2015).

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Frame Work

Independent variables	Dependent variables

Factors that influence peace

Mediation process

- ❖ Parties to the conflict.

- ❖ IGAD Member states

- ❖ south Sudan government and community.

Challenges to peace mediation
- ❖ Suspicion
- ❖ Double standards on both sides involved in the conflicts
- ❖ Breakdown of peace talks
- ❖ Regional rivalries and power struggles;
- ❖ Centralization of decision-making and lack of institutionalization within IGAD

Moderating Variables

- ❖ Role of international organizations

- ❖ Role of international community

Source: adopted from Docking Timothy (2002) Responding to war and state collapse in West Africa, Special report no.81 and modified by the Researcher, 2018 for this study

To undertake this research, a conceptual framework was been developed to show the relationship between mediation and the challenges to IGAD'S mediation capacity in South Sudan. The conceptual framework above shows the relationship between the independent variable (mediation process) and the dependent variable which is challenges faced in the mediation process. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999 pg 57-58), independent variable is a variable that a researcher manipulates in order to determine its effect on another variable. It's

also called a predictor variable because it predicts the amount of variation in another variable while dependent variable sometimes called criterion variable, attempts to indicate the total influence arising from the effects of the independent variable. The mediation process entails initiating peace talks between belligerent groups usually in presence of neutral parties, actual holding of peace talks and eventually negotiating for peace under the pretext of resuming normal relations and life. This is aimed at ensuring that peace can prevail again and the society achieves stability. Despite the process being positive in the bid to foster peace and stability, it may as usually it is experience challenges which include suspicion, double standards on both sides involved in the conflicts, breakdown of peace talks, regional rivalries and power struggles and centralization of decision-making and lack of institutionalization within IGAD. The independent and dependent variable are moderated by the extraneous factors such as the role of international organizations and role of international community.

Conclusion

The literature review aligned subthemes is of great importance in understanding the causes and consequences of the current conflict in South Sudan, factors that influence Inter Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan conflict, the challenges to IGAD mediation capacity in South Sudan and strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan. It generally helps in understanding conflict, mediation and conflict resolution in Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter covers the research design, the study population, the sample size and selection, sampling techniques, methods of data collection, procedure of data collection, data management and analysis, reliability and validity of the research instruments as well as data processing, analysis and interpretation.

3.1 Research Design

Research Design is the blueprint for conducting the study that maximises control over factors that could interfere with the validity of the findings. Designing a study helps the researcher to plan and implement the study in a way that helps the researcher to obtain intended results, thus increasing the chances of obtaining information that could be associated with the real situation (Burns & Grove 2001:223). Therefore it's a plan or means of obtaining data for a specific study. It explained how the data was organised and implemented in detail (Bogere and Gesa, 2015). Qualitative research design was employed for this purpose; both primary and secondary sources of data were combined and collected from different sources. In the primary, interviews and discussions with focused groups. The secondary data was collected from books, journal articles, and policy documents on this subject.

3.2 Population of Study

Polit and Hungler (1999:37) refer to the study population as an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications. The population of South Sudan according to the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (2016) is 12.23 million. The target population of the study was 102; the study only accessed 90 respondents and then sampled 73 respondents out of the accessible population of 90. The population comprised of Embassy of South Sudan staff (10), IGAD staff (10), Political leaders (09), and University Academicians (61). From this, the researcher obtained the sample of Embassy of South Sudan staff (07), IGAD staff (05), Political leader (07), University Academicians (54).

3.3 Study Site

The research site was South Sudan which is experiencing the current conflict.

3.4 Sampling Methods and techniques

The process of selecting a portion of the population to represent the entire population is known as sampling (LoBiondo-Wood & Haber 1998:250; Polit&Hungler 1999:95). A sample is a subset of a population selected to participate in the study, it is a fraction of the whole, selected to participate in the research project (Brink 1996:133; Polit&Hungler 1999:227). There are two sampling methods that were used in this study, namely probability and non-probability sampling.

3.4.1 Probability or representative

A representative sample is a small quantity of something that accurately reflects the larger entity; an example is when a small number of people accurately reflect the members of an entire population. With probability sampling, the researcher used simple random sampling technique and obtained data from 54 University Academicians since they were many in number.

Probability sampling helped in increasing the level of accuracy in the data collected, hence providing the most reliable data. The method gave each member of the population an equal chance of being selected for the sample. Examples of probability sampling include simple random sampling, stratified sampling and cluster sampling from which the researcher will select the suitable sampling techniques for this study. (Kombo et al., 2000) According to Amin (2005) a simple random sampling is a sample obtained from the population in such a way that samples of the same size have equal chances of being selected. Simple random sampling was used to select 54 respondents for data collection who were university academicians .

3.4.2 Non-probability or non-representative

A non-probability sampling method was adopted which, according to LoBiondo-Wood and Haber (1998:249), is less vigorous and tends to produce less accurate and less representative samples than probability or random sample. Non-probability sampling implies that not every element of the population has an opportunity for being included in the sample, such as convenience (accidental), quota, purposive and network sampling procedures (Burns & Grove 2001:804).

With non-probability sampling, the researcher used simple purposive sampling technique to obtain data from Embassy of South Sudan staff, IGAD staff and Political leader since they were few in number. Examples of non-probability sampling include; purposive sampling and multi-stage sampling and others from which the researcher selected the suitable sampling techniques

for this study. With non-probability sampling, the researcher determined only those elements he deems important for the study to be included in the sample.

This method gave the researcher the mandate to select out 05 members from among the IGAD staff and 07 from among the embassy staff (South Sudan embassy in Uganda), 07 from among the political leaders that were important for consideration in the sample using the purposive sampling technique. Through this technique 19 respondents were obtained for the study sample.

3.5 Sample Size Determination

Sample size determination is the act of choosing the number of observations or replicates to include in a statistical sample. The sample size is an important feature of any empirical study in which the goal is to make inferences about a population from a sample.

This sample size for this study was selected using a number of sampling methods, namely; probability and non-probability in which then the researcher used the purposive and random sampling techniques. The sample size for the current study selected was based on the formulae set by Yamane (1967:886) who provided a simplified formula to calculate sample sizes. Where n is the sample size, N is the population size and e is the level of precision.

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N\ (e)^2}$$

Where n= the required sample size

N= the accessible population which is 90

e= the level of significant co-efficient which is 0.05^2

$$n = \frac{N}{1+ N\ (0.05)^2}$$

Therefore;

$$n = \frac{90}{1 + 90\ (0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{90}{1+0.3}$$

n= 73

Number and Category of Respondents

Table 3.1: The number and Category of respondents

Category of respondents	Study population	Sample size	Sampling technique
Embassy of South Sudan staff	10	07	Purposive
IGAD staff	10	05	Purposive
Political leaders	09	07	Purposive
University academicians	61	54	Simple random
Total	**90**	**73**	

Source: primary data, 2018

3.6 Secondary data sources

Secondary data refers to information the researcher obtains from research articles, books, causal interviews while primary data refers to information the researcher obtains from the field i.e. from subjects in the sample (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999). The secondary method of research involved the use of library sources, published and unpublished literature, official reports and other important policy documents and position papers were sought from resource centers such as the website as well as Nkumba University library.

3.7 Data Collection Methods

Polit and Hungler (1999) define data as information obtained in a course of a study. Data refers to all information a researcher gathers for his or her study. Researchers recognise two types of data: primary data and secondary data (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999).In this study data was collected by using structured interview schedules. A structured interview schedule was used in order to capture data relevant to the study's objectives and research questions. The research study applied the following data collection methods;

3.7.1 Questionnaire

Dick, Bob. Convergent, 2002 says that a questionnaire refers to a research instrument consisting of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents. According to Saunders (2007), is used for explanatory research which enables the study to examine and explain relationships between variables in particular to conduct an

assessment of the challenges to IGAD'S mediation capacity in the Horn of Africa focusing on South Sudan from 2011 – 2016. The use of questionnaire was therefore more effective for the literate proportion of the sample, and time saving too. Questionnaires were administered by the researcher to the different respondents who had the capacity of interpreting the questions during the survey. Questionnaire composed of structured and semi-structured in nature with close-ended questions. The questionnaire was delivered at the respondents' place of work and was collected at appointed time by the researcher.

3.7.2 Interview

According to Mugenda and Mugenda, (1999) an interview is an oral administration of a questionnaire or an interview schedule. Interviews are face to face encounters. To obtain accurate information through interviews a researcher obtained maximum the co-operation from respondents.

The interview is another method that was used by the researcher that involves face-to face interview which has a distinguished advantage of enabling the researcher to establish rapport with potential participants and therefore gain their cooperation. The interview method yielded higher response rates in survey research since structured interview were to be used when all the questions were drafted and a respondent were be asked to clarify incase an ambiguous answer was given and sought for follow up information hence the researcher would obtain the best information. (Leifman, et. al., 2009)

It was a very good technique for getting the information about the complex, emotionally laden subjects. For the method, the researcher got to know the exact information. By this method, the respondent gave the information confidently since there was eye contact between the researcher and the respondents thus yielding more information. The respondent adapted to the ability to be interviewed, this was achieved through conversation with the respondent and there were frequent responses from the respondent. The data collected by this method was more correct compared to the other methods that were used for the data collection. The interview method was good to use since the researcher went to the field herself and ask the respondents for more information that was necessary for the research thus yielding more information from the field compared to other methods. (Leifman et. al., 2009)

3.7.3 Document review

The researcher reviewed documents in order to obtain recorded information that is related to the issue under investigation. This method was used because it saved the researcher time from looking at all documents. Another advantage of this method is that it enabled the researcher access data at her convenient time, obtain data that were thoughtful in that the informants have given attention in obtaining them and enabled the researcher obtain data in the language of the respondent (Oso and Onen, 2008).

3.8 Data Collection Tools/ Instruments

A researcher needs to develop instruments with which to collect the necessary information. In social sciences research there most commonly used instruments are questionnaires, interview schedules, observational forms and standardized tests (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999). This was the first hand information from the people concerned. A number of tools were used for data collection and these include; self-administered questionnaires and interview guides

3.8.1 Self-administered questionnaire

The researcher used the questionnaire technique or tool for collecting data that was constructed with closed ended questions. The researcher opted to use the questionnaires because they could be used to collect large amounts of information from a large number of people in a short period of time, and it was a relatively cost effective, quick and easily quantifiable by the researcher to analyze the data and to compare the findings for clarity (Angrosino, 2002). Furthermore, the researcher used closed ended questions. close-ended questions involved questions that required answers limited within a scope that involve *strongly disagree, disagree, not sure or uncertain, agree and strongly agree* (Five point Liker scale questionnaire).

The researcher chose questionnaires because the research contains variables that could not provide data through direct observation. Such data requires the respondents to express their feelings, opinions about the challenges to IGAD mediation capacity in South Sudan conflict thus questionnaires being the most appropriate tool used.

The questionnaires reached the respondents in time. The respondents interpreted the questions in the right way since the researcher was present to interpret the questions. Questionnaires were expensive to carry out in terms of transport to reach the respondents, printing them and in reaching out people of the targeted population sample.

The structured interview tool assessed the challenges to of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Mediation in South Sudan.

The Self-Administered Questionnaire (included as annexure A of this proposal) comprised the following sections:

a) Section A. Questions related to demographic information
b) Section B: Factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan
c) Section C: The challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan
d) Section D: The strategies that can be adopted in improving of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan

3.8.2 Interview guide

The researcher set questions to guide the oral/ mouth to mouth interactions between the researcher and the respondents. The data collected by this method was more correct compared to the other methods that were used for data collection. The interview method was good to use since the researcher was in the field herself and asked the respondents more information that was necessary for the research thus yielding more information from the field compared to other methods. Interview method was time consuming and it had little tie with language barrier. But getting the appropriate respondents was quite hard as many of them may skip appointments (Burns & Grove 2001).

3.8.3 Review of existing documents

According to Bogere and Gesa (2015), Secondary data collection is obtained through a researcher reviewing or reading other peoples works. It is very vital to be very careful when using secondary data as it significantly differs in its validity and reliability based on its source.

Secondary data was collected from previous studies such as books, journals, magazines, internet, among others were used to help in the findings. Obtainable documents such as library research, published and unpublished literature, official reports, existing literature, various reports and publications were used to get relevant information for the study from resource centres such as;

the embassy of South Sudan Newspaper publications, Nkumba University library and any others considered important.

3.9 Data Quality Control

Quality Control refers to the validity and Reliability of instruments / methodology/content. The researcher should describe the techniques that were used or employed to control or reduced the effects of the extraneous variables (Mutunzi, 2013 pg. 17)

The following criteria were applied to this qualitative and quantitative study in order to make the research credible that is reliability and validity. Respondents' checking was undertaken to give credibility to the analysis. It was up to the reader to determine whether the text has sufficient credibility to qualify as quality piece of research.

3.9.1 Reliability

Reliability is a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials, reliability in research is influenced by random error, as random error increases reliability decreases (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999). To ensure the content reliability, the study used the test -retest method and cronbatch alpha method, results were analyzed using peason's correlation coefficient (PLCC) and the T-test for PLCC if the significance equal or inferior to 0.05 then instrument were reliable for T test, if significance equal or greater than. These methods were used since they helped in avoiding the potential of bias that could accrue during the research processes.

3.9.2 Validity

According to Wangusa (2007), validity is the extent to which a test measures what it claims to measure. To insure the validity of the questionnaire and interview guide; some two experts in research were involved. In this regard, after constructing the questionnaires and interview guide, they were submitted to two experts to ensure their validity through their duties 'basis. This was based on alpha coefficient value of 0.7 and more. Thus, after the expert judgments, the compilation of the responses from raters was computed to determine the content validity index (CVI). If the coefficient computed is from 0.7 and above, the instruments were considered to be valid but if it is less, the instruments were invalid therefore considered valid since the CVI was 0.9 which is above 0.7. This method gave advice to the researcher on which items relevant to the study and those that were not important to the study helped to streamline the study.

3.10 Data Collection and Processing

According to Mugenda and Mugenda, (1999), interview schedules and observation checklists are used to yield qualitative data. However it should be noted that these tools may yield quantitative data. The difference is the way data is collected and the type of data required. Usually qualitative researchers interviewed a respondent several times in order to get in-depth information on a phenomenon.

The researcher obtained an introduction letter from the university authority that is the Dean of the School of Social Sciences. The questionnaires were collected after 2 weeks after the respondents had filled them. Data analysis was done immediately after collection of questionnaires from the field.

In order to shift the power of the researcher/participant relationship to the study participants, the research was undertaken in environments that were selected by and comfortable for study respondents. Focus group discussions and Interviews were conducted in comfortable places for respondents. Key informants were interviewed at their convenience. In this way it was an interviewee-guided interview and the researcher was able to direct, select and structure the story. Data editing coding the data and cleaning was done after data has been collected to ensure that all mistakes made by respondents were cleared then entering the data into the computer for analysis and summarizing the data. Also in this process a number of questionnaires were administered to several respondents.

3.11 Data Analysis

Data analysis is a process that involves editing, classifying and tabulating the collected data (Kothari 2004). In this study, the study employed both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques. Data collected was edited, coded, summarized and analyzed using SPSS software in conformity with objectives of the study this gave a clear presentation of the various responses and the significance of each response depending on the magnitude of the corresponding number and frequency percentage of total responses and conclusions was drawn on the basis of those frequencies. Quantitative data was derived from questionnaires and documentary review levels were classified, tallied and computed into percentages. Tables were used to interpret, summarize, justify and conclude the study. The Microsoft excel computer programme were applied to compute percentages of quantifiable data so as to simplify data analysis process. Qualitative data

analysis was made using content analysis technique by examining data collected from interviews and questionnaires. The data collected from interviews and questionnaires were summarized. Quotations were interpreted in terms of their contents in relation to a particular research question and objectives. In the process of coding and analysis, the content of the same categories were considered and accordingly worked upon. Therefore all the above methods of data analysis helped to simplify data analysis process, hence providing the most reliable and valid report.

3.12 Ethical Considerations

The researcher informed the respondents the purpose of the study, why and how they will be selected. The research went ahead and sought for informed consent of each respondent both orally and in writing.

The researcher told the respondents of the long-term and short-term benefits of the study. The respondents who refused to participate in the study, their decisions were respected.

The researcher tried as much as possible to minimize embarrassing questions especially during interview. In order to obtain the best results, the researcher tried as much as possible to avoid perceptual biases during questionnaire administration and interviews. The above ethical considerations were vital in ensuring that respondents do not withhold desired information and ensure that the data collected would reflect a true and fair image of the views of the study respondents.

3.13 Limitations and delimitations of the Study

In the research process, the researcher faced a number of challenges that affected the progress of the study. These include;

The researcher also faced a challenge of the unavailability of many of the respondents that are to be selected for interviews. The first and foremost was the unavailability of many of the respondents from the IGAD Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan(IGAD-OSESS) and Embassy of South Sudan staff that were selected for interviews. Additionally, because of busy schedules and in many cases due to reasons of confidentiality and sensitivity of the matter, many were unwilling to take part in the interview prepared by the researcher. Out of those who agreed to be interviewed, many did not wish to be recorded and gave their answers on an off record basis.

There was also limited time to fully assess all respondents for interview and questionnaire administration as well as to analyze all the information in journal and other documentary sources/ articles. This problem was solved by conducting interviews fast, administering questionnaires fast and getting a good number of relevant documents such as journals and going through them quickly.

Some respondents did not return the questionnaires in time, and some were not willing to take part in the study. This problem was tackled by use of different data collection methods for example observation in order to generate more data to come up with good presentation of work. Resources in terms of money were not enough.

Finally, appointments over a long period of time and sometimes their cancellations were also an obstacle in the undertaking of this study.

Delimitations of the study

This research is limited to the assessment of the challenges to IGAD'S mediation capacity in the Horn of Africa focusing on South Sudan from 2011 – 2016 in relation to the specific objectives of the study; To establish the causes and consequences of the current conflict in South Sudan; To analyze factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan; To assess the challenges to IGAD mediation capacity in South Sudan ; To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges the researcher was able to conduct research on the challenges to IGAD'S mediation capacity in the Horn of Africa focusing on South Sudan with help of the above mentioned methodology.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter gives detailed presentation and interpretation of the finding that were based on primary and secondary sources of data.

The researcher carried out a critical assessment of the challenges to IGAD peace mediation in the South Sudan focusing on South Sudan conflict from 2011 – 2016. The researcher contacted 90 respodents but obtained data from 73 respondents. Different respodents were contacted to seek their opinions on the subject of study. These included the lectures, students studying in Ugandan universities, Embassy of South Sudan staff, IGAD staff and Political leaders.

Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used to gather both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was obtained from different literature sources such as reports, magazines, and texts among others.

The findings are presented, interpreted, analysed and discussed in relation to the specific objectives of the study;

i.   To analyze factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

ii. To assess the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan

iii. To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan

4.1 General Information

The researcher obtained data on respondents' personal variables.

The study ascertained the general information on the response rate, category of respondents involved in the study.

4.1.1 Response rate

Table 4.1: Response rate

Number of respondents	Actual respondents	Percentage (%)
90	73	81.1

Source: primary data, 2018

From table1, when the researcher contacted 90 respondents but 73 of them were able to provided data which was vital for the current study, and in a rare circumstances the researcher was able to obtain 81.1 % response rate, so the findings are reliable and a true reflection of what is in the field.

4.1.2 Category of respondents

Table 4.2: Category of respondent

Category of respondents	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Embassy of South Sudan staff	07	9.6	9.6
IGAD staff	05	6.9	16.5
Political leaders	07	9.6	26.1
University academicians	54	73.9	100.0
Total	**73**	**100**	

Source: primary data, 2018

The Category of respondents and the results obtained revealed that 07 (9.6%) of the respondents were Embassy of South Sudan staff, 05 (6.8%) were IGAD staff, 07 (9.6%) were Political leaders and 54 (73.9%) were university academicians in Uganda. According to table 4.2, most of the respondents were Academicians in Uganda at 73.9 % of the total number of respondents which shows that there were more academia respondents than any other category of respondents, this was as result of availability and easier accessibility of these respondents than the rest however all categories provided valuable data for this study.

4.2 Respondents' Personal Variables

The research set out to examine the demographic characteristics of the respondents which include gender, age groups, marital status, highest level of education attained, designation in

government, designation outside of government and involvement in diplomatic practice and the results obtained are presented, analyzed, interpreted and discussed in this section; Details of the findings are presented in tables 4.3-4.9

4.2.1 Gender Presentation of Respondents

Table 4.3 Gender

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	44	60.3	60.3
Female	29	39.7	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

The research study set out to establish the gender of respondents and the results obtained revealed that 44 (60.3%) of the respondents were males and 17 (39.7%) were females as showed in table 4.3. According to table 4.3, most of the respondents were male at 60.3% of the total number of respondents which shows that there were more male respondents than their female counterparts, but both male and females provided valuable data for this study. As evidenced by the researcher, this was because there were more respondents male willing to take part of the study than female respondents and that male respondents were the most active members as compared to females. Gender analysis is so important to the study since it shows the level of gender disparities in the country.

4.2.2 Age Disparities among Respondents

Table 4.4 Age bracket

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	18-30	23	31.5	31.5
	31-40	13	17.8	49.3
	41-50	24	32.9	82.2
	51-60	06	8.2	90.4
	61-above	04	5.5	95.9
	Total	70	95.9	
Missing	System	03	4.1	100.0
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

The respondents were also asked to indicate their Age bracket and the results from the respondents are tabulated above.

Respondents were asked to indicate their age brackets. The table 4.5 presents the age groups of the respondents, where 23(31.5%) were between 18-30 years, 13 were between 31-40 years, 24 (32.9%) were between 41-50 years, 6 (8.2%) were between 51-60 years and 4 (5.5%) were 61 and above years. The study concludes that there were respondents from all the age groups. Most respondents were aged 18 to 50 years and these constituted the of employees in diplomatic service, civil servants, political leaders, business personnel, lecturers and advanced level learners which were all assumed to have valuable information for this study. Therefore, it is concluded that there was more labour turn over in the country since majority of the respondents were between 18 to 50 years. The study also reveals that the researcher mostly obtained information from respondents with knowledge, skills and experience in relation to the study hence providing the most reliable and valid data.

Age bracket analysis is so important in the study since it shows the different level participations by different age groups. This is because it is opined that the level of participation decreases as someone tends to age however the more one grows the more he or she becomes more experienced with different issues.

4.2.4 Marital Status Presentation
Table 4.5 Marital Status

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Widowed	07	9.6	9.6
Divorced	06	8.2	17.8
Single	33	45.2	63.0
Married	27	37.0	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

According to Table 4.6, majority of data was obtained from single people. This constituted a proportion of 33(45.2 %) of the total respondents. 27 (37%) of the respondents were married, 7(9.6%) were widowed and 6(8.2%) were divorced. Despite the fact that most respondents were single, all category of respondents provided important information for study. Marital status analysis helped to assess the level of responsibility of the respondents who participated in the

study. It helps to get information from different marital status levels because these respondents have different perception and experiences in life thus providing vital information to the study. Most of the single respondents were university students who were still pursuing their education. These were easily accessible and available to the researcher as compared to the other respondents some who had busy schedules.

4.2.5 Highest Formal Education Level Attained

Table 4.6: Highest education level attained

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Certificate	03	4.1	4.1
Diploma	07	9.6	13.7
Bachelor's Degree	37	50.7	64.4
Master's degree	21	28.8	93.2
Doctorate	05	6.8	**100.0**
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Respondents were asked to indicate their level of education attained. It is noted that educated staff possess adequate minimum skills to perform in their duties and they are said to have high levels of integrity. This helps them to interpret the questionnaire effectively and hence providing relevant information needed by the study. Table 4.6, established that the education level of the respondents, and their responses were; 3 (4.1%) of the respondents had completed certificate such as their highest level of education, 7 (9.6%) were diploma holders, 37 (50.7%) had completed a bachelor's degree and 21 (28.8%) had masters and 5 (6.8%) had doctorate. This implies that the respondents could interpret the questionnaire effectively, hence providing relevant information needed by the study. Therefore all respondents were literate enough to understand and provide vital information to the study.

4.2.6 Designation in government

Table 4.7: designation in government

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Political leader	07	9.6	9.6
Bureaucrat	25	34.2	43.8
None	41	56.2	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

According to table 4.8, 07 (9.6%) of the respondents were political leaders, 25(34.2%) were bureaucrats and 41 (56.2%) had no designation government. The bureaucrats and political leaders had more in-depth knowledge on diplomatic practices, whereas those who did not hold any of those portfolios also provided valuable data for this study.

4.2.7 Designation outside of government
Table 4.8: designation outside government

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Businessman	23	31.5	31.5
Student	45	61.6	93.1
None	05	6.9	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

The researcher established the designation of respondents outside of the government establishment and the results obtained showed that 23 (31.5%) of the respondents were businessmen, 45 (61.6%) were students and 05 (6.9%) were in neither of the two categories. But due to the fact that they accepted to participate in the study, the data all these respondents provided was vital for this study. This was also important because it helped the research understand the kind of work carried out by different respondents in the study and how each of these respondents perception of the topic in the study.

4.2.8 Involvement in any mediation process

Table 4.9: Involvement in mediation process

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	39	53.4	53.4
No	34	46.6	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they have ever got involved in any peace mediation processes in conflict resolution, the results in table 4.4 indicates that (53.4%) of the respondents generally agreed with the statement. However (46.6%) of the total respondents said No. Table 4.10 indicates that majority of the respondents who have ever got involved in the peace mediation. This indicates that the respondents had viable and the most reliable information that the researcher required. This was also vital because the researcher need to know the type of respondents she was getting information from. There was need to know whether the respondents were particularly knowledgeable about mediation and conflict resolution in general.

4.3 Objective One: To analyze Factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinions regarding the factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. Results from the study are tabulated as in table 4.10-4.24

Table 4.10: Parties to the conflict

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly Disagree			
	Disagree			
	Not sure			
	Agree	27	37.0	37.0
	Strongly Agree	43	58.9	95.9
	Total	70	95.9	100.0
Missing	System	03	4.1	
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.10, 43(58.9%) respondents strongly agreed while 27(37.0%) also agreed that parties to the conflict greatly influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. Therefore (95.9%) of respondents generally agreed that parties to the conflict greatly influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. The main parties to the current South Sudan conflict are Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar. However 4.1% was missing system which meant those respondents who did not respond to this particular statement

Table 4.11: Mediation mandates

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly Disagree	06	8.2	8.2
	Disagree	11	15.1	23.3
	Not sure	09	12.3	35.6
	Agree	14	19.2	54.8
	Strongly Agree	32	43.8	98.6
	Total	72	98.6	100.0
Missing	System	01	1.4	
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

Results from Table 4.11 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (63.0%) generally agreed that Mediation mandates greatly influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (23.3%) of the total respondents disagreed ,12.3% were not sure but 1.4% was missing system which meant those respondents who did not respond to this particular statement. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, Mediation mandates greatly influenced to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

This is in line with what Mehari and Abel, (2013) "In the African context mediation mandates are typically contained in resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council, the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council or sub-regional bodies that attempt to resolve specific conflicts. Mandates serve several functions". Failure to obtain a strong mandate from the parties can weaken the mediator's authority and

credibility. It can also cause domestic and international stakeholders to lose confidence in the mediation, and give rise to rival peacemaking bids.

Table 4.12: Nature of IGAD mediation

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree Disagree	04	5.5	5.5
Not sure	10	13.7	19.2
Agree	34	46.6	65.7
Strongly Agree	25	34.2	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results from Table 4.33 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (80.8%) generally agreed that nature of IGAD mediation greatly influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However (5.5%) of the total respondents disagreed and (13.7%) were not sure. Therefore the nature of IGAD mediation greatly influences to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.13: IGAD's wider Mandate

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	07	9.6	9.6
Disagree	13	17.8	27.4
Not sure	07	9.6	37.0
Agree	22	30.1	67.1
Strongly Agree	24	32.9	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results in Table 4.13 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (63%) generally agreed that IGAD's wider Mandate greatly influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (27.4%) of the total respondents disagreed and 9.6% were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD's wider Mandate greatly influenced to the Inter-

Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.14: IGAD member states

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree			
Disagree			
Not sure	03	4.1	4.1
Agree	18	24.7	28.8
Strongly Agree	52	71.2	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results in Table 4.14 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (95.9%) generally agreed that IGAD member states greatly influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, none of the total respondents disagreed and (4.1%) were not sure on how IGAD member states influenced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan.

Table 4.15: African Union

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	02	2.7	2.7
Disagree	10	13.7	16.4
Not sure	04	5.5	21.9
Agree	32	43.8	65.7
Strongly Agree	25	34.2	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results in Table 4.15 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (78.0%) generally agreed that African Union greatly influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (16.4%) of the total respondents disagreed and (5.5%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, African Union greatly influenced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.16: IGAD donor reliance

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	07	9.6	9.6
Disagree	13	17.8	27.4
Not sure	08	11.0	37.4
Agree	38	52.1	89.5
Strongly Agree	07	9.6	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results in Table 4.16 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (61.7%) generally agreed that IGAD donor reliance does influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (27.4%) of the total respondents disagreed and (11.0%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD donor reliance has influence on the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.17: IGAD PLUS

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	04	5.5	5.5
Disagree	14	19.2	27.4
Not sure	06	8.2	65.8
Agree	29	39.7	74.0
Strongly Agree	20	27.4	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Table 4.17 indicates that, 8.2% of the total respondents were not sure about whether IGAD PLUS influences Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, 27.4% of the total respondents disagreed while 67.1% generally agreed. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD PLUS has influence on the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed as compared to those who disagreed with the statement.

Table 4.18: United Nations

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	03	4.1	4.1
Disagree	08	11.0	15.1
Not sure	05	6.8	21.9
Agree	36	49.3	71.2
Strongly Agree	21	28.8	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results in Table 4.18 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (78.1%) generally agreed that United Nations influences Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (15.1%) of the total respondents disagreed and (6.8%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, United Nations has greatly influenced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.19: European Union

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	06	8.2	8.2
Disagree	14	19.2	27.4
Not sure	08	11.0	38.4
Agree	25	34.2	72.6
Strongly Agree	20	27.4	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results in Table 4.19 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (61.6%) generally agreed that European Union greatly influences the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (27.4%) of the total respondents disagreed and (11.0%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, European Union has influenced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.20: Troika and the US

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	09	12.3	12.3
Disagree	13	17.8	30.1
Not sure	11	15.1	45.2
Agree	24	32.9	78.1
Strongly Agree	16	21.9	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Results in Table 4.20 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (54.8%) generally agreed that Troika and the US influences the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (30.1%) of the total respondents disagreed and (15.1%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, Troika and the US have also influenced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement.

Table 4.21: China

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	04	5.5	5.5
Disagree	35	47.9	53.4
Not sure	05	6.9	60.2
Agree	19	26.0	86.2
Strongly Agree	10	13.7	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

According to the results in Table 4.21, the majority of the respondents (53.4%) generally disagreed that China does not influences the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However (39.7%) of the total respondents agreed and (6.9%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, China does not have much influence the Inter-

Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement.

Table 4.22: Grass ownership of the conflict

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	01	1.4	1.4
Disagree	16	21.9	23.3
Not sure	03	4.1	27.4
Agree	23	31.5	58.8
Strongly Agree	30	41.1	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

According to the results in Table 4.22, the majority of the respondents (72.6%) generally agreed that Grass ownership of the conflict does influence the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (23.3%) of the total respondents disagreed and (4.1%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, Grass ownership of the conflict influences the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement.

Table 4.23: South Sudan Environment

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	05	6.8	6.8
Disagree	10	13.7	20.5
Not sure	08	11.0	31.5
Agree	32	43.8	75.3
Strongly Agree	18	24.7	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

Table 4.23 reveals that majority of the respondents (68.5%) generally agreed that South Sudan Environment influences the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (20.5%) of the total respondents disagreed and (11.0%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, South Sudan Environment does influence the Inter-Governmental

Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.24: Cold war legacy

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	10	13.7	13.7
Disagree	14	19.2	32.9
Not sure	19	26.0	58.9
Agree	26	35.6	94.5
Strongly Agree	04	5.5	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

According to Table 4.24, of the respondents generally (41.1%) agreed that Cold war legacy influences the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. However, (32.9%) of the total respondents generally disagreed and (26.0 %) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, Cold war legacy has no much influence the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

4.5: Objective Two: To assess the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan

Respondents were asked to give their opinions regarding the Challenges to the IGAD Mediation Capacity in South Sudan Conflict. The results are tabulated as in table 4.46-4.51

Table 4.25: Regional rivalries and power struggles

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree			
Disagree	03	4.1	4.1
Not sure	01	1.4	5.5
Agree	43	58.9	64.4
Strongly Agree	26	35.6	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary Data, 2018

According to Table 4.25, the majority of the respondents (93.9%) generally agreed that IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan Conflicts is faced with the challenge of regional rivalries and power struggles. However, (4.1%) of the total respondents disagreed and (1.4%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD Mediation Capacity in South Sudan Conflicts is faced with the challenge of regional rivalries and power struggles since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.26: The rivalry between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar makes negotiations hard

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	01	1.4	1.4
Disagree	06	8.2	9.6
Not sure	03	4.1	11.7
Agree	29	39.7	63.4
Strongly Agree	34	46.6	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.26, indicates that, the majority of the respondents (86.3%) generally agreed that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan conflict is faced with the challenge of rivalries between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar. However, (9.6%) of the total respondents disagreed and (4.1%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan Conflicts is faced with the challenge of rivalries between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar, which makes negotiations hard since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.27: There are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	06	8.2	8.2
Disagree	08	11.0	19.2
Not sure	12	16.4	35.6
Agree	24	32.9	68.5
Strongly Agree	23	31.5	**100.0**
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.27, indicates that, the majority of the respondents (64.4%) generally agreed that, there are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation. However, (19.2%) of the total respondents disagreed and (16.4%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, there are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement, hence hindering the IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan.

