Abstract:
This book is a result of a study carried out as part of the author’s doctoral research. It contains an assessment of intelligence oversight mechanisms and institutions in a democratic context. Accordingly, the book contains a critical examination of the environment within which Uganda’s intelligence services conduct their trade, that is to say, whether or not the constitutional legal and institutional frameworks are robust to constrain them to conform to the democratic norms and principles, as they execute their noble function towards the protection of the state.
The book is about intelligence management with a primary focus on intelligence oversight. The emphasis is on the challenges of holding to account those who operate in an area of activity where secrecy and discretion constitute vital considerations.
The book opens with a definition of key terms and it has seven chapters. Chapter one is on the intelligence oversight dilemmas for emerging democracies. Chapter two presents the discourses and perspectives on intelligence oversight, bringing out the contributions, limitations, differences and gaps in the available knowledge. Chapter three presents the historical and philosophical underpinnings of intelligence oversight. The Chapter describes the philosophical issues related to intelligence and intelligence oversight, as well as the historical aspects of the same variables.
Chapters -four, five, and six, present aspects that were uncovered by the study. These three chapters reveal the thoughts and perceptions from individual interviews, and a documentary review concerning intelligence oversight and the promotion of democracy in Uganda. As is typical of qualitative research, extensive samples of quotations from participants are included in the book to bring to the reader the real experiences from those living it but at the risk of sounding repetitive.
Chapter four, therefore, indicates that; despite the bad management history of intelligence services in Uganda, there are some positive changes that have taken place since 1987. However, the reforms are inadequate and their sustainability may be doubtable unless there are strategic interventions. Further, the inadequacy of the reforms indicates that the understanding of democratic oversight of intelligence services is still very low among the oversight bodies and the general public in Uganda. The legal framework regulating the services has served a while, but it needs to be amended to accommodate the necessary contemporary democratic credentials.
Chapter five is dedicated to the discussion regarding the need for certain institutions and bodies to perform oversight of the intelligence services in Uganda. These include; the Agency level or the intelligence services internal administration; the executive authority; the parliament through committees; the judiciary, which performs indirect oversight through judicial review; and other statutory bodies like the PPDA, IG, and the UHRC. The Chapter also contains revelations that the mechanisms employed by these bodies are limited by the lack of clear legislation on intelligence oversight.
In Chapter Six, it is argued that much as there are general oversight bodies, there are no specific intelligence oversight institutions in Uganda. The general oversight institutions that oversee executive departments are assumed to be performing intelligence oversight. Be that as it may, the author argues that such general oversight is not effective, and calls for the need to specify in the prevailing intelligence legal regime an outline of effective intelligence oversight. The Chapter also suggests that it is also important to train the present oversight institutions on what is expected of them and to encourage dialogue between intelligence services and oversight institutions. Lastly, in Chapter Seven, a policy brief is presented, as a general recommendation to amend the intelligence legislation to strengthen oversight of intelligence services in Uganda.