This paper inquired into whether or not the incumbent Constitution of Uganda contains sufficient guardrails to stymie infringement upon the independence of the Director of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter “the DPP”) in Uganda. The paper employed a qualitative approach and relied upon the text analysis method of inquiry. It, therefore, reviewed the text of the incumbent Constitution as to the independence of the DPP. It also gleaned the literature regarding a constitutional climate that helps or hurts the independence of public prosecutors, to fortify the findings of the inquiry. The paper determined that de jure, the Constitution provides for the independence of the DPP, but also ascertained that de facto, the DPP is not independent due to a flawed mechanism of the DPP’s appointment, the absence of a life tenure or a single-term tenure for the DPP, and the fact that the DPP can be removed or re-appointed by the unilateral will of the president. The paper offers proposals for constitutional reform to strengthen the independence of the Office of the DPP in Uganda including that the Parliament of Uganda should amend the Constitution to provide for the appointment of the DPP by a body of prosecutors or lawyers in lieu of politicians. Or the DPP, upon appointment by the President should serve a fixed term that is not renewable. The paper also recommends that the DPP should only take over the prosecution of a criminal case he or she did not institute, with the concurring will and consent of an individual or entity that initiated it, and only so to continue the case to its logical conclusion.