Table 4.28: Centralisation of decision-making at the Heads of State level

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Strongly Disagree	04	5.5	5.5
Disagree	13	17.8	23.3
Not sure	05	6.9	30.2
Agree	26	35.6	65.8
Strongly Agree	25	34.2	**100.0**
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary data, 2018

Results in Table 4.28, indicates that, the majority of the respondents (69.8%) generally agreed that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan Conflicts is faced with the challenge of high centralisation of decision-making at the Heads of State level. However, (23.3%) of the total respondents disagreed and (6.9%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, during IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan, the decision-making normally Centralizes at the Heads of State level since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.29: Lack of institutionalization within IGAD

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Strongly Disagree	02	2.7	2.7
Disagree	16	21.9	24.6
Not sure	07	9.6	34.2
Agree	25	34.2	68.5
Strongly Agree	23	31.5	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary data, 2018

Results in Table 4.29, indicates that, the majority of the respondents (65.7%) generally agreed that lack of institutionalization is one of the challenges facing IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan. However, (24.6%) of the total respondents disagreed and (9.6%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan are challenged with lack of institutionalization since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.30: Challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	04	5.5	5.5
Disagree	16	21.9	27.4
Not sure	08	11.0	38.4
Agree	26	35.6	74.0
Strongly Agree	19	26.0	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary data, 2018

Results in Table 4.30, indicates that, the majority of the respondents (61.6%) generally agreed that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan are faced with the challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites. However, (27.4%) of the total respondents disagreed and (11.0%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan is facing the challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.31: Insufficient Expertise in Mediation

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	06	8.2	8.2
Disagree	14	19.2	27.4
Not sure	05	6.9	34.3
Agree	33	45.2	79.5
Strongly Agree	15	20.5	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary data, 2018

Results in Table 4.31, indicates that, the majority of the respondents (65.7%) generally agreed that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan are facing the challenges of Insufficient Expertise in Mediation process. However, (27.4%) of the total respondents disagreed and (6.9%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan are facing the challenges of Insufficient expertise in mediation since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

> *This is in line with Nathan (2007) who states that, over the past decade domestic mediation has evolved in many countries to the point that it is now regarded as a professional discipline.*

Table 4.32: Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	07	9.6	9.6
Disagree	18	24.7	34.2
Not sure	05	6.8	41.1
Agree	18	24.7	65.8
Strongly Agree	25	34.2	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary data, 2018

Results in Table 4.32 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (58.9%) generally agreed that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan is facing the challenges of Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators. However, (34.2%) of the total respondents disagreed and (6.8%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD mediation is faced with the challenges of Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

> *This is in agreement with Nathan (2007); all mediators in high-intensity conflict are confronted by a complex array of actors, issues, tasks and problems. They justifiably ever feel like jugglers struggling to keep in the air more balls than is humanly possible, painfully aware that the consequences of dropping even a single ball could be very damaging.*

Table 4.33: No Institutional Memory and Learning

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	11	15.1	15.1
Disagree	19	26.0	41.1
Not sure	13	17.8	58.9
Agree	22	30.1	89.0
Strongly Agree	08	11.0	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: Primary data, 2018

According to Table 4.33, 41.1% of the total respondents generally disagreed that IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan faces the challenges of no or less Institutional Memory and Learning environment, whereas another (41.1%) of the total respondents agreed that IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan faces the challenges of no or less Institutional Memory and Learning environment but (17.8%) were not sure. Therefore, there was an equal response to this statement.

Table 4.34: No Viable Concept of Mediation

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	08	11.0	11.0
Disagree	20	27.4	38.4
Not sure	15	20.5	58.9
Agree	17	23.3	82.2
Strongly Agree	13	17.8	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.34 shows that, (38.4%) of the respondents generally disagreed that IGAD Mediation Capacity in South Sudan is challenged with No or less Viable Concept of Mediation. However, (41.1%) of the total respondents agreed and (20.5%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan has adequate viable Concept of Mediation since majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement.

4.6: Objective Three: To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan.

Respondents were asked to indicate the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan. Results are indicated in table 4.35-4.41

Table 4.35: Endless calls for cessation of hostilities would foster end to fighting

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Disagree	23	31.5	31.5
Not sure	03	4.1	35.6
Agree	03	4.1	39.7
Strongly Agree	44	60.3	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.35 shows that, the majority of the respondents (64.4%) generally agreed that, endless calls for cessation of hostilities would foster end to fighting is one of the strategies that Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan is using to improving peace mediation capacity in the country. However, (35.6%) of the total respondents disagreed and (4.1%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, endless calls for cessation of hostilities would foster end to fighting is used in South Sudan to improving peace mediation capacity in the country since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.36: The use of trade sanctions by IGAD on the government of South Sudan can force the fighting groups to for peace

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Disagree	07	9.6	9.6
	Not sure	29	39.7	49.3
	Agree	30	41.1	90.4
	Strongly Agree	06	8.2	98.6
	Total	72	98.6	
Missing	System	01	1.4	100.0
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.36 shows that, the majority of the respondents (49.3%) generally agreed that, the use of trade sanctions by IGAD on the government of South Sudan can force the fighting groups to for peace. However, (40.3%) of the total respondents disagreed and (8.2%) were not sure but 1.4% was missing system which meant those respondents who did not respond to this particular statement. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, the use of trade sanctions by IGAD on the government of South Sudan has forced the fighting groups to go for peace mediation since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.37: Arms embargo motivates the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	03	4.1	4.1
Disagree	15	20.5	24.7
Not sure	05	6.8	31.5
Agree	31	42.5	73.0
Strongly Agree	19	26.0	100.0
Total	**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.37 shows that, the majority of the respondents (68.5%) generally agreed that, arms embargo motivates the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations is adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan to improving peace mediation capacity. However, (24.7%) of the total respondents disagreed and (6.8%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, arms embargo motivates the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations is adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan to improving peace mediation capacity since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.38: Institutionalization of mediation units can easily end fighting

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Disagree	19	26.0	29.2
	Not sure	08	11.0	40.3
	Agree	21	28.8	66.7
	Strongly Agree	24	32.9	100.0
	Total	72	98.6	
Missing	System	01	1.4	
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

Table 4.38 shows that, the majority of the respondents (61.7%) generally agreed that, institutionalization of mediation units is adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan to easily end fighting. However, (26.0%) of the total respondents disagreed and (11%) were not sure 1.4% was missing system which meant those respondents who did not respond to this particular statement. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, institutionalization of mediation units is adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan to easily end fighting since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.39: Preparation of mediation actions plans to strengthen IGAD's capabilities and participation in peace building in South Sudan

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Strongly Disagree	05	6.8	6.9
	Disagree	18	24.7	31.9
	Not sure	03	4.1	36.1
	Agree	13	17.8	54.2
	Strongly Agree	33	45.2	100.0
	Total	72	98.6	
Missing	System	01	1.4	
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

Table 4.39 shows that, the majority of the respondents (63%) generally agreed that, preparation of mediation actions plans to strengthen IGAD's capabilities and participation in peace building in South Sudan. However, (31.9%) of the total respondents disagreed and (4.1%) were not sure

but 1.4% was missing system. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, preparation of mediation actions plans to strengthen IGAD's capabilities and participation in peace building in South Sudan since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

Table 4.40: Strengthening existing peace agreements, which have been signed with attempts, restore peace and stability to the country

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Disagree	08	11.0	11.0
	Not sure	10	13.7	24.7
	Agree	23	31.5	56.2
	Strongly Agree	31	42.4	100.0
	Total	72	98.6	
Missing	System	01	1.4	
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.40 shows that, the majority of the respondents (73.7%) generally agreed that, Strengthening existing peace agreements, which have been signed with attempts, restore peace and stability to the country improve on the mediation capacity. However, (11.0%) of the total respondents disagreed and (13.7%) were not sure. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, strengthening existing peace agreements, which have been signed with attempts, restore peace and stability to the country to improve on the mediation capacity in South Sudan.

Table 4.41: Creation of dedicated Mediation: Units The mediation units would have two primary functions to end the conflicts that is conflict prevention and conflict resolution

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Disagree	15	20.5	20.8
	Not sure	18	24.7	45.8
	Agree	24	32.9	79.2
	Strongly Agree	15	20.5	100.0
	Total	72	98.6	
Missing	System	01	1.4	
Total		**73**	**100.0**	

Source: primary data, 2018

Table 4.41 shows that, the majority of the respondents (53.4%) generally agreed that, creation of dedicated Mediation Units improve on the mediation capacity. However, (20.5%) of the total respondents disagreed and 32.9% were not sure 4.1% was missing system which meant those respondents who did not respond to this particular statement. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, creation of dedicated mediation Units is used to improve on the mediation capacity since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

4.6 Discussion of Findings

4.6 .1 Introduction
This section presents the discussion of findings basing on the following study objectives;

i)   To analyze the factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan.

ii)   To assess the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan.

iii) To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan.

4.6.2 Objective Two: To analyze factors that influence IGAD peace mediation process in South Sudan conflict
According to the findings, among the factors that influenced the Inter-Governmental Authority on development peace mediation process in South Sudan included; parties to the conflict, mediation mandates, nature of IGAD mediation, IGAD's wider Mandate, IGAD member states, African Union, IGAD donor reliance, IGAD PLUS, United Nations, European Union, Troika and the US, China, Grass ownership of the conflict (civil society, religious leaders, cultural leaders etc.) South Sudan Environment, cold war legacy and principles of mediation.

From the findings (100.0%) and while (95.9%) indicated that parties to the conflict and IGAD member states greatly respectively influence peace mediation process on South Sudan conflict. Other factors also included nature of IGAD mediation (80.8%), African Union and United Nations, grass root ownership of the conflict, South Sudan environment, mediation mandates, IGAD's wide mandate, IGAD PLUS, IGAD donor reliance and European Union. Not forgetting Troika and US, Cold war legacy and china respectively.

96

These member states had both positive and negative influence on the IGAD peace mediation process in South Sudan. Positively, the neighboring states threatened to impose punitive measures in order to secure a durable peace, South Sudan's warring elites need to begin to feel the consequences of their actions. In terms of impact, Uganda's role in the South Sudanese civil war was second to none. Negatively, Uganda's military intervention on behalf of Kiir's government and unilateral decisions were a constant strain on the peace process, an x-factor that made an already complicated knot harder to untie. In addition to undermining IGAD's impartiality, the tension between Museveni and what he saw as "junior" partners in Ethiopia and Kenya prevented regional consensus at critical junctures.

It is not a thing of surprise that South Sudan crisis unveiled the conflicting interests of the regional governments. In fact, the neighboring countries of South Sudan have been criticized for supporting the government and the rebel group or shifting their support from one side to another. In the region we are living today, it would be fair to say that Sudan is involving the conflict due to political reasons and publicly expressed its support for Salva Kiir, though reports confirm its support of the opposition as well.

