Rational Government: The Hazards of Untempered Political Power and the Remedial Strategies for Uganda

Abstract

The arguments in this book derive from the risks of putting up with an untempered government. In this connection, Chapter One deals with philosophical views regarding the type of government that is necessary for the construction of a well organised, orderly, or civilised society in which the people are free and can pursue and obtain happiness. Specifically, the Chapter contains a discussion on Thomas Hobbes’ and Robert Filmer’s intellectual defences and prescriptions for an absolute, unlimited, and untempered exercise of governmental power. It also delves into John Locke and Rousseau’s theses on the need to moderate or to temper governmental power. Chapter Two deals with self-interest and explains why it is man’s seminal condition for rational action. In the Chapter, it is argued that rationality is a relative fact that guides people’s actions variably, and that if not moderated, it may lead a government to act in its own interest in lieu of the interest of the public. In this Chapter, it is further contended that self-interest is generated by love. It is also argued in the Chapter that selflessness is a flagrant fallacy. Chapter Three is dedicated to the historical illustrations of the disorders, misdeeds, and the ramifications of untempered governments that have obtained in Uganda since independence. In Chapter Four, various constructions of politics are rejected on the premise that they may have been responsible for the misapplication of politics in Uganda, including; the popularly held conception that is imputed to Idi Amin that ‘politics is a dirty game’, and Museveni’s idea that politics is the science of managing a society, among other conceptions. In Chapter Five, the non-cynical and sound concept of politics is explained, that is to say, the view of this book that politics is “any activity that leads to the moderation of all actors within a State for the general public good.” Chapter Six is dedicated to the corruption discourse; and contrary to the conventional view, it is argued in the Chapter that corruption in government is extant because officials who engage in it are not only patriotic, but also rational people who love themselves, understandably, more than they love others, and not because they are less patriotic as conventional wisdom holds. In the Chapter, it is argued that patriotism is first, the love for self then the love for others and not the other way round. The thesis that theft of public funds leads to economic development if the funds are invested in the economy is rejected. In the alternative, it is explained that such analysis is non-pragmatic and may lead to economic collapse and State failure. Further, it is argued in the Chapter that nepotism, which is a form of corruption undercuts effective accountability, and finally in the Chapter, the idea that corruption in Uganda persists because of a deficiency of political will is rejected. Chapter Seven is about the concept of patriotism and its general benefit to a State. It is argued in the Chapter that a patriotic person is selfish and the idea that Uganda’s ‘liberators’ who resisted Amin, Obote, and Lutwa’s ‘bad governance’ did so out of selflessness, is countered. In the alternative, it is explained that their principal motivation was their self-interest and that the resulting benefits Ugandans enjoy are just incidental. In the Chapter, it is also shown that a patriotic person can be one who supports a government or one who resists it, depending on whether such resistance or support causes the attainment of the public good generally. In Chapter Eight, the idea of sovereignty, its historical development, and mutation over time is explained and traced. In this context, the classical sovereignty, which was claimed by tyrannical kings and their divine right to rule without limit, is discussed. The Chapter traces how that changed and how kings lost the right to rule absolutely. It also contains a discussion on how parliament claimed the sovereignty from kings, and how the people ended up being the sovereign. In Chapter Nine, the author discusses the idea of civil- military relations in which he shows why the military, despite being more powerful than civil institutions must be subservient to civil authority. The Chapter contains an explanation of why the military should not be represented in parliament or serving military officers appointed to head civil institutions, and why the army should not be used to stop peaceful demonstrations. Chapter Ten is about the philosophical theories of separation of powers and checks and balances. It deals with the logic of separating the functions and powers of government, the dangers that attend the separation, and the correctional purpose of checks and balances. Chapter Eleven is dedicated to the executive arm of government. It is shown in the Chapter that the executive in Uganda exercises intrusive power, which makes him a tyrant. The role of party caucusing in creating an imperial president or a dictatorial executive is discussed. It is also explained that it is undemocratic for a vice president to be senior to a speaker of parliament and a chief justice in the hierarchical order. In the Chapter, the concept of presidential immunity, which derives from the doctrine of sovereign immunity, although internationally practiced, is intellectually challenged. Chapter Twelve is dedicated to the presidential term limits debate. The arguments for and against term limits are considered, and a conclusion is held that term limits are necessary in some societies in which electoral democracy is crudely applied. In Chapter Thirteen, it is explained that the judiciary in Uganda lacks judicial legitimacy, is unaccountable, and unindependent. It is argued in the Chapter that judicial officers do not derive their power from the people, although Article 126 of the Constitution assumes so. The chapter calls for a popular election of judges in order to enable the judiciary to legitimately exercise judicial power, and to be accountable to the people and independent of the executive. In Chapter Fourteen, it is explained that the legislature is by normative and structural weakness, not independent. Specifically, it is argued that a combination of party caucus and the unicameral structure of the legislature in Uganda is responsible for its weakness, and recommendations to that effect are furnished. A case is made for internal checks and balances within the legislature. Chapter Twelve is dedicated to the discourse on electoral democracy in Uganda. In the Chapter, the dogma of universal adult suffrage is contested, and its ruinous effect on governance in emerging democracies and civilising states like Uganda is explained. In the Chapter, the appointment of persons to the Electoral Commission by the executive is contested. The possibility of having an ‘independent’ commission is also contested in this Chapter. In the alternative, it is shown that it is possible to have a “balanced” electoral body. It is also argued that it is possible and necessary for an incumbent president to resign before seeking re-election as a way of ensuring fair elections.