Against the unclear position of Khartoum, Uganda has maintained regular contact and support with the SPLA and South Sudanese Government both pre and post-independence respectively. In the most recent crisis, Ugandan troops are physically in South Sudan fighting the rebels fearing that a collapsed South Sudan state will be the home of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and support the government in order to restore peace and order. However, though some may express the support of Uganda as a generous and friendly, Uganda on the other hand has its own plan and desire to protect its political and economic interests in South Sudan. Not different from Uganda's stance, Kenya shares Ugandan concerns that prolonged instability in South Sudan will spoil its economic interests in South Sudan and reversely send back waves of refugees to its borders. Therefore, the Kenyan president has expressed "support and solidarity" with Kiir and called for a speedy resolution of the crisis.

According to the findings, (67.1%) generally agreed that 'IGAD-Plus' initiative has an influence on the peace mediation process however (8.2%)weren't sure about this. The IGAD mediation process is notable for its extensive involvement of outside actors. The talks became known as

the 'IGAD-Plus' initiative, due to the presence of states beyond the group's East African bloc, with representatives from the so-called 'Troika' group (the US, the UK and Norway, responsible for financing the talks), China, the European Union and the African Union joining. The start of the IGAD process indeed presents a great reprieve for the people of South Sudan, the region, and the international community. In earnest, the warring parties sent their delegations for peace talks in Addis. Despite sustained efforts by these parties, the mediators, and peace process supporters to concretize a "multi-stakeholder" political dialogue, these groups were never allowed to engage as full participants.

Results in Table 4.16 indicate that, the majority of the respondents (61.7%) generally agreed that IGAD donor reliance does influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan for example at the request of IGAD, Norway and other European partners financed the peace process, supplemented by contributions from the United States. Despite the readiness of partners to provide funds and thereby take a major concern off the mediators' plate, coordination and expectation management remained constant challenges. As the US envoy later reflected, "When Western nations fund peace processes they do not control, tensions emerge as those funds are sometimes attached to policy preferences, legal requirements, or political obligations back home." IGAD, meanwhile, had its own priorities, which did not necessarily reflect those of the donors.

From the findings, (63.0%) of the respondents generally agreed that mediation mandates influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan. Political support from IGAD member states, however, was lacking. Though regional heads of state had tasked them with an official mandate, in practice the mediators quickly found themselves operating on a very short leash. The heads of state retained ultimate control over the direction of the process and its outcomes. When summit decisions ignored the mediators' progress or simply overturned their decisions, their lack of authority was exposed, and the parties henceforth calculated accordingly.

4.6.4 Objective Two: To assess the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan

From the study findings, the challenges to the IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan conflict were regional rivalries and power struggle - the rivalry between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar

that made negotiations harder, there were off-shoots of fighting groups which hampered negotiations, centralization of decision-making at the Heads of State level, lack of institutionalization within IGAD, Challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites, Insufficient Expertise in Mediation, Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators.

From the study, the peace process faces numerous internal and external challenges before and after signed the "Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan." According to, Yohannes (2015:52) challenges that destabilize the efforts of solving the conflict. Mediation and peace processes can be complex and last much longer than expected. Difficulties and challenges arising from the interests of warring parties, member states, regional organisations, external actors and development partners are to be expected. For instance, one major challenge was the continued splitting of warring factions and rebel groups, which is partly explaining the intractability of the conflict but also underlines the complexity of the accompanying mediation and peace processes.

According to Table 4.25, the majority of the respondents (93.9%) generally agreed that IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan Conflicts is faced with the challenge of regional rivalries and power struggles. Table 4.25, indicates that, majority of the respondents (86.3%) generally agreed that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan conflict is faced with the challenge of rivalries between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar.

According to the finding the majority of the respondents (64.4%) generally agreed that, there are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation. Therefore repeated violations of cessation of hostilities agreements coupled with boycotting of peace talks were a reflection of the non-dialogue approach taken by warring parties. Despite IGAD's warnings against this did not translate into punitive measures against the parties. The parties regarded each other with deep mistrust and animosity they believed that their differences were irreconcilable they considered their own position to be non-negotiable and feared that their settlement would entail unacceptable compromise. These concerns were intense due to the large scale killings that had occurred while security, identity, freedoms and justice were at stake. These concerns were both a product of conflict and obstacles to its resolution. These lead to lack confidence in negotiations

as a means of achieving a satisfactory outcome, even when the cost of hostilities is high and there are no chances of possibility of outright victory.

From the study, 86.3% of the respondents indicated that, IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan conflict is faced with the challenge of rivalries between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar. The warring parties hold the largest share of blame for failing to end the conflict they started, but the mediation is partly culpable given how the process has been managed. One of the serious challenges to the IGAD mediation had been the fact that the mediators did not simply understand the power of momentum. Whenever the talks reached a critical stage, the mediators would send the parties on recess. During recess, momentum fades away and when the parties returned, they came with their positions hardened and on many occasions they reneged on previously agreed positions. This is what led to the collapse of the peace talks in December, 2014. One of the most serious instances that demonstrate this was when the parties clearly had agreed on a number of critical issues in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, and instead of inviting the principals to iron out the few remaining items, the parties were sent on a long recess to conduct consultations. When the SPLM-IO convened for the first time in Pagak, it essentially reneged on previous commitments and took a hard line position on major issues. The government also resolved to take hard line positions on a number of controversial issues during the consultative process in Juba.

But the success of this will be contingent upon multiple factors such as building of trust, neutrality, patience, knowledge of the conflict history, interests and motivations of the parties and the ability of mediators to research and keep abreast of developments and dynamics of the conflict. Of overwhelming importance, however, will be the availability of continued financial resources to facilitate the process.

The mediation also seemingly suffered from lack of full mandate and independence. This is presumed from the fact that the mediators hardly tried to resolve any impasses with the parties. Instead, they consulted the Heads of State and Government whenever hurdles were hit. Whilst the pressure from the IGAD leaders was welcomed, it seemingly interfered with the smooth flow of the mediation. It felt that the mediators were not fully in charge of the process and therefore were not as creative and were pulled to all directions.

Evidently, the actions of the IGAD Heads of State did not necessarily help the process move forward given their conflicting interests as important actors. Particularly, Uganda and Sudan, two countries that are deeply involved directly in the conflict, still sit on the mediation table. This conflict of interests is not confined only to the IGAD Head of States; there was an apparent competition between the Ethiopian and Kenyan mediation teams.

The most serious challenge for the IGAD has been issue-framing. From the start, IGAD mediation had framed the conflict in terms of power sharing and so restructuring state power and finding equitable power sharing ratios was the preoccupation of the peace envoys. Though the conflict started as a power struggle within the SPLM, it has grown beyond the confines of the party, and hence, power sharing alone would not address it. This framing did not allow the mediation team sufficient operational space to think outside the rigid walls of power sharing.

Although the parties agreed to focus on the issue of power restructuring, their constituencies are not necessarily concerned with power. They are concerned with mundane issues of daily living and the need to alleviate their current states of being. Predicating a solution to a serious national crisis on finding a win-win power equation leaves so much to be desired and tragically ignores the concerns of the commons.

Additionally, the IGAD-led peace process was fraud with regional and international interests that were interfering with the principal objective of finding a permanent resolution to the conflict in South Sudan. Regionally, Uganda and Sudan are fighting proxy wars on the ground in South Sudan. Uganda had deployed its troops mostly in Juba and Bor in support of the government. Sudan, on the other hand, provided logistical support to the opposition forces, mostly in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states. They had preferences regarding the solution to the crisis. Kenya and Ethiopia also had competing interests; they were vying for control over the mediation process. The Troika and other supporters of IGAD also had their own objectives, which may not be in line with those of the parties. Since Troika and the European Union were paying the bill, they held sway over the mediators as well. Such an environment could not produce an immediate peace.

Another challenge identified relates to inadequate resource capacity of IGAD to sustain the mediation process. What is needed in the face of such challenges is for the mediators to develop

techniques and innovative approaches to navigate such difficulties and challenges at the very outset of mediation and negotiation processes.

The IGAD mediation also seriously suffered from lack of credibility, partly because of the style of the mediation leadership. The process has not been tightly controlled and it had been subjected to so much interference from the warring parties, IGAD leaders, and their supporters.

The whole IGAD mediation got into serious trouble after the parties failed in March 2015 to reach a final settlement. Attempts were made to revive the IGAD led mediation through a new mechanism called the IGAD-Plus that brought the Troika countries, China, the EU, UN and five representative countries of the African Union, to the mediation table. The pendulum continued. Last year, the focus was mainly on the need for South Sudanese inclusive peace process. As discussed, it did not produce edible fruits. Now, the thinking was to populate the table with all the world powers, with the hope that these powers will squeeze out every bit of air in the warring parties so as to reach an agreement. Though there was skepticism regarding the ability of IGAD-Plus to push the parties towards an agreement, the IGAD-Plus succeeded in pressuring the parties into signing the fledgling agreement called the Agreement on the Resolution of Crisis in South Sudan on August the 17 and 26, 2015, respectively.

Despite the other challenges, in reference to the study findings, 41.1 % and 38.4% of the total generally disagreed that IGAD peace mediation faces challenge of no institutional memory and learning and no visible concept of mediation respectively.

4.7.5 Objective Three: To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan
The study revealed that IGAD should to continue strengthening the existing peace agreements which have been signed with attempts to restore peace and stability to the country and also use arms embargo so as to motivate the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations. In addition, IGAD has to continue making endless calls for cessation of hostilities in order end to fighting, preparation of mediation action plans, institutionalization of mediation units that can easily end fighting and use of trade sanctions respectively.

According to the study, (64.4%) of the respondents indicated that, endless calls for cessation of hostilities would foster end to fighting. However, (35.6%) of the total respondents disagreed. From Table 4.57, (49.3%) of the respondents generally agreed that, the use of trade sanctions by IGAD on the government of South Sudan would force the fighting groups to for peace. However, (40.3%) of the total respondents disagreed and (8.2%).

Additionally, (68.5%) of the respondents suggested that, arms embargo would motivate the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations if adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan to improving peace mediation. However, (24.7%) of the total respondents disagreed whereas (6.8%) were not sure about this strategy. whereas 61.7% of the respondents indicated that, institutionalization of mediation units is adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan to easily end fighting. However, (26.0%) of the total respondents disagreed and (11%) were not sure 1.4% was missing system which meant those respondents who did not respond to this particular statement. Therefore, despite of the level of divergence in the responses from the respondents, the study concludes that, institutionalization of mediation units is adopted by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan to easily end fighting since majority of the respondents agreed with the statement. The (63%) of the respondents generally agreed that, preparation of mediation actions plans to strengthen IGAD's capabilities and participation in peace building in South Sudan. However, (31.9%) of the total respondents disagreed and (4.1%) were not sure.

In reference to the study findings that, (73.7%) the of the respondents generally agreed that, Strengthening existing peace agreements, which have been signed with attempts, restore peace and stability to the country improve on the mediation capacity. According to the findings that, (53.4%) the of the respondents generally agreed that, creation of dedicated Mediation Units improve on the IGAD peace mediation. And (63.0%) agreed to Preparation of mediation actions plans to strengthen IGAD's capabilities and participation in peace building in South Sudan

According to the study, other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia In addition the best strategy IGAD has

employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan is engaging high diplomatic mediation such as IGAD secretariat and peace ambassadors which however has not worked.

Just like what Nathan, (2010) suggested, greater attention should be paid to the criteria for appointing mediators and to the talent and experience of those appointed. The current approach of deploying serving or retired heads of state and diplomats without regard to their aptitude for peacemaking is patently unsound.

There should be Support to mediators because mediators are confronted by conflicts that are highly complex and volatile. Typically, the conflict is violent; it has many structural and proximate causes; it involves several disputant parties, most of which are intransigent and some of which are divided within their own ranks; and it encompasses a range of external actors, some of whom play a harmful role and some of whom have to be coordinated in the peace process. Adapt a confidence building approach to mediation because mediation in national conflicts relies too much on power-based diplomacy, attempting to make progress by exerting pressure on the disputant parties through declarations, admonitions, threats and punishment. These strategies should be replaced by a confidence-building approach to mediation. It seems painfully obvious that deep-rooted national conflict cannot be solved quickly or easily. Nevertheless, international mediators and donor governments frequently make the mistake of seeking a quick fix. In doing so, they overestimate their influence, underestimate the complexity of the conflict and ignore the parties' visceral feelings of hatred and mistrust (Nathan, 2010).

Building confidence between the protagonists in a national conflict is vital for several reasons: a negotiated settlement necessarily entails compromises and mutual accommodation by the parties and this will not happen while they remain locked in enmity; the implementation of agreements demands the parties' co-operation; and stable governance in the long-term depends on their on-going co-operation. Given these factors, confidence-building is not a luxury. It is a pragmatic imperative and should be a paramount goal of the mediator. A fine example of a confidence-building approach can be found in the mediation that led to the ending of the Mozambican civil war in 1992 (Nathan, 2010).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the study and areas of further study basing on the four objectives of the study that were;

i. To analyze factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

ii. To assess the challenges to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan

iii. To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan

5.1 Summary of the Study

5.1.1 Objective One: To analyze Factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

According to the findings, the factors that influence the Inter-Governmental Authorities on the development of peace mediation in South Sudan included; parties to the conflict, mediation mandates, nature of IGAD mediation, IGAD's wider Mandate, IGAD member states, African Union, IGAD donor reliance, IGAD PLUS, United Nations, European Union, Troika and the US, China, Grass ownership of the conflict (civil society, religious leaders, cultural leaders etc) South Sudan Environment and cold war legacy.

From the findings IGAD member states greatly respectively influence peace mediation process on South Sudan conflict. Other factors also include nature of IGAD mediation , African Union and United Nations, grass root ownership of the conflict, South Sudan environment, mediation mandates, IGAD's wide mandate, IGAD PLUS, IGAD donor reliance and European Union. Not forgetting Troika and US, Cold war legacy and china respectively.

These member states had both positive and negative influence on the IGAD peace mediation process in South Sudan. Positively, the neighboring states threatened to impose punitive

measures in order to secure a durable peace, South Sudan's warring elites need to begin to feel the consequences of their actions. In terms of impact, Uganda's role in the South Sudanese civil war was second to none. Negatively, Uganda's military intervention on behalf of Kiir's government and unilateral decisions were a constant strain on the peace process, an x-factor that made an already complicated knot harder to untie. It is not a thing of surprise that South Sudan crisis unveiled the conflicting interests of the regional governments. In fact, the neighboring countries of South Sudan have been criticized for supporting the government and the rebel group or shifting their support from one side to another.

According to the findings, (67.1%) generally agreed that 'IGAD-Plus' initiative has an influence on the peace mediation process however (8.2%)weren't sure about this. The IGAD mediation process is notable for its extensive involvement of outside actors. The talks became known as the 'IGAD-Plus' initiative, due to the presence of states beyond the group's East African bloc, with representatives from the so-called 'Troika' group (the US, the UK and Norway, responsible for financing the talks), China, the European Union and the African Union joining.

The majority (61.7%) of the respondents generally agreed that IGAD donor reliance does influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan for example at the request of IGAD, Norway and other European partners financed the peace process, supplemented by contributions from the United States..

5.1.2 Objective Two: To assess the Challenges to IGAD mediation capacity in South Sudan
Among the major Challenges to IGAD Peace Mediation in South Sudan Conflict that the study identified included; regional rivalries and power struggles (the rivalry between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar makes negotiations hard) , there are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation, centralization of decision-making at the Heads of State level, lack of institutionalization within IGAD, Challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites, Insufficient Expertise in Mediation, Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators.

The study revealed that the major challenges to IGAD's peace mediation are the regional rivalries and power struggles between warring parties Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar, the vested

interests of member states in South Sudan as well as the historical enmities. The conflict in Sudan also had a huge impact on the course of conflict in South Sudan

The peace process faced numerous internal and external challenges before and after signed the "Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan." According to, Yohannes (2015:52) challenges that destabilize the efforts of solving the conflict**.** Mediation and peace processes can be complex and last much longer than expected. Difficulties and challenges arising from the interests of warring parties, member states, regional organisations, external actors and development partners are to be expected. For instance, one major challenge was the continued splitting of warring factions and rebel groups, which is partly explaining the intractability of the conflict but also underlines the complexity of the accompanying mediation and peace processes.

Therefore IGAD was faced with repeated violations of cessation of hostilities agreements coupled with boycotting of peace talks were a reflection of the non-dialogue approach taken by warring parties. Despite IGAD's warnings against this did not translate into punitive measures against the parties. The parties regarded each other with deep mistrust and animosity they believed that their differences were irreconcilable they considered their own position to be non-negotiable and feared that their settlement would entail unacceptable compromise.

It is obvious, the warring parties hold the largest share of blame for failing to end the conflict they started, but the mediation is partly culpable given how the process has been managed. One of the serious challenges to the IGAD mediation had been the fact that the mediators did not simply understand the power of momentum. Whenever the talks reached a critical stage, the mediators would send the parties on recess.

The mediation also seemingly suffered from lack of full mandate and independence. This is presumed from the fact that the mediators hardly tried to resolve any impasses with the parties. Instead, they consulted the Heads of State and Government whenever hurdles were hit. Whilst the pressure from the IGAD leaders was welcomed, it seemingly interfered with the smooth flow of the mediation. It felt that the mediators were not fully in charge of the process and therefore were not as creative and were pulled to all directions.

Evidently, the actions of the IGAD Heads of State did not necessarily help the process move forward given their conflicting interests as important actors. Particularly, Uganda and Sudan, two countries that are deeply involved directly in the conflict, still sit on the mediation table. This conflict of interests is not confined only to the IGAD Head of States; there was an apparent competition between the Ethiopian and Kenyan mediation teams.

Generally IGAD as a regional organisation lacks of strong political union. It's imperative to note that it's more of a common club of the Heads of states, it is not a political union and no wonder it on many occasions has less to say on a number of issues emanating from its member states even when the situation calls for a strong statement. This lack of political mandate has vehemently rendered IGADs mandate so vague. In addition to the lack of strong political union is lack of political will by   member states.

The IGAD mediation was the fact that IGAD itself did not live up to its end of the agreements. The most serious challenge for the IGAD has been issue-framing. From the start, IGAD mediation had framed the conflict in terms of power sharing and so restructuring state power and finding equitable power sharing ratios was the preoccupation of the peace envoys. Additionally, the IGAD-led peace process was fraud with regional and international interests that were interfering with the principal objective of finding a permanent resolution to the conflict in South Sudan. Regionally, Uganda and Sudan are fighting proxy wars on the ground in South Sudan. Another challenge identified relates to inadequate resource capacity of IGAD to sustain the mediation process.

The IGAD mediation also seriously suffered from lack of credibility, partly because of the style of the mediation leadership. The whole IGAD mediation got into serious trouble after the parties failed in March 2015 to reach a final settlement. Attempts were made to revive the IGAD led mediation through a new mechanism called the IGAD-Plus that brought the Troika countries, China, the EU, UN and five representative countries of the African Union, to the mediation table. IGAD Member states unable to condemn each other: Due to dictatorships, regional leaders do hardly condemn each other when it comes to problems committed by some leaders.

5.1.4 Objective Three: To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan

The study finally revealed that endless calls for cessation of hostilities would foster end to fighting, the use of trade sanctions by IGAD on the government of South Sudan can force the fighting groups to for peace, Arms embargo motivates the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations, and institutionalization of mediation units can easily end fighting.

In reference to the study findings, (73.7%) majority of the respondents generally agreed that, Strengthening existing peace agreements, which have been signed with attempts, restore peace and stability to the country improve on the mediation capacity

Greater attention should be paid to the criteria for appointing mediators and to the talent and experience of those appointed. The performance of the mediators should be assessed periodically and at the end of each mediation.

There should be support to mediators because mediators are confronted by conflicts that are highly complex and volatile. In these circumstances, mediators need considerable support, which can be categorised as follows: Mediation expertise, thematic expertise, Communications expertise, Management, administrative and financial expertise, developing a learning culture.

Because national conflicts have common features and challenges, much can be learnt from comparative research with a thematic focus. Detailed mediation case studies can also be extremely useful as they enable a close examination of the complexities of the process.

The strategies should be replaced by a confidence-building approach to mediation. Building confidence between the protagonists in a national conflict is vital for several reasons like a negotiated settlement necessarily entails compromises and mutual accommodation by the parties.

5.2 Conclusion of the study

5.2.1 Objective One: To analyze Factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

The study concluded that Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan was majorly influenced by the parties to the conflict; in this case these were Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar. In addition , the study also concluded that mediation

mandates, nature of IGAD mediation, IGAD's wider Mandate, IGAD member states, African Union, IGAD donor reliance, IGAD PLUS, United Nations, European Union, Troika and the US, religious leaders, cultural leaders etc) South Sudan Environment and cold war legacy also had influence on IGAD mediation peace process respectively.

The parties to the conflict had a great influence on the peace process because without their incompatibility interests there would be no need of mediation in South Sudan. Therefore they held the greatest influence on IGAD with respect to the conflict. The member states were the main players in this peace process therefore had great influence on the process. They had both negative and positive impacts on IGAD mediation capacity, not forgetting the role which was played by the international community which gave financial support however with strings attached on what to do next.

5.2.2 Objective Two: To assess the Challenges to IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan

The study concluded that IGAD peace mediation was majorly challenged by; power struggles, between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar made negotiations hard, there are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation, centralization of decision-making at the Heads of State level, self-interests of IGAD states, lack of institutionalization within IGAD, Insufficient Expertise in Mediation and Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators. Not forgetting multi external involvement in the peace process.

South Sudan's leaders bear primary responsibility for the conflict, the troubled nature of peace negotiations, and the devastation borne by millions of their fellow South Sudanese. But as the principal entry point for international actors, the IGAD-led peace process also merits critical review. Drawing on principles of mediation best practice, an analysis of the peace process demonstrates an unusually fraught mediation context, including deficits in five fundamental areas: preparedness, consent, impartiality, inclusivity, and strategy.

The role of regional actors and wider peace process supporters in any mediation effort can be hugely consequential, as interested states can variously support, shape, or spoil a peace process. South Sudan was no exception. Most notably, the potential value brought to the South Sudanese

mediation effort by IGAD's frontline states; Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda was ultimately outweighed by their competing national interests and stakes in the outcome.

Further analysis revealed layer of dynamics that complicated the task of the mediators, from intra-group tensions and forum shopping to summit diplomacy and empty threats. Together, these issues offered important insights into the peacemaking effort, the challenges confronted, and the environment in which an ill-fated peace agreement was forged.

Despite notable flaws in the process, the success or failure of any mediation effort depends first and foremost on the political will of the parties themselves. South Sudan's principal combatants not only lacked the will to make peace—they were often hostile to the very idea of a negotiated settlement. As such, IGAD and the wider constituency of peace process supporters faced a political and moral dilemma often confronted by outside actors when a conflict is not "ripe" for settlement-when tradeoffs are made between ideal solutions and the imperative to stop the violence.

5.2.3 Objective Three: To examine the strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan

The study concluded that endless calls for cessation of hostilities would foster end to fighting, the use of trade sanctions by IGAD on the government of South Sudan can force the fighting groups to for peace, Arms embargo motivates the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations, and institutionalization of mediation units can easily end fighting.

Greater attention should be paid to the criteria for appointing mediators and to the talent and experience of those appointed. The performance of the mediators should be assessed periodically and at the end of each mediation.

There should be support to mediators because mediators are confronted by conflicts that are highly complex and volatile. In these circumstances, mediators need considerable support, which can be categorised as follows: Mediation expertise, thematic expertise, Communications expertise, Management, administrative and financial expertise, developing a learning culture.

The strategies should be replaced by a confidence-building approach to mediation. Building confidence between the protagonists in a national conflict is vital for several reasons like a negotiated settlement necessarily entails compromises and mutual accommodation by the parties.

5.3 Recommendations for the study

1. There is need for instutionalisation of mediation units that can help in ending fighting and also preparation of action plans to strengthen IGAD'S capacities and participation in peace building in South Sudan. Not forgetting the creation of dedicated mediation units that can have two primary functions that is conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

2. Endless calls for cessation of hostilities should not stop and strengthening of the existing peace agreements which have been signed with attempt to restore peace and stability. And these should be respected by all parties to the conflict. The parties should get serious. After every agreement they sign, they offer contradictory statements that indicate lack of commitment to the agreement.

3. IGAD should bring mechanisms to supervise the implementation of the peace plan and should deploy a team that monitors the situation with necessary provisions. And also ensuring progress in peace and state building in South Sudan requires the establishment of clear targets and strategies aimed to reach the people at the grassroots coupled with a performance monitoring framework from the regional actors.

5.4 Areas for further study

1. Assessment of the gap between mandate and capacity of regional organizations

REFERENCES

Aleu Garang,(2015) The impact of external actors on the prospects of a mediated settlement in South Sudan *Paper to be presented at the Academic Conference on International Mediation, University of Pretoria, 2-4 June 2015, Pretoria, South Africa.*

Amin, M.E. (2005) Social Science Research: Conception, Methodology and Analysis. Makerere University Press, Kampala.

Augsburger David (1999) Conflict Mediation across Cultures (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), p.202

Awolowich, A. (2015), Political Parties and the Push for Political Consensus. Sudd Institute. Africa Report. No. 217. 10th April. King, K. (2015)

Baker, T.L. (1994), Doing Social Research (2nd Edn.), New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.

Beardsley, Kyle, David Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 2006 "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes" Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(1): 58–86

Bercovitch Jacob (1997) Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice: Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds. I. William

Bercovitch Jacob and Gerald Schneider 2000, Who mediates? The political economy of International Conflict Management Journal of Peace Research 37(2): 387–404

Bercovitch, Jacob/Judith Fretter. 2004. "Regional Guide to International Conflict Management." Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly

Bereketeab Redie (2015) why South Sudan conflict is proving intractable. Policy note 4,the Nordic African Institute

Berridge, G.R. and Alan James (2003) A Dictionary of Diplomacy. Second Edition, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bogere M. and Gesa A. (2015).Understanding Research and Statistical Methods: A guide for East African students and Researchers. New Edition Printed by Smart Stationeries Ltd

Boutros-Ghali 1992; UN General Assembly 1994; UN 2001, 2006, 2008; UN Security Council (2005)

Burns, N. and Grove, S.K. (2001).The Practice of Nursing Research, Conduct, Critique, and Utilization. 4th Edition, W.B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia

Caldeira and Gibson (1995), Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Mediation in Civil War. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, 18th March.

Carlos, K and Gutschke, T. (2014). South Sudan's Newest War: When two old men divide a nation.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and CMI's mediation of ceasefire (2003)

Cloke, Kenneth (2005) Mediators without borders: A Proposal to Resolve Political Conflicts."

Coleman et al., (2008) Innovations in "African Solutions to African Problems, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2011), pp. 287–314; Ruggeri,

Conflict Research Consortium (2005) International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict: University of Colorado, USA

Cooper Donald R. and Pamela S. Schindler (2006) Business research methods, 2006, English, Book, Illustrated edition

Copeland Alisson (2015) The Tension between UN HQ and the Field in Implementing the Protection of Civilians," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

David, F (2008). Peace and Conflict in African GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Zed Books, London.

De Vaus, D.A. (1993), Surveys in Social Research (3rd edn.), London: UCL Press.

Deng, F., 1997, "Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Sudan", Preventive Diplomacy Series, no. 1, Durban: ACCORD

Ebert et al., (1995), keeping the peace, outside and in: Argentina's UN missions, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press

Fetherston, A.B., (1994) Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping, Palgrave Macmillan,(52) 4: 723-740.

Fisher, Ronald J. 1995. "Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: A Review and an Analysis." Pp. 39-59 in Vasquez et al. (eds.), Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Franke K.R. (2009) Psychological intervention with military personnel in Rwanda. Mil Med.; 163:559–63.

Friedrich Ebert Stiftunget al. (1995), Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia: April 1992 – March 1995, December, Sweden Life and Peace Institute and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with the Lessons-Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1995.

Ghali, Boutros-Boutros, (1994)."An Agenda for Development". Report of the Secretary General Accessed February 27th 2010 URL

Goodhand, Jonathan and Hulme, David (1999). "From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-Building in the New World Disorder". Third World Quarterly Vol. 20, No.1
Hand Book for Beginning Researchers, Second Edition, Makerere University, Kampala

Hartnack W. (2005) UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3(2): 89–122

Healy Jonathan (2009) Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict." Political Science Quarterly 108:2

Hemmer Boyle (2012) American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal, Campaign speech, Pabst Theater, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University

Herrberg Antje, Gunduz Canan and Davis Laura, (2009), Engaging the EU in Mediation and Dialogue: Reflections and Recommendations May 8

Hoffman, Ronald, and Peter J. Albert (1986) Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1783. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, American Journal of Political Science 47(4): 597–611

http://globalpolicy.org/reforms/initiatives/ghali/1994/0506dvelopment
http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14019208

https: //www.britannica.com

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56176 Wednesday 26 August 2015, South Sudan's Kiir to sign peace agreement

https://en.m.wikipedia.org

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan

https://www.vocabulary.com Dictionary

Human Rights Watch (2016), South Sudan: Army Abuses Spread West, 6 March 2016.

Hume Michal (1994) UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate." International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series

International Crisis Group. (2014). South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.

Jok Harry (2011) Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In Handbook of Political Science, eds. F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. Vol. VII. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(2): 360–89

Kasaija Philip Apuli (2015), African Security volume 8, issue 2 Journal home page(published on 9 th June 2015)

Kathuri, N. J., & Pals, E. (1993), Introduction to education research. Njoro: Egerton University

Kleiboer, Marieke(1996), "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation."

Klingebiel et al. 2008), Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation."The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 37:4: 709-734

Kombo, D.K. and Tromp, D.L.A, (2000) Proposal and Thesis Writing -An Introduction. Nairobi: Pauline Publications.

Kosso, Peter (2011), A Summary of Scientific Method. Springer.p. 9.

Kressel, Andy Knight (2009) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peace building in Africa: An Overview', African Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2008), pp.

Kydd, Andrew (2003) "Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility and Mediation."

Kydd, Andrew. 2006. "When Can Mediators Build Trust?" American Political Science Review 100(3):449-462.

Lacher Rugeri (2013) 'Illiberal Peace building in Angola', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 287–314

Leifman, Howard et. al., (2009) Vault's Guide to Resumes, Cover Letters, and Interviews (New York: Vault.com.

Lobiondo-Wood, G & Haber, J (1998) Nursing Research; 4thedition. St Louis: Cv Mosby.

Lomodong Charles (2016) The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) South Sudan's Risky Political Impasse; Juba, 14 April 2016.

Mahboub Maalim(9 May 2013),IGAD's Role in Stability and Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa www.chathamhouse.org(https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/.../Africa/090513summary.pd...May 9, 2013)

Marino, S. C. (1999). Dimensions of Intra-Inter State Conflicts: a Comparative Study. Advanced Program in Conflict Resolution Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Uppsala University.

Mark Katz, "The Future of Superpower Conflict Resolution in the Third World," in Soviet-American Conflict Resolution in the Third World, ed. Mark Katz (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

Menkhaus, K., (1996) International peace building and the dynamics of local and national reconciliation in Somalia, International Peacekeeping, 3:1, pp.42-67

Mohammad NaqibIshan Jan, (2008) The Role of Mediation in the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, International Islamic University Malaysianaqib@iiu.edu.my

Møller, B. (2009) Africa's Sub-Regional Organisations: Seamless Web or Patchwork? Crisis States Working Paper, Series 2, 56, London: CSRC, London School of Economics.

Møller, B. (2009), The African Union as Security Actor: African Solutions to African Problems? Crisis States Working Paper, Series 2, 57, London: CSRC, London School of Economics

Mugenda Olive. M and Mugenda Abel. G (1999), Research Methods; Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches Nairobi, Acts Press

Mutanda Darlington (2013), The art of mediation in resolving African conflicts: lessons for Zimbabwe and Africa, Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research, Vol. 5 Iss: 3, pp.130 – 146

Mutunzi kitunzi (2013 pg. 17). Developing Research Proposal.: writing acceptable /good research proposals lesson 5 Feb, 20

Nachmais, Chava Frankfort; Nachmais, David. (2008) Research

Nathan Laurie (2007) Mediation in African conflicts: The gap between mandate and capacity (African Retreat, 29/3/2007)

Nathan Laurie (2010), The process of international mediation: An analysis of the determinants of successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Australian Journal of Political Science

Nathan Laurie (2010), Towards A New Era In International Mediation

Nathan Laurie (2010) The Peacemaking Effectiveness Of Regional Organisations; Crisis States Research Centre, Global and Regional Axes of Conflict; Working Paper no. 81, Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2

Nathan, L., 1999,"When Push Comes to Shove: The Failure of International Mediation in African Civil Wars", Track Two, vol. 8, no. 2, Centre for Conflict Resolution, November

Nathan, L., 2005, 'Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise', Discussion Paper 10, CSRC

Nathan, L., 2006, "No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement", Working Paper, series 2, no. 5, Crisis States Research Centre, September

Ndunge Ngunia Judith, (2014), an assessment of IGAD's role in conflict management in South Sudan (2011-2013), September.

Ngoma P., (2004) The psychodynamic processes related to the involvement in peacekeeping missions: Experience of Slovenian police officers. Journal of Criminal Justice and Security. 4:444–62.

Nicholas Brealey, 2002) Small and Far Between: Peacekeeping Economies in South Sudan, Journal of Intervention and State building 9(3): 353–371

Mulugeta Birhanu, (2016) evaluating the challenges of IGAD-led peace process of south Sudan Addis Ababa, October, center for African and oriental studies.

Oso, Willis Yuko and Onen, David (2009) A General Guide to Writing Research and Report. A Perry Mars (2001) Ethnic Politics, Mediation, and Conflict Resolution: The Guyana Experience: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 3, Special Issue on Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes (May, 2001), pp. 353-372, Sage Publications, Ltd.

Polit, D. and Hungler, B. (1999) Nursing Research: Principle and Method, 6th ed.; Philadelphia: Lippincott Company, (1999), P.P. 416-417

R.P Barston (2006) Modern Diplomacy 3rd edition: London,

Longman

Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. "Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management." World Politics 58(2):207–41.

Romano Father (1998), Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace (New York, United Nations, Second Edition, Sales Publication E.95.1.15

Smith and Stam's (2003), The construct validity of the tripartite classification of attitudes. Journal of Marketing Research 16, 88–95

Sorbo, G.M. (2014). Return to war in South Sudan. Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre, Policy Brief.

South Sudan News Agency (SSNA), November 15, 2014, IGAD-led peace talks are not convincing,"

South Sudan Protection Cluster (2014), Protection Trends Analysis. Norwegian Refugee Council, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Protection Cluster.

Stedman, S.J., 1991, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980, Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner

Stewart, D.W. and Shamdasani, P.N. (1990) Focus Groups: Theory and Practices. Sage, UK.

Sudan Tribune (2014) Machar decries Juba's comments on power-sharing deal, November 13.

Tashakkori, A and Teddlie, C. (1998), Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative & Quantitative Approaches, Sage

Terris, Lesley and ZeevMaoz, (2005) Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 5 (Sep., 2005), pp. 563-583

Tewodros, M. (2015), Causes, Consequences and Role of External Actors in the Current South Sudan Conflict. Addis Ababa University.

Touval, Saadia (1975) Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1(1):51–69.

United Nations (UN), 1945, p. 3

Wall, James A., and Lynn, Ann (1993), 'Mediation: A Current Review", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37: 1, 160-194.

Wamaitha Mugo Judy, (2016) an analysis of mediation as a tool in conflict resolution in Africa: a case study of mediation process in South Sudan between December 2013-march 2015.

Wangusa, Timothy (2007): Essentials of research Methods in Human and Social Sciences. Kampala: Bow and Arrow Publishers Ltd.

Website of the Delhi Mediation Centre www.delhimediationcentre.gov.in Accessed on: March 8, 2011

Wells, (2016) ''Those who could Not Run Died" Civilian Perspectives on the Conflict in South Sudan, Center for Civilians in Conflict, United States of America

Willis Yuko Oso and David Onen (2009), Writing Research Proposal and Report, Jomo Kenyatta Foundation Nairobi Kenya

www.dictionary.com

www.longman.com /dictionaries

www.Oxford dictionaries.com

www.oxforddictionaries.com

Yamane, Taro. (1967), Statistics, An Introductory Analysis, 2nd Ed., New York: Harper and Row.

Young, Oran R. (1967), The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, William (2000) 'Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond', in Paul C. Stern et al., International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 225-250.

APPENDICES

NKUMBA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

June, 2018

RE: REQUEST TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE BELOW

Dear respondent,

My name is **Watera Racheal** a student of Nkumba University pursuing a Master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy, conducting a research under the topic **"ASSESSMENT OF CHALLENGES TO IGAD'S PEACE MEDIATION IN SOUTH SUDAN .**
A CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT (2011 - 2016)".

The information obtained here will strictly be confidential. The answers to these questions will be used for research purpose and may be an important input in prescribing policies to improve the mediation in Africa. This is to request you to kindly complete the attached questionnaire.

Thank you so much

Signed

……………………………….

Watera Racheal

Candidate

	Section A: Respondents' personal variables	
	Tick/ fill against the alternative you most agree with	
A1.	What is your gender or sex?	Male …………….. Female……............
A2	In which age bracket do you belong?	1. 18-30…….. 2. 31-40…….. 3. 41-50…….. 4. 51-60…….. 5. 61+………..
A3	What is your current marital status?	1. Married……… 2. Single………. 3. Divorced…….. 4. Widowed……
A4.	Your highest education level attained	1. Certificate…….. 2. Diploma……… 3. Bachelors…… 4. Masters………. 5. Doctorate……..
A5.	What is your occupation/Designation in government?	Political leader………………... Bureaucrat…………………...... None…………………………...
A8	Designation outside of government	………………………………..

Note: For sections B, C and D choose from the scale given here; SD= Strongly Disagreed,

D= Disagreed, NS=Not Sure, A=Agree and SA= Strongly Agree

Section B: Factors that influence Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

Factors that influence IGAD mediation process in south Sudan

No.	Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA
1	Parties to the conflict					
2	Mediation mandates					
3	Nature of IGAD mediation					
4	IGAD's wider Mandate					
5	IGAD member states					
6	African Union					
7	IGAD donor reliance					
8	IGAD PLUS					
9	United Nations					
10	European Union					
11	Troika and the US					
12	China					
13	Grass ownership of the conflict					
14	South Sudan Environment					
15	Cold war legacy					

Section C: The Challenges to the IGAD Mediation Capacity of in South Sudan Conflict.

	Challenges to the IGAD Mediation Capacity					
No.	Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA
1.	Regional rivalries and power struggles					
2.	The rivalry between Salvar Kiir and Riek Machar makes negotiations hard					
3.	There are off-shoots of fighting groups which hamper negotiation					
4.	Centralisation of decision-making at the Heads of State level					
5.	Lack of institutionalization within IGAD					
6.	Challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites					
7.	Insufficient Expertise in Mediation					
8.	Inadequate Institutional Support for Mediators					
9.	No Institutional Memory and Learning					
10.	No Viable Concept of Mediation					

Section D: The strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in South Sudan

	Strategies					
No.	Statement	SD	D	NS	A	SA
1.	Endless calls for cessation of hostilities would foster end to fighting					
2.	The use of trade sanctions by IGAD on the government of South Sudan can force the fighting groups to for peace					
3.	Arms embargo motivates the sides involved in fighting to settle for peace negotiations					
4.	Institutionalization of mediation units can easily end fighting					
5.	Preparation of mediation actions plans to strengthen IGAD's capabilities and participation in peace building in South Sudan					
6	Strengthening existing peace agreements which have been signed with attempts restore peace and stability to the country					
7	Creation of dedicated Mediation Units The mediation units would have two primary functions to end the conflicts that is conflict prevention and conflict resolution					

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE

<u>**REQUEST TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS**</u>

Dear respondent,

You are requested to provide relevant responses to the questions stated here during the interview

1. What factors have influenced mediation capacity of IGAD in South Sudan conflict?
    (a)How have the internal factors influenced mediation capacity of IGAD?
    (b) How have the external factors influenced mediation capacity of IGAD?

2. Has IGAD had any impact as a mediator in South Sudan conflict? How?
    b) What criticisms does it get as a mediator?

3. Do you think that mediation in South Sudan was beyond IGAD's capacity?

4. What factors hinder IGAD's ability to deliver its peacemaking mandate in South Sudan Conflict?

5. Do you think IGAD has a wide mandate? b) How does IGAD manage to achieve its mandate? c) Which of its mandates has it well achieved, why?

6. Is IGAD supported by any other international community? Who funds IGAD?

7. Do you think IGAD has been able to achieve its peacemaking mandate in south Sudan? If yes, why and how, if yes what has helped IGAD to achieve it? If No, what has hindered IGAD from fulfilling its mandate?

8. What strategies has it imposed so far to improve its mediation capacity?

9. What Strategies that can be adopted in improving peace mediation capacity of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development?

Thank you for you for the assistance

APPENDIX 3: MAP OF SOUTH SUDAN

Source: map no 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS
October 2011

APPENDIX 4: MAP OF IGAD REGION

APPENDIX 5: BUDGET LINE AND TIME LINE/RESEARCH WORK PLAN

i) Budget Estimates

No	Items	Quantity	Unit cost	Amount
1	Transport to and from the field	06	30,000	180,000
2	Typing and printing	10 copies	15,000	150,000
3	Stationery	04 reams	15,000	60,000
4	Binding	04 copies	20,000	80,000
5	Data collection	02 research assistants	250,000	500,000
6	Up keep	03	50,000	150,000
8	Communication	Airtime and internet charges	-	100,000
9	contingency			250,000
	Ground Total			**1,470,000/=**

ii) Research work plan

Period	Activities	Resources	Persons involved
March 2018	Submission of the research topic	**Scholastic materials**	Researcher and supervisor
April - June 2018	Writing of the research proposal	**Scholastic materials**	Researcher and supervisor
June 2018	Approval of the research proposal	**Scholastic materials**	The supervisor
July 2018	Data collection	**Scholastic materials**	Researcher and Respondents
July-August 2018	Submission of the research report for corrections	**Scholastic materials**	Researcher and supervisor

APPENDIX 6: DOCUMENT CHECKLIST

1.   Preliminary pages

☐ Declaration

☐ Dedication

☐ Acknowledgement

☐ Table of contents

☐ List of Tables

☐ List of Acronyms

☐ Definition of operation terms used.

2. Chapter One: Background of the study

☐ Overview

☐ Background of the study

☐ Problem statement

☐ General objective

☐ Study objectives

☐ Research questions

☐ Scope of the study

☐ Purpose of the study

☐ Significance of the study

3. **Chapter Two: Literature Review**

☐   Introduction

☐   Objective one: To analyze the factors that influence Inter-governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

☐   Objective Two: To assess the challenge to Inter-governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan.

☐   Objective Three: To examine the Strategies that can be adopted by IGAD in improving peace mediation capacity in South Sudan.

☐   Conceptual Framework

4. **Chapter Three: Methodology**

☐   Introduction

☐   Research design

☐   Population of the study/study population

☐   Study site

☐   Sampling Methods and techniques

☐   Sample size determination

☐   Data collection methods

☐   Data quality control

☐ Data collection and processing

☐ Data analysis

☐ Ethical considerations

☐ Limitations and delimitations of the study

5. Chapter Four: Data Presentation and Interpretation of findings

☐ Introduction

☐ Respondent's personal variables

☐ Objective One: To analyze the factors that influence Inter-governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

☐ Objective Two: To assess the challenge to Inter-governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan.

☐ Objective three: To examine the Strategies that can be adopted by IGAD in improving peace mediation capacity in South Sudan.

6. Chapter Five: Discussion of Finding

☐ Objective One: To analyze the factors that influence Inter-governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

☐ Objective Two: To assess the challenge to Inter-governmental Authority on Development IGAD peace mediation in South Sudan.

☐ Objective Three: To examine the Strategies that can be adopted by IGAD in improving peace mediation capacity in South Sudan.

7. Chapter Six: Summary, conclusion, recommendation and area for further study.

☐ Objective one: To analyze the factors that influence Inter-governmental Authority on Development peace mediation process in South Sudan

☐ Objective Two: To assess the challenge to Inter-governmental Authority on Development peace mediation in South Sudan.

☐ Objective three: To examine the Strategies that can be adopted by IGAD in improving peace mediation capacity in South Sudan.

8. References

☐ References

9. Appendices

☐ Appendix 1: Questionnaire

☐ Appendix 2: Interview guide

☐ Appendix 3: Map of South Sudan

☐ Appendix 4: Map of IGAD

☐ Appendix 5: Budget line and Research work plan

☐ Appendix 6: Document checklist

10. Font Size
☐ Font 12

11. Paragraphs
